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ABSTRACT
Modeling of evolution is becoming increasingly important in biological and social systems. The
idea of evolution presents a reasonable and convincible perspective to the problem of long term com-
petition between different species or populations in nature. Evolutionary game theory has seen tremen-
dous achievements and it exhibits good performance in modeling competition of species or populations.
However, there remain many challenges, and the underlying scientific mechanism of competition is
full of uncertainties. Bringing tools of math-biology and statistics to modeling the competitive phe-
nomenons provides a way of throwing off the veil of nature to reveal itself to the world.
In this thesis, we study the spatial effects on evolution in game models numerically and theoreti-
cally, optimality and stability of symmetric evolutionary game and its applications to genetic selection
and social network, and parameter estimation in game theoretic modeling of the biological and social
systems. More precisely, we categorize the types of nonlinear games and investigate the simulation
study of spatial effects on the evolution of cooperation in a nonlinear yeast game. We also incorporate
the spatial diffusion effects in the replicator dynamics of nonlinear game models, and prove the asymp-
totic behavior of the solution to the corresponding adapted replicator diffusion equation. Furthermore,
we apply the statistical techniques and methodologies to solve the inverse problem in evolutionary
game dynamics, that is, the NB mixture model and Markov random field model incorporating replica-
tor equations are built where penalized approximated negative log-likelihood method with generalized
smoothing approach and Besag pseudo-likelihood method are implemented to facilitate the estimation
and inference of model parameters. Finally, the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for
symmetric evolutionary games is explored, and new proofs and computational methods are provided.
And the symmetric evolutionary game is applied to model the evolution of a population over a social
network, then several different types of equilibrium states corresponding to social cliques are analyzed
and a set of conditions for their stabilities are proved.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory is an important and comprehensive way to look at the world. It arises
whenever the fitness of an individual is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of others
in the population. And in evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation is an essential differential
equation that describes frequency-dependent selection among a fixed number of species or strategies.
Evolutionary game theory and ecology are linked via the equivalence between the replicator equation
and Lotka-Volterra equation of ecological systems. The main ingredients of evolutionary game theory
are reproduction, selection and spatial movement. And population is the fundamental basis of every
evolution. Individuals, genes, or ideas change over time, and population evolve.
1.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
1.1.1 Evolutionary Theory
The original formulation of evolutionary theory dealt with the genetic evolution of the origin and
adaptation of the species in nature. But more recently the idea of evolution has expanded to all fields
including biology and related disciplines of the life science. Wherever information reproduces, there is
evolution. Mutations are caused by errors in information transfer, resulting in different types of mes-
sages. Selection among types emerges when some messages reproduce faster than others. Mutation and
selection make evolution. Mutation and selection can be described by a lot of mathematical equations
and statistical models. Therefore evolution has become a theory based on mathematics and statistics.
Evolutionary theory presents the principles according to which life has evolved and continues to
evolve. The study of evolution has grown enormously since the 1950s. It is driven by the quest to
understand the world we live in and the stuff we are made of. All observation of a living system could
ultimately be interpreted in the context of its evolution. Darwin’s evolutionary theory has provided
2a general guideline or principle for how life is developed and evolved, but the question now is that
can we add bricks to build a solid foundation for it, in other words, can we make our contribution to
the sophisticated system of mathematical equations and statistical models to support, explain, or even
extend the evolutionary theory.
1.1.2 Game Theory
Game theory was established by John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern. They wished to build
a mathematical theory, for example, using quantitative models of competition and cooperation between
the decision makers, to study human behavior in strategic and economic decisions. Later John Nash
participated and created a simple but important concept in game theory, which is now called Nash
equilibrium. Another type of equilibrium named evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is very similar to
Nash equilibrium. Both concepts are important for game theory. William Hamilton and Robert Trivers
were among the first to use game theoretical ideas in biology. John Maynard Smith and George Price
introduced game theory to evolutionary biology and population thinking to game theory. The field of
evolutionary game theory was also founded by the work of Peter Taylor, Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund
and other scientists.
Traditional game theory typically analyzes an interaction between two players and deals with the
problem, for example, how each player can maximize her or his payoff in a game given that each player
do not know what the other player do. There are four basic elements in a game: players, information,
strategies and payoffs. And the concept of rationality are usually assumed in a game for the individ-
uals come to play. However, evolutionary game theory does not necessarily reply on rationality. It
considers a population of players interacting in a game. Individuals have fixed strategies and interact
randomly with each other. Payoff is then interpreted as fitness, and success in the game is translated into
reproductive success. Strategies that do well reproduce faster. This is straightforward natural selection.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
In this thesis, we bridge the areas of evolutionary theory, game theory with population dynamics,
and mathematical and statistical modeling in biological and life science systems. The overarching
3goal of the research is to study the spatial effects on evolution of models, optimality and stability
of symmetric game and its applications, and parameter estimation in game theoretic modeling of the
biological and social systems. We categorize the types of nonlinear games and investigate the effect
of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation in a nonlinear yeast game via simulation studies.
We also incorporate the spatial diffusion term in the replicator dynamics of nonlinear game to obtain
the adapted replicator diffusion equation, and prove the asymptotic behavior of the solution to this
adapted parabolic equation. Furthermore, we apply the statistical techniques and methodologies to
solve the inverse problem in evolutionary game dynamics, that is, the NB mixture model and Markov
random field model incorporating replicator dynamics are built where penalized approximated negative
log-likelihood method with generalized smoothing approach and Besag pseudo-likelihood method are
implemented to facilitate the estimation and inference of model parameters. Finally, the theory for
obtaining optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evolutionary games is explored, and new proofs
and computational methods are provided. Also the symmetric evolutionary game is applied to model
the evolution of a population over a social network, and several different types of equilibrium states
corresponding to social cliques are analyzed with a set of conditions for their stabilities proved.
The outline of the thesis is the following. First of all, in Chapter 2, we derive the conditions to dis-
tinguish several types of nonlinear games, and investigate the effect of spatial structure on the evolution
of cooperation in the nonlinear yeast game computationally. In Chapter 3, we study the equivalent con-
ditions to evolutionarily stable strategies in general nonlinear games, and prove the long term behavior
of the solution to the replicator diffusion equation adapted from the replicator dynamics in nonlinear
games. We then investigate the famous inverse problem by using statistical models and techniques in
Chapter 4 and 5. In particular, in Chapter 4 we establish a NB mixture model with generalized smooth-
ing approach to study the interaction among various OTUs in microbial communities, which is expected
to be useful for a variety of evolutionary game studies. In Chapter 6, we review the theory for obtaining
optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evolutionary games, and provide new proofs and compu-
tational methods, which is applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of
genetic selection games. In Chapter 7, the symmetric evolutionary game is defined over a social net-
work, and the correspondence between equilibrium states and social cliques are proved. Finally we sum
up and conclude in Chapter 8.
4CHAPTER 2. 2D YEAST COOPERATION GAME
A paper to be submitted
Min Wang, Yuanyuan Huang, Zhijun Wu
Abstract
Evolutionary game theory plays an important role in cooperation problem of evolutionary biol-
ogy, and there are mainly two games that scientists are enamored by in recent decades: the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and the Snowdrift Game. Numerous experimental studies have demonstrated the distinct evo-
lutionary dynamics of cooperative behavior in these two linear games from intriguing explorations. We
generalize the study on these two simple linear games to the nonlinear games, and investigate the effect
of spatial structure on evolution of cooperation computationally. We apply the numerical procedure to
a specific nonlinear game raised by Gore et al. who studied the coexistence of wildtype cooperator
strain and mutant cheater strain in a yeast system. Along with the simulation procedure, we establish
the dynamic difference equations for the simulation study which boil down to replicator equations un-
der certain conditions. Finally we analyze the conditions for two circumstances of invasion which are
consistent with the simulation studies. We expect that the proposed analysis and conclusions will be
widely applied to a variety of nonlinear games.
2.1 Introduction
The phenomenon of cooperative interactions among microbial species has attracted scientists intu-
itively over several decades. A lot of experimental results have proved the persistence of cooperation
and coexistence which is closely related with spatial scales in the competition environment. Kerr, Riley,
Feldman and Bohannan (2002) experimentally tested the biodiversity of colicin-producing strain (C),
5sensitive strain (S) and resistant strain (R) in a C-S-R model, and proposed that these three strains with
non-hierarchical relationship would coexist when dispersal and interaction were local but the diversity
was rapidly lost when dispersal and interaction occurred over large spatial scales in (10). Griffin, West
and Buckling (2004) explored the interaction between relatedness and the spatial scale of competition
and found that the scale competition was of particular importance to the evolution of cooperation in
microorganisms (6).
The exact relationship between the coexistence and the spatial scale has also been numerically
verified by immense simulations. Nowak (1992) mentioned that the generated spatial structure within
populations may often be crucial for the evolution of cooperation in (12). The evolvement of mutualism
that required spatial structure in competitive interactions was established by Doebeli and Knowlton (3).
Durrett (1997) analyzed the stability of the spatially structured population given set of parameters and
concluded that coexistence was easily achievable in a spatially explicit system (4). However Hauert
and Doebeli (2004) showed the property that spatial structure promoted the evolution of cooperation in
Prisoner’s Dilemma did not work for Snowdrift Game anymore and instead the spatial structure reduced
the proportion of cooperators in (8).
We introduce a yeast game Gore et al. proposed at 2009. They manipulated the microbial interac-
tions in models of cooperation and competition between two yeast strains. One type of yeast was the
wild-type cooperator who produced invertase, hydrolyzed sucrose and released the glucose and fruc-
tose, of which vast majority diffused away and the rest small proportion was imported into the cell.
The other type was the mutant cheater that did not produce invertase but instead took advantage of and
invaded a population of wild-type cooperator cells. Gore et al. fitted the experiment results with the
nonlinear defector’s payoff PD and cooperator’s payoff PC . And both payoff functions were defined
with respect to the frequencies of cooperators, and changed over a set of parameters including the glu-
cose and histidine concentrations. Also they found that the competition was Prisoner’s Dilemma when
the concentration level of the histidine was low and that of the glucose was high, and the game switched
to Snowdrift Game if the concentration of histidine was high and that of glucose was low. Based on
these, we examined the mathematical properties of this model with varying experimental parameters in
(9). We also simulated the growths of the yeast trains and compared them with the experimental results.
Finally the equilibrium states of the system were computed and analyzed.
6In all of the two-strategy games with possible numerical simulations, scientists have considered the
two most famous ones: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift Game, and these two games are usually
formulated in linear or matrix forms since the payoff functions of two strategies are assumed to be
linear functions of the frequencies or equivalently functions of matrix-multiplied-vector forms. Here
the generalization of these two games are introduced and defined in the sense that the payoff functions
can be explicitly expressed by nonlinear functions of frequencies and the relationship between the two
strategies could be quantified. From the nonlinear payoff functions, we analyze the mechanism of
cooperation on a popular two dimensional lattice and experimentally simulate the interactions among
individuals on the lattice. In the simulations, we gradually increase the neighborhood size of interaction
which is a control parameter and appropriately describes the spatial effects. Then from the simulated
investigations with corresponding neighborhood size, we sum up the conclusion that there is a strong
relationship between the strength of local cooperation and spatial parameter, and as the neighborhood
size increase, the frequency of cooperation is decreasing and eventually converges to the equilibrium
frequency that is observed in the experiment.
From the simulation study that evolution of cooperation is closely related with the spatial structure
and the convergence of the cooperation frequency to experimental equilibrium as interaction region
extends to the overall population, we are able to build corresponding theoretical equation to interpret
the underlying mechanism. It’s known that the general continuous form of the differential equation
associated with evolutionary game theory is the replicator dynamics equation. However the continuous
time and space involved in the derivative is a subtle issue when we formulate the simulation of discrete
process which is implemented from the idea of replicator equation. That is, all updates in the simulation
are applied at both sequential time points and randomized grids which characterize the temporal and
spatial discreteness. When we consider the changing interaction neighborhood, in other words, tun-
ing the spatial effect, it is equivalent to incorporate and change the spatial parameter in the simulated
process. So in order to set up the mathematical theory, it’s natural to modify the common replicator
equation which yields to a simulation-based replicator equation with the spatial parameter included.
Finally from the modified replicator equation, we analyze the mechanism of local cooperation and the
invasion conditions for single cooperator and single defector, which explain the numerical simulations
well.
7The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the yeast system and corre-
sponding game dynamics. In section 2.3, we describe the traditional linear games and particular simu-
lation explorations. Sections 2.4 generates the defined concept of traditional games to nonlinear games
and presents the interesting simulation study of 2D yeast game. In section 2.5 we propose the difference
equation to interpret the simulation and analyze the invasion conditions for two circumstances. Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Yeast System and the Nonlinear Payoffs
The interesting game between two strains—the wildtype cooperator strain (C) and the mutant
cheater or defector strain (D) in a yeast system is undertaken by Gore et al., and the strains are ma-
nipulated as a microbial interaction in ways which have leaded to microbial models of cooperation
and competition. As described in Figure 2.1, sucrose is often used as a carbon sources for yeast and
it is hydrolyzed by the enzyme invertase which creates glucose and fructose. The majority of these
monosaccharaides lose away before they are imported in to the cell which leads to cooperative sucrose
metabolism that is exploited by the mutant cheater strain. The main difference between the wildtype
cooperator strain and the mutant cheater strain is that the cooperator has an intact SUC2 gene which
encodes invertase used in the hydrolysis while the cheater lacks the SUC2 gene. Also cooperator is
histidine auxotroph since it has a defective HIS3 gene but the cheater possesses an intact HIS3 gene,
and this difference imposes an extra cost on the cooperator.
Figure 2.1 Design of the yeast experiment and sucrose metabolism in yeast.
8Gore et al. experimentally investigated the coexistence between the cooperator and cheater strains
and they found that the nature of interaction between these two strains or two strategies is the so-
called Snowdrift Game or Hawk-dove game. The Snowdrift Game derives its game from the potentially
cooperative interaction present when two drivers are trapped behind a pile of snow, and each driver must
decide whether to clear a path. In this game, the optimal strategy is the opposite of the opponents, that
is, cooperate when your opponent defects and defect when your opponent cooperates. The Snowdrift
Game is qualitatively different from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which all players have the incentive to
cheat regardless of the strategies being followed by the others. In the experiment, the growth rate is
measured as a function of glucose concentration and this function is actually concave and nonlinear.
Furthermore the capture efficiency , cost c and the power of α = 0.15 ± 0.01 are imposed onto the
benefit terms from the concavity of the observed benefits. Then the payoff functions of cheater or
defector and cooperator are approximately the following:
PD = [f(1− )]α
PC = [+ f(1− )]α − c,
where f is the fixation or frequency of cooperators.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.2 Theoretical and experimental summary of cooperation in yeast system. (a) A model of
cooperation with experimentally measured concave benefits. (b) Fraction of cooperators at
equilibrium as a function of glucose and histidine concentrations.
In Figure 2.2, we notice that varying the glucose concentration and histidine transforms the outcome
of competition, that is, the type of the yeast game changes with respect to different parameters. More
9specifically, the interaction between the cooperator and defector is a Mutual Beneficial game when
the histidine level is very high and the glucose concentration is almost zero, a Prisoner’s Dilemma
game when the histidine level is low and the glucose concentration is large and a Snowdrift Game
otherwise. There are different equilibrium states corresponding to different games. Furthermore, the
equilibrium states are also different even for the same type of game but different parameters. Therefore
the parameters are key elements in the nonlinear games and different subsets of full parameter space
may change both the type and equilibrium state of the games.
2.3 Linear Games and Simulations
We consider a two-strategy evolutionary game defined by the matrix A which is called the fitness
or payoff matrix in Table 2.1. Strategy C is also denoted as strategy 1 and strategy D corresponds to
strategy 2. Let S = {x ∈ R2 : x ≥ 0,
2∑
i=1
xi = 1} be the set of all mixed strategies. Denote the strategy
played by player 1 be x ∈ S and strategy played by player 2 be y ∈ S. The strategy for each player
could be a pure strategy type, i.e., ei for i ∈ {1, 2} where ei is the ith unit vector, or a mixed one with
no element equal 1.
Table 2.1 Payoff or fitness matrix for linear game with two strategies C and D
XXXXXXXXXXXXPlayer 1
Player 2
Strategy C Strategy D
Strategy C a b
Strategy D c d
For the pure strategy type games, there are four possible paired strategy choices for the players, that
is, (C, C), (C, D), (D, C) and (D, D), where the first coordinate is the strategy for player 1 and the second
for player 2. And the elements a, b, c and d in matrix A characterize the fitness of player 1 playing with
player 2 for those choices. That is, player 1 with strategy C gets payoff a when playing against play
2 with strategy C; player 1 with strategy C gets payoff b when playing against play 2 with strategy
D; player 1 with strategy D gets payoff c when playing against play 2 with strategy C; player 1 with
strategy D gets payoff d when playing against play 2 with strategy D. On the other hand, in the mixed
strategy type games, a mixed strategy s ∈ S can be interpreted in the sense that the player choose pure
strategy i with probability si for i ∈ {1, 2}. More specifically, if the pure strategy type game is repeated
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over large number of times, then the frequency for a typical player to play strategy i is si. Denote the
strategy profile for player 1 to be x and for player 2 be y, then the fitness for player 1 can be defined by
pi(x, y) = xTAy and for player 2 by pi(y, x) = yTAx where A =
 a b
c d
 . If c > a > d > b, then
this type of game is Prisoner’s Dilemma game. If c > a > b > d, then it becomes the Snowdrift Game.
It is assumed that all players tend to maximize their fitness in competitions of games. If the game is
Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player will choose pure strategy D over all the possible strategies to obtain the
optimal fitness. If the nature of the game is Snowdrift Game, both players will choose optimal strategy
x∗ = y∗ where x∗1 = y∗1 = (b − d)/(b + c − a − d), x∗2 = y∗2 = (c − a)/(b + c − a − d). In the
optimization process, there is a phenomenon which actually reveals the cooperation and competition of
two strategies. That is, strategy D always dominates strategy C in Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, in
Snowdrift Game, strategy C and strategy D are evenly matched and each takes over certain proportion
of the population.
We extend the case of two players to a population of competing individuals with two strategies, and
model the evolution of cooperation in the population. Denote the individuals choosing strategy C to be
C players and the ones choosing strategy D be D players. Let fC be the proportion of C players and fD
be that of D players, then (fC , fD) is the population profile. Let the expected payoff of typical C and D
player be PC and PD respectively, then the average increase in fitness of C players is PC = afC + bfD
and that of D players is PD = cfC + dfD, which are called the payoff functions of C players and
D players respectively and are both linear functions of the frequencies, from which the linear game
derive its name. Note that a system of differential equations called replicator dynamics describe the
evolution of the frequencies of these two strategies in a population and the underlying mechanisms can
be modeled by the following 2-strategy differential equation on S:
f˙C = fC(PC − φ) = fC(afC + bfD − φ)
f˙D = fD(PD − φ) = fD(cfC + dfD − φ),
(2.1)
where the average payoff φ is fCPC +fDPD = fC(afC +bfD)+fD(cfC +dfD). Since fD = 1−fC ,
then system (2.1) is equivalent to
f˙C = fC(1− fC)(PC − PD) = fC(1− fC)[(a− b− c+ d)fC + b− d]. (2.2)
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The fixed points of equation (2.2) are fC = 0, fC = 1, and all the values of fC ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
(a−b−c+d)fC +b−d = 0. If the game is Prisoner’s Dilemma, then (a−b−c+d)fC +b−d < 0 for
fC ∈ (0, 1) which means f˙C < 0 for fC ∈ (0, 1), and this implies fC will decrease and finally reaches
the equilibrium fC = 0. If the game is Snowdrift Game, then there exists f∗C = (b− d)/(b+ c− a− d)
such that (a− b− c+ d)fC + b− d = 0. Then f˙C > 0 for fC ∈ (0, f∗C) and f˙C < 0 for fC ∈ (f∗C , 1),
which indicates fC increases on (0, f∗C) and decreases on (f
∗
C , 1). So there is an interior equilibrium
f∗C for the Snowdrift Game. This scenario is called coexistence between C players and D players. If
the game has elements satisfying a > c and b < d, then (a − b − c + d)fC + b − d < 0 for fC ∈
(0, (d−b)/(b+c−a−d)), i.e., f˙C < 0 for fC ∈ (0, (d−b)/(b+c−a−d)), and (a−b−c+d)fC+b−d > 0
for fC ∈ ((d− b)/(b+ c− a− d), 1), i.e., f˙C > 0 for fC ∈ ((d− b)/(b+ c− a− d), 1). Thus there
are two Nash equilibriums fC = 0 and fC = 1. This is called bistability between strategies C and D.
These three situations are illustrated in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3 The payoff functions with respect to cooperator frequencies and corresponding equilibrium
for three types of matrix games.
The three most common possibilities for the models of two strategies linear games are Prisoner’s
Dilemma, Snowdrift Game and Bistable-Equilibrium Game. Scientists prefer simulation studies on the
first two types of game models. The mechanism underlying the modeling equation (2.2), which suggests
the change in time dependent frequency of C players is proportional to the difference between the payoff
of C players and that of D players, is of great importance to the simulation. And the differential equation
models the frequency dependent selection in the deterministic limit of an infinitely large, well-mixed
population, where stochasticity and spatial effects are ignored.
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However, when the comparison between these two strategies is restricted to a local structure called
neighborhood or interaction region where spatial effects are incorporated in simulations, it will corre-
spondingly affect the center or focal individual whose strategy follows an update rule which is related
with the replicator dynamics. These two-strategy game simulations are often established on a square
lattice where each grid is occupied by an individual who plays as either a cooperator or a defector.
Lattices are initialized randomly with certain proportions of the two strategies. The general assumption
is that at each generation the current individuals at chosen update grids interact with their neighbors
including themselves which yields payoff for these individuals respectively. And two typical neighbor-
hoods are von-Neumann neighborhood which includes four nearest neighbors and Moore neighborhood
with eight nearest neighbors. Similarly, for any of these two types of neighborhoods being used, each
grid in the neighborhood region of updating center individual has a payoff, and once the payoffs of
all the individuals in the neighborhood region are collected, the individual or strategy with the highest
payoff invade the central player at next time point with a certain probability which is a function of the
payoffs. Each time the update rule is closely related with the update probability. If the probability is
always one, then the update is often called deterministic update; if the probability is less than or equal
to one, then the update is called stochastic update. There are also two choices for the region of update
grids, that is, two types of timekeeping updates—synchronized and asynchronous ones. Synchronized
update correspond to populations with nonoverlapping generations and all individuals interact with all
their neighbors and update their strategy in a synchronized fashion. Asynchronous or random update is
that individuals are randomly selected and then interact with their neighbors, which yield the update of
their strategy. Note that stochasticity of the simulation is introduced by both settings of asynchronous
and stochastic updates.
Through the comparison of linear game simulations with results from mean field systems, some
literature are able to pinpoint the effects solely arsing from the rigid spatial structure of the population
(4; 7; 8). In particular, they have shown that for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, space can outweigh the inherent
advantage of defectors over cooperators—at least for a small parameter range. For the Snowdrift game,
a counter-intuitive result is obtained and justified several times that spatial structures tend to result in
more frequent escalations in intra-species competitions.
13
2.4 Nonlinear Games and 2D Simulations
We generalize the selection dynamics as the nonlinear payoff functions for the two strategies C and
D in population games are considered. That is, the replicator equations are
f˙C = fC(PC − φ)
f˙D = fD(PD − φ),
(2.3)
where the average payoff φ is fCPC + fDPD and at least one of PC and PD are nonlinear functions of
the frequency fC or fD. Since fD = 1− fC , then system (2.3) is equivalent to
f˙C = fC(1− fC)(PC − PD). (2.4)
Similar to the three types of games in linear games, we extend their definitions to nonlinear games with
nonlinearity for payoff functions in terms of strategy frequencies. And the analytical equilibriums for
three type of nonlinear games are described by the plots in Figure 2.4. The comparative relationship
between PC and PD in nonlinear games is almost the same as that in linear games showed in Figure
2.4 except the skewness and convex or concave behavior in Snowdrift Game. From Figure 2.5, we can
see that strategy D dominates strategy C in Prisoner’s Dilemma where dominate means PD > PC for
any fC ∈ [0, 1]. For Snowdrift Game, PC and PD intersect at a point with fC = f∗ and strategy C
dominates strategy D for fC ∈ [0, f∗) while strategy D dominates strategy C for fC ∈ (f∗, 1] and
this indicates fC = f∗ is an interior Nash equilibrium. However the third plot suggests a completely
different situation from the Snowdrift Game. There is also an intersection point fˆ between PC and PD.
However, PC > PD for fC ∈ (fˆ , 1], and PD > PC for fC ∈ [0, fˆ), which indicates there are two
isolated Nash equilibriums fC = 0 and fD = 1. So the nonlinear system illustrated by this plot is
bistable for both strategies C and D.
For the nonlinear payoff functions in yeast system that Gore et al. have proposed in their paper, the
more specific forms are:
PD = [g + (1− g)f(1− )]α
PC = [g + (1− g)(+ f(1− ))]α − c,
where f = fC is the frequency of cooperators and g, c are parameters correspond to glucose concen-
trations and cost. By investigating the pattern and property of the nonlinear payoff functions for two
14
Figure 2.4 The payoff functions with respect to cooperator frequencies and corresponding equilibrium
for three types of nonlinear games.
strategies C and D, we observe that there are essentially two types of nonlinear games—Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Snowdrift Game for different combinations of parameters g and c in this system, and two
typical examples of these are shown in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5 The payoff functions with respect to cooperator frequencies and corresponding equilibriums
for the nonlinear games in yeast system.
By intuitively obtaining the idea from the selection dynamics or replicator equation f˙C = fC(1 −
fC)(PC−PD), we use the nonlinear payoff functions in yeast game to implement the spatial simulation
with different neighborhood sizes N which will be described.
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The procedure of 2D simulation is as followed. First of all, the spatial structured population is
set up, and individuals are confined to sites on a regular 100 × 100 lattice with periodic boundary
conditions which means the edges are wrapped around to generate a toroidal universe such that all of
them interact with their neighbors. The neighborhood or interaction region is tuned with parameters
N = 4, 8 and 24. Then the square lattice is initiated, and each individual is random assigned with either
strategy C or D, or specifically assigned with some particular patterns of the two strategies. Note here
we only consider pure strategy for each individual. Then each time we randomly pick the interaction
region which consists of one grid, and compute the nonlinear payoff of each neighbor which depends
on the frequency of C in the neighborhood of each neighbor and finally yields to the averaged payoff
for C and D. Afterwards we update the center individuals based on well-defined update rules. There are
empirically two rules to update the center. One is the deterministic rule and the other is the stochastic
rule. The deterministic rule is the revised best-take-over rule according to which the strategy with
the highest average payoff will take over the center individual with probability 1 while the generic
best-take-over rule is that the individual with the highest payoff in a given neighborhood replacing the
center. The stochastic rule is that the strategy with the highest average payoff will replace the center
individuals with certain probability which depends on the difference of the average payoff difference of
two strategies. One type of probability we use is the form of expected mean in logistic distribution with
one parameter determining the scale. Finally the results of the equilibrium levels are determined by
evolving the lattice over M (M = 1, 000, 000) generations and then averaging the cooperator strategies
over another 1, 000 generations. They will show that the frequency of cooperators converges to a stable
state as the running time goes to infinity.
Table 2.2 Frequencies of cooperator at equilibrium for various glucose and histidine
XXXXXXXXXXHistidine
Glucose
0 0.0010 0.0020 0.0030 0.0050 0.0100 0.0300
0.0050 0.0082 0.0012 0 0 0 0 0
0.0100 0.0071 0.0046 0.0006 0.0001 0 0 0
0.0200 0.0122 0.0051 0.0010 0.0007 0.0002 0 0
0.0500 0.0208 0.0112 0.0032 0.0017 0.0010 0.0004 0
0.2000 0.1097 0.0643 0.0201 0.0116 0.0060 0.0038 0.0015
1.0000 0.6000 0.2950 0.2025 0.1825 0.1000 0.0400 0.0250
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The data Gore et al. collected in their experiment is displayed in Table 2.2. The table shows us
that there are 42 observed equilibriums associated with 42 combinations of glucose and histidine level
which correspond to 42 choices of parameter settings including the cost c. We implement the numerical
simulation with neighborhood sizes N = 4, 8, 24 and different initialized matrices for the lattice. In
the process of simulation, there are two types of update rules—deterministic and stochastic rules used.
Deterministic rule means each individual will certainly choose the strategy that posses higher average
payoff in its neighborhood region at each generation while stochastic rules means the strategy with
higher average payoff will take the focal point with the probability which depends on the difference of
average strategy payoffs. The computational results based on them are generally different with more
details as followed.
Figure 2.6 Plots of average cooperator frequencies with respect to number of generations in two spe-
cific games with corresponding glucose and histidine parameters (1 corresponds to cooper-
ator while 0 corresponds to defector).
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2.4.1 Deterministic Rule
The numerical experimental plots in Figure 2.6 show us that the average frequencies of cooperators
over finite large M generations stay almost the same after certain number of generations. These curves
of them also suggest that the average frequencies of cooperators for different games are all getting
closer to the ”approximate” true equilibriums or more precisely some equilibriums with small enough
oscillations as the number of generations increases. The actual pattern of cooperators and defectors is
changing all the time, and the frequency of cooperators, in a sufficiently large array, is almost constant,
which is called a ”dynamic equilibrium”. But this approximation is not static since there are still minor
wiggles around the ”approximate” true equilibriums. They suggest that the average frequency of coop-
erators stays at the small range close to some constant after M time steps of generation. So we collect
the average frequencies of cooperators over certain generations after M generations, and the results for
all cases are displayed in Figure 2.7.
For different lattices that are chosen specifically, the simulations are applied in three different neigh-
borhood sizes respectively, and the frequencies of cooperation after M iterations are provided. Figure
2.7 suggests that for different initialized lattices, the final dynamic equilibrium of the cooperator fre-
quencies follows almost the same pattern for different neighborhood sizes. From the plots, we also
obtain that the frequencies of cooperators at the left bottom part stay at high level of proportion which
are about or above 0.9, while those at the right top part are decreasing as the neighborhood size increases
and most of them are less than 0.1. Furthermore we see that the average frequencies of cooperators will
increase as the neighborhood size increases for the mutually beneficial game in last row with raw equi-
librium frequency about 0.6. The frequencies on the last column are not so small, but there is a pattern
of sharp decrease asN change from 8 to 24. Also we can see that the differences between the simulated
frequencies and the original frequencies stay at the left bottom part, but become smaller for right top
part as the neighborhood size increases. And this is consistent with the conclusion that coexistence
can persist under localized competition and rapidly lost when dispersal and interaction enlarge in the
C-S-R model promoted by Kerr, Riley, Feldman and Bohannan (10). Further more, as N becomes large
and finally the interacting region extends to the whole lattice, the frequencies above the diagonal will
converge to the original equilibrium frequencies which are almost zero.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 2.7 Plots for log frequencies of cooperators using deterministic rules in the numerical experi-
ments based on four types of initialized lattices (3 columns from left to right correspond to
N = 4, 8 and 24). (a) Randomized initial lattice. (b) Initial lattice with a square of coopera-
tors in a population of defectors. (c) Initial lattice with a square of defectors in a population
of cooperators. (d) Initial lattice with left side cooperators and right side defectors.
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2.4.2 Stochastic Rule
In stochastic update rule, the update probability is given in the form of p(x) = [1+exp(−(PC(Nx)−
PD(Nx))/κ)]
−1 where x is site x on the lattice, Nx is the neighborhood of x and κ is a noise term that
reflects uncertainties in assessing the payoffs which is usually set to be 0.01. The cooperator frequency
plots for Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift Game based on spatial evolutionary game dynamics using
this stochastic update rule are displayed in Figure 2.8. They again tell us the approximate convergence
of the average frequencies of cooperators. This shows that the average frequency of cooperators stays
stable after M generations. The average frequencies of cooperators over certain generations after M
generations for all cases are plotted and presented in Figure 2.8.
In Figure 2.8, different rows correspond to the simulation results of different initial lattices, and
there is no obvious distinction among the four chosen cases. This indicates initial lattice has no effect
on the evolution of cooperation in yeast game, which is the same as that in deterministic update. By
comparing the average frequencies of certain generations after M generations using stochastic update
rule with those using deterministic update rule, we can see that the stochastic updated ”equilibrium”
frequencies at the left bottom and right bottom parts, which are called deterministic-high-stochastic-
low parts, are generally smaller than the deterministic updated ones under the same neighborhood size,
while the situation is converse for the rest parts. There is also a pattern that the deterministic-high-
stochastic-low parts are getting smaller as neighborhood size increases. Again the four different initial
lattices give us almost the same ”equilibrium” plots for the same neighborhood size which indicates
the initial conditions generally don’t affect the final stable states. The frequencies are getting larger as
row number increases for each neighborhood size. We can further see that the average frequencies of
cooperators will decrease as the neighborhood size increases for both Snowdrift games and Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Also the differences between the final static frequencies from simulation and the original
frequencies are getting bigger at the left bottom part, but becoming smaller for right top part as the
neighborhood size increases. And this is consistent with the conclusion that coexistence can persist
under localized competition and rapidly lost when dispersal and interaction enlarge in the C-S-R model.
Finally, as N becomes large and the interacting region for every individual extends to the whole lattice,
the phenomena observed on the coorpeartor frequencies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma games is the same
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 2.8 Plots for log frequencies of cooperators using stochastic rules in the numerical experi-
ments based on four types of initialized lattices (3 columns from left to right correspond to
N = 4, 8 and 24). (a) Randomized initial lattice. (b) Initial lattice with a square of coopera-
tors in a population of defectors. (c) Initial lattice with a square of defectors in a population
of cooperators. (d) Initial lattice with left side cooperators and right side defectors.
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as that observed by using deterministic rule, and they are all converging to the original equilibriums
with corresponding frequencies that are almost zero.
2.5 General Mathematical Theory
For the 2D simulation in the yeast system, each grid on the lattice and its neighborhood region is
denoted as a focal system. There are lots of focal systems on a 2D plane where the number of focal
systems is the count of grids on the plane. There is a difference equation with discrete time and discrete
space for each focal system, and they can be formulated as
δ〈fi〉λ(x, t)/δt = F
(
〈fi〉λ(x, t), Pi
(
x, 〈fi〉λ(x, t)
)− P (x, 〈fi〉λ(x, t))), ∀x,
where λ = λ(N), x is the lattice grid position , 〈fi〉λ(x, t) ∈
{
0, 1M ,
2
M , · · · , 1
}
is the fraction of strat-
egy or species i ∈ {C,D} in the system with M = N + 1 grids, δt is the time difference between gen-
erations, δ〈fi〉λ(x, t) is fraction difference of strategy i between generations and F (·, ·) characterizes
the update probability of x. When F is of the form of indicator function, it corresponds to the deter-
ministic update rule. When F is written as a continuous form and δt is infinitely small, the exponential
form of the update probability could be approximately derived from the limit form of the difference
equation, in which situation it corresponds to stochastic update rule. Specifically if F (x, y) = xy and
the neighborhood extends to the whole lattice which is well-mixed population, then the difference equa-
tion boils down to limit form which is replicator equation as δt goes to 0. The difference equation is
homogeneous for all focal grids. Also, the difference systems are not independent if the neighborhood
regions of two focal grids are intersected, that means, the intersection part affects the systems which
have the intersection part included. The effect will spread out to more systems and be weaker if the
neighborhood size increases because there will be more systems involved.
To analyze the theory of the difference equation, we describe the system from the perspective of
invasion circumstances based on at least two parameters—discrete time and discrete space in the per-
spective of deterministic update—defectors invading cooperators and cooperators invading defectors
which are similar to single parameter case of the payoff matrix from Nowak book in (14), while in that
of stochastic update it introduces many uncertainties which are put in a more complicated framework
of future investigation.
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2.5.1 Defectors Invading Cooperators
The following are directed edges from a directed graph for four cases of invaded defectors: (a) a
single defector; (b) von Neumann neighborhood (Manhattan distance r = 1) of 5 defectors; (c) square
(Moore neighborhood) of 9 defectors; (d) von Neumann neighborhood (Manhattan distance r = 2)
of 13 defectors. For Prisoner’s Dilemma or Snowdrift Game in yeast system, the payoffs PC(f) and
PD(f) are both monotone increasing functions. The conditions for defectors-invading-cooperators un-
der neighborhood size N = 4 are the following:
(i) (a)→ (b): 14PC(45) + 34PC(1) < PD(45), PC(45) < PD(45);
(ii)(b) → (c): 13PC(35) + 23PC(1) < PD(35) < 14PC(45) + 34PC(1), 23PC(35) + 13PC(45) < 12PD(0) +
1
2PD(
3
5);
(iii) (c) → (d): 34PC(45) + 14PC(1) < PD(15), PD(25) < 12PC(45) + 12PC(1), PC(45) < 23PD(15) +
1
3PD(
2
5), PC(
4
5) <
1
4PD(0) +
1
4PD(
1
5) +
1
2PD(
2
5);
(iv) (b) → (d): 14PC(45) + 34PC(1) < PD(35), 13PC(45) + 23PC(1) < PD(35), 23PC(35) + 13PC(45) <
1
2PD(0) +
1
2PD(
3
5);
(v) (d) → (c): 12PD(0) + 12PD(35) < 23PC(35) + 13PC(45), PC(35) < 23PD(0) + 13PD(25), 12PD(25) +
1
2PD(
3
5) <
1
3PC(
3
5) +
2
3PC(1), PD(
3
5) <
1
4PC(
4
5) +
3
4PC(1);
(vi) (c) → (b): PC(45) < 14PD(0) + 14PD(15) + 12PD(25), 23PD(15) + 13PD(25) < PC(45), PD(15) <
3
4PC(
4
5) +
1
4PC(1), PD(
2
5) <
1
3PC(
4
5) +
2
3PC(1);
(vii) (b) → (a): 12PD(0) + 12PD(35) < 23PC(35) + 13PC(45), PD(35) < 13PC(35) + 23PC(1), PD(35) <
1
4PC(
4
5) +
3
4PC(1);
(viii) (d) → (b): 12PD(0) + 12PD(35) < 23PC(35) + 13PC(45), 23PD(0) + 13PD(35) < PC(35), 12PD(25) +
1
2PD(
3
5) <
1
3PC(
3
5) +
2
3PC(1), PD(
3
5) <
1
4PC(
4
5) +
3
4PC(1);
(ix) (c) → (a): 14PD(0) + 14PD(15) + 12PD(25) < PC(45), 23PD(15) + 13PD(25) < PC(45), PD(15) <
3
4PC(
4
5) +
1
4PC(1), PD(
2
5) <
1
3PC(
4
5) +
2
3PC(1);
(x) (a)→ (a): PD(45) < 14PC(45) + 34PC(1), PC(45) < PD(45);
(xi) (b) → (b): PD(35) < 14PC(45) + 34PC(1), PD(35) < 13PC(35) + 23PC(1), 23PC(35) + 13PC(45) <
1
2PD(0) +
1
2PD(
3
5);
(xii) (c) → (c): PD(15) < 34PC(45) + 14PC(1), PD(25) < 12PC(45) + 12PC(1), PC(45) < 23PD(15) +
23
1
3PD(
2
5), PC(
4
5) <
1
4PD(0) +
1
4PD(
1
5) +
1
2PD(
2
5);
(xiii) (d)→ (d): 23PC(35) + 13PC(45) < 12PD(0) + 12PD(35), PC(35) < 23PD(0) + 13PD(25), 12PD(25) +
1
2PD(
3
5) <
1
3PC(
3
5) +
2
3PC(1), PD(
3
5) <
1
4PC(
4
5) +
3
4PC(1).
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.9 Invasion conditions for defectors.
The first four conditions are the inequalities correspond to the process of defectors’ expansion.
Conditions (v)-(ix) suggest the constraints while the defectors’ region are shrinking, and conditions (x)-
(xiii) tell us when the four cases stay still. It’s interesting to consider how the 42 different combinations
of parameters perform in the above 13 defectors-invading-cooperators conditions. We compute the
values on the left hand side and right hand side of each inequality for all combinations of parameters,
and obtain an impressive pattern for the True/False results of the inequalities which are attached in
Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
For the defectors-increase conditions (i)-(iv), there is a general pattern that almost all 42 choices
of parameters partially satisfy some inequalities and partially do not satisfy the rest inequalities, and
this indicates some cases will change and other cases will stay or mutate to cases not listed above.
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Furthermore, the parameter vectors correspond to the left top part all meet the conditions of (i), i.e.,
they tend to enlarge from a single cooperator to a von Neumann neighborhood of 5 cooperators in a
population of defectors. But none of the parameters in the right and bottom parts satisfy condition (iv),
i.e., there will never be the situation that a von Neumann neighborhood of 5 defectors expand to the
von Neumann neighborhood of 13 defectors for the simulated models with parameters correspond to
the right and bottom parts.
In addition, we find that the inequalities in defectors’ shrinking conditions are mostly satisfied under
all given sets of parameters. This suggests the risk of survival for defectors of 4 cases in an environment
of surrounding cooperators because the cases with more defectors will be likely to switch to the cases
with less defectors, which in some sense explains why coexistence exists in the simulation when the
original game is Prisoner’s Dilemma whose cooperator frequency is 0 and large portion of cooperators
persist under localized competition.
Partially true and partially false results are also found in the inequalities of conditions (v)-(viii)
under all parameter choices. To some extent, the results show us that it’s hard for the 4 structures of
defectors to keep themselves in a population of cooperators given any choice of parameters. These
structures of defectors could keep portion of them sometimes, but the rest will change to structures
which are more complicated than listed ones for most parameter combinations.
In summary, the above invasion description and analysis suggest there are no special patterns emerg-
ing if a single defector invades a world of cooperators for the given parameter choices. The resulting
patterns are neither dynamical fractal that combines symmetry and chaos, nor ”evolutionary kaleido-
scope” which are found in linear 2D simulations. Actually they are locally cooperators preferred and
mostly partially-keep-partially-mutate. And they also show us the deterministic unpredictability and
asymmetry of beauty.
2.5.2 Cooperators Invading Defectors
We also provide four cases of invading cooperators: (a) a single cooperator; (b) von Neumann
neighborhood (Manhattan distance r = 1) of 5 cooperators; (c) square (Moore neighborhood) of 9
cooperators; (d) von Neumann neighborhood (Manhattan distance r = 2) of 13 cooperators. The con-
ditions for cooperators-invading-defectors under neighborhood size N = 4 are the following:
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(i) (a)→ (b): 34PD(0) + 14PD(15) < PC(15), PD(15) < PC(15);
(ii)(b) → (c): 23PD(0) + 13PD(25) < PC(25) < 34PD(0) + 14PD(15), 13PD(15) + 23PD(25) < 12PC(25) +
1
2PC(1);
(iii) (c) → (d): 14PD(0) + 34PD(15) < PC(45), PC(35) < 12PD(0) + 12PD(15), PD(15) < 13PC(35) +
2
3PC(
4
5), PD(
1
5) <
1
2PC(
3
5) +
1
4PC(
4
5) +
1
4PC(1);
(iv) (b) → (d): 34PD(0) + 14PD(15) < PC(25), 23PD(0) + 13PD(15) < PC(25), 13PD(15) + 23PD(25) <
1
2PC(
2
5) +
1
2PC(1);
(v) (d) → (c): 12PC(25) + 12PC(1) < 13PD(15) + 23PD(25), PD(25) < 13PC(35) + 23PC(1), 12PC(25) +
1
2PC(
3
5) <
2
3PD(0) +
1
3PD(
2
5), PC(
2
5) <
3
4PD(0) +
1
4PD(
1
5);
(vi) (c) → (b): PD(15) < 12PC(35) + 14PC(45) + 14PC(1), 13PC(35) + 23PC(45) < PD(15), PC(45) <
1
4PD(0) +
3
4PD(
1
5), PC(
3
5) <
2
3PD(0) +
1
3PD(
1
5);
(vii) (b) → (a): 12PC(25) + 12PC(1) < 13PD(15) + 23PD(25), PC(25) < 23PD(0) + 13PD(25), PC(25) <
3
4PD(0) +
1
4PD(
1
5);
(viii) (d) → (b): 12PC(25) + 12PC(1) < 13PD(15) + 23PD(25), 13PC(25) + 23PC(1) < PD(25), 12PC(25) +
1
2PC(
3
5) <
2
3PD(0) +
1
3PD(
2
5), PC(
2
5) <
3
4PD(0) +
1
4PD(
1
5);
(ix) (c) → (a): 12PC(35) + 14PC(45) + 14PC(1) < PD(15), 13PC(35) + 23PC(45) < PD(15), PC(45) <
1
4PD(0) +
3
4PD(
1
5), PC(
3
5) <
2
3PD(0) +
1
3PD(
1
5);
(x) (a)→ (a): PC(15) < 34PD(0) + 14PD(15), PD(15) < PC(15);
(xi) (b) → (b): PC(25) < 34PD(0) + 14PD(15), PC(25) < 23PD(0) + 13PD(25), 13PD(15) + 23PD(25) <
1
2PC(
2
5) +
1
2PC(1);
(xii) (c) → (c): PC(45) < 14PD(0) + 34PD(15), PC(35) < 12PD(0) + 12PD(15), PD(15) < 13PC(35) +
2
3PC(
4
5), PD(
1
5) <
1
2PC(
3
5) +
1
4PC(
4
5) +
1
4PC(1);
(xiii) (d) → (d): 13PD(15) + 23PD(25) < 12PC(25) + 12PC(1), PD(25) < 13PC(35) + 23PC(1), 12PC(25) +
1
2PC(
3
5) <
2
3PD(0) +
1
3PD(
2
5), PC(
2
5) <
3
4PD(0) +
1
4PD(
1
5).
Similar as the defector-invading-cooperators conditions, we have the 13 conditions for cooperators-
invading-defectors listed above. Conditions (i)-(iv) are the equivalent inequalities to cooperator clusters’
growing. If conditions (v)-(ix) hold, then the defector clusters are taking over cooperators’ sites. There
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.10 Invasion conditions for cooperators.
will be period one oscillator for all four cases when conditions (x)-(xiii) are satisfied. The performance
of the 42 different combinations of parameters on the above 13 cooperators-invading-defectors condi-
tions is again interesting. The computation on the left hand side and right hand side of each inequality
for all parameters choices are Table 2.4, and the summary for the True/False results are as followed.
For the first four conditions, we encounter that most of the inequalities are true under all choices
of parameters while a small proportion of them are false. This phenomena indicates that the single
cooperator outperforms the neighbor defectors, and this single cooperator will keep growing to clusters
with more cooperators, and a von Neumann neighborhood of 5 cooperators will certainly extend at each
direction of its structure.
On the contrary, most of the inequalities in conditions (v)-(ix) don’t hold for any given combination
of parameters. We can expect that the clusters of cooperators are likely to expand more than just
retaining themselves and have few motivation to shrink. In other words, they prefer to keep growing to
structures of even more cooperators which are not listed here.
The True/False results of last four conditions (period one oscillator) are similar to those in the
27
situation of defectors invading cooperators, that is, part of the inequalities are true and the rest are false.
More specifically, a single cooperator cannot retain itself and have the willing to expand; part of the
cases (b), (c) and (d) can keep themselves, but the rest part cannot outperform defectors and their sites
will be taken by defectors in the next generation.
To sum up, the invasion analysis tell us that the cooperators tend to grow if they are invading a
population of defectors for any choice of parameter. The growing clusters of cooperators move around,
expand, fragment and give birth to new clusters of cooperators. There is no special pattern emerging for
a single cooperator invading a world of defectors. This also suggests that the successful dominance of
cooperator under localized competition. Again the competition consists of deterministic unpredictabil-
ity and beauty of asymmetry.
2.5.3 Generalization
The invasion analysis can be generalized in several aspects. The games can be studied with stochas-
tic update rules and the invasion conditions will be unpredictable which are very complicated. Instead of
asynchronous updating, we can investigate synchronous updating as well, and the basic structures will
be symmetric. Synchronous updating introduces less random choice and therefore less stochasticity. It
will in general display less variety in dynamical behaviors.
From the discussion for two situations of invasion with the neighborhood size N = 4, we can
see that the 13 conditions are sufficient for the analysis of basic four structures. For general larger
neighborhood sizes N = 8 and 24, the basic structures of cooperators or defectors are a little different,
and thus there will be more conditions for the invasion of a single individual in a population with
opposite strategy. It’s fussy to list all conditions again for the situation of different neighborhood sizes.
However we can anticipate that a single cooperator still tends to grow in a population of defectors and
cooperator strategy could dominate in a localized competition but the dominance is not so strong as that
with small neighborhood sizes.
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2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
Evolutionary game theory has achieved tremendous success in modeling biological and social sys-
tems. However almost all of the successes have been focus on the linear games. The first applicable
nonlinear game model is proposed by Gore et al. in 2009 and later the mathematical theory, especially
the theoretical properties of this model is developed by us. We now make a further investigation of this
nonlinear game model based on the perspective of 2D simulation and the contributions of this paper
can be listed as follows.
First of all, we have reviewed and generalized three types of linear games whose definitions are
based on the comparative relationship of the elements in the so-called payoff matrix. The generalized
nonlinear game are defined with nonlinear payoff functions instead of matrix-based linear functions.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift game for nonlinear games are conceptualized from the perspec-
tive of payoff functions’ curves and intercepts of payoff functions which are comparably same to those
in matrix games, except the skewness and concavity of the curves. Parameters in payoff matrix as now
replaced by environmental or internal parameters in nonlinear payoff functions. We also study the repli-
cator dynamics of nonlinear games and would expect the nonlinear games can be widely use for a large
group of systems.
Secondly, the combination of numerical simulation and evolutionary game theory has been proved
to be useful to study the linear game models and how the spatial effects impact the evolution of co-
operation. We extend the combined model to the field of nonlinear game models where rare scientist
has considered before. We find that the spatial structure on a 2D lattice tends to promote the evolution
of cooperation in both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift Game, which is a little different from those
found in matrix games since Christoph shows that spatial effects increase the proportion of cooperation
in Prisoner’s Dilemma while this doesn’t hold for Snowdrift Game in matrix games. We also compare
the deterministic and stochastic update rules and conclude that their results are different from each other
but tend to coincide as neighborhood size increases.
Thirdly, we propose the difference equations for the 2D simulation that are implemented in Section
2.5. Then we analyze some basic properties of the difference equations for the systems of players. The
invasion conditions are provided given four structures for two different situations with the neighborhood
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size N = 4. We find some interesting patterns for the inequalities of the invasion conditions under
different combinations of parameters from the experimental data Gore et.al collected and those patterns
convince us the promotion of cooperation in the numerical experiments. We also make a generalization
based on neighborhood sizes and update rules and concluding results are discussed.
Finally, this paper invites more interest from both mathematical and biological communities in
evolutionary game theory and its applications in modeling. It’s a further extension of the work about the
game dynamic model for yeast development proposed by Huang and Wu (2012). Further development
of our work can be fascinating, such as the rigorous theoretical properties for the 2D model on the
lattice and so on.
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Table 2.3 Defector invading cooperators (sign for inequalities: ”+” means inequality holds while ”−”
means it doesn’t hold.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii)
(1,1) ++ + +− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ +−+ + + ++ + + ++ −+ +−− + +−− −−++
(1,2) ++ +−− −−−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− +−−− −−−−
(1,3) ++ +−− −−−− + +− +−−− −+ +− +−− + +−− + + +− −+ −−− +−−− −−−−
(1,4) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− +−−− −−−−
(1,5) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(1,6) ++ + +− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ +−+ + + ++ + + ++ −+ +−− + +−− −−++
(1,7) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(2,1) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−+− −+ ++ +−− + + +− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−+−
(2,2) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−+− −+ ++ +−− + + +− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−+−
(2,3) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(2,4) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(2,5) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(2,6) ++ + +− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ +−+ + + ++ + + ++ −+ +−− + +−− −−++
(2,7) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(3,1) ++ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ −+ + +− + +−− −−++
(3,2) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−+− −+ ++ +−− + + +− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−+−
(3,3) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(3,4) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(3,5) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(3,6) ++ + +− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ +−+ + + ++ + + ++ −+ +−− + +−− −−++
(3,7) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(4,1) ++ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ −+ + +− + +−− −−++
(4,2) ++ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ −+ + +− + +−− −−++
(4,3) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(4,4) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−−− −+ ++ +−− + +−− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−−−
(4,5) ++ +−− −+−− + +− +−+− −+ ++ +−− + + +− + + ++ −+ −−− + +−− −−+−
(4,6) ++ + +− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ +−+ + + ++ + + ++ −+ +−− + +−− −−++
(4,7) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(5,1) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(5,2) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(5,3) ++ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ −+ + +− + +−− −−++
(5,4) ++ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ −+ + +− + +−− −−++
(5,5) ++ + +− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ +−+ + + ++ + + ++ −+ +−− + +−− −−++
(5,6) ++ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ −+ + +− + +−− −−++
(5,7) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,1) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,2) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,3) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,4) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,5) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,6) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
(6,7) −+ −+− −+−− −−− +−++ −+ ++ + + + + + ++ + + ++ ++ + +− + +−− −−++
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Table 2.4 Cooperator invading defectors (sign for inequalities: ”+” means inequality holds while ”−”
means it doesn’t hold.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii)
(1,1) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(1,2) +− +−− +−++ + +− +−−− +−−− +−− + +−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ −−−−
(1,3) +− +−− +−++ + +− +−−− +−−− +−− + +−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ −−−−
(1,4) +− +−− +−++ + +− + +−− +−−− +−− + +−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ −+−−
(1,5) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(1,6) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(1,7) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(2,1) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(2,2) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ + +−−
(2,3) +− +−− +−++ + +− +−−− +−−− +−− + +−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ −−−−
(2,4) +− +−− +−++ + +− + +−− +−−− +−− + +−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ −+−−
(2,5) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(2,6) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(2,7) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(3,1) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(3,2) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(3,3) +− +−− +−++ + +− + +−− +−−− +−− + +−− −−−− −− −−− −−++ −+−−
(3,4) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −+−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(3,5) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(3,6) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(3,7) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,1) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,2) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,3) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,4) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,5) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,6) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(4,7) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,1) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,2) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,3) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,4) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,5) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,6) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(5,7) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,1) ++ +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −+ −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,2) ++ +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −+ −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,3) ++ +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −+ −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,4) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,5) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,6) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
(6,7) +− +−+ +−++ + + + −+−− +−−− −−− −−−− −−−− −− −−+ −−++ + +−−
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CHAPTER 3. ESS IN NONLINEAR GAME AND THE ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR
OF SOLUTION TO ADAPTED REPLICATOR DIFFUSION EQUATION
A paper to be submitted
Min Wang, Zhijun Wu
Abstract
In this paper we introduce the generalized replicator dynamics in game theory with nonlinear payoff
functions of n strategies for all species in a population. Thus the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the payoff functions under the evolutionarily stable state and regular evolutionarily stable state are
investigated in the framework of evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, we extend the generalized
replicator dynamics to adapted replicator diffusion equation by adding an diffusion term, and propose
the theorem concerning the long time behavior of the solution to the replicator diffusion equation un-
der appropriate conditions on the payoff functions. Simulation studies of two examples of replicator
diffusion equation are followed to verify the asymptotic behavior of the replicator diffusion equation.
3.1 Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) defined the classical game theory by introducing the axioms
for the concept of the individual rational player in the special case of zero-sum game in (39). But the
player who made consistent decisions did not necessarily assume the other players also acted rationally.
In 1951, John Nash set up the modern game theory by defining rational players in a degree such that
they could coordinate their strategies where a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium prevailed in (34). Later
on, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) formulated the evolving populations in a way where competition
of several species could be analyzed as strategies and some mathematical criteria were used to predict
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the prevalence of the competing strategies in (32). Then Taylor and other scientists focused more on the
dynamics of the strategy which depended on the relative abundances or frequencies of all species in the
population (30; 38; 41). This is the origination of the evolutionary game theory.
A fundamental goal of evolutionary game theory is to understand how the individual organisms in
biological system or social system interact with each other, and evolve over time with the environment
determine the spatial distribution of populations and the structure of communities. It considers a popu-
lation of players interacting in a game with fixed strategies and payoff of each individual is interpreted
as fitness, and success in the game is translated into reproductive success. The reproduce process is de-
scribed by the evolutionary game dynamics and the paper of Taylor and Jonker (1978) used a differential
equation for game dynamics which is the pioneer work of this area. The differential equation is called
replicator dynamic equation and the payoff of a strategy in the equation is an estimate of the growth rate
of players choosing this strategy. If the payoff functions of all strategies are linear combinations of the
frequencies of all species, then the game is called matrix game or linear game. Furthermore, Zeeman
(1980), Schuster , Hofbauer, and Sigmund (1979), and so on investigated on the properties of replicator
equation in such game and there were collective research results on this equation. However few have
considered the situation that at least one of the payoff functions are actually nonlinear functions or more
general functions with respect to the frequencies of all species with the corresponding game called non-
linear game. We will firstly focus on the theory of this general replicator dynamics for nonlinear games
in the following section.
A basic task of evolutionary game theory is to explore the stability of game dynamics. Nash equi-
librium is a traditional concept in the stability theory of game which predicts the outcome of a strategic
interaction. If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit by changing her
strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged, then that set of strategies constitute the
Nash equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is another fundamental concept of evolutionary
game theory, and it is introduced by Maynard Smith and Price in terms of two-component populations
in a 1973 nature paper. ESS is an equilibrium refinement of Nash equilibrium. An ESS is a strategy
such that, if most of the members of a population adopt it, there is no mutant strategy that would give
higher reproductive fitness, that is, it is resistant to invasion by mutant strategies. Given the definition
of ESS, there are lots of literature that analyze the conditions of the payoff matrix under which the ESS
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exist in a linear game for different type of matrices, for example, Haigh(1975), Bishop and Cannings
(1976), (1978), Taylor and Jonker (1978), Abakuks (1980) and so on (19; 20; 21; 28; 38). But there is
rare result on the necessary and sufficient conditions for ESS with respect to the differentiation of payoff
functions in a replicator dynamics of nonlinear games. We thus derive the equivalent conditions of ESS
in terms of the derivatives of payoff functions and the equilibrium strategy using the Taylor expansion
in this paper.
In recent decades, empirical evidence suggests that the spatial structure of environments in a pop-
ulation can influence interactions of species and the composition of communities. The natural way to
understand spatial effects is to use mathematical models. There are several types of spatial population
models, for example, cellular automaton, interacting particle systems, the idea free distribution and dis-
persal models based on integral kernels. Each type is based on some corresponding hypothesis about
the scale and structure of the spatial environments and the way the species disperse through it. Dif-
fusion term in the general reaction-diffusion equations also provides a good perspective to incorporate
the spatial effects into a differential equation model. It translates the local assumptions or data about
the movement strategy and reproductivity of individuals into global considerations of the competition
and cooperation of population species. For the replicator differential equation of nonlinear games we
mentioned above, we add the diffusion term and adapt the replicator dynamics to replicator diffusion
equation with appropriate initial and boundary conditions. The goodness of this adaptation is that it
spatially includes quantities such as dispersal rates, carrying capacities as parameters in the partial dif-
ferential equation. Thus we can study questions about the way that variation in parameters especially
diffusion rates influences the population dynamics.
Stability is a fundamental goal for the evolutionary game theory. That is, we care about the con-
vergence of the solution of the game dynamics. Thus the long time behavior of solution of the adapted
replicator diffusion equation is an interesting problem to us. The adapted replicator diffusion equation
belongs to the class of general reaction diffusion equation and there are already some theoretical results
for the long time behavior of reaction diffusion equation. Friedman (1964) considered a special class of
reaction diffusion equations called the first and second initial boundary value problem and proved the
theorems for the convergence of solutions of these two type of parabolic equations. Ewer and Peletier
(1975), Chafee (1975), Mimura (1979), Redheffer, Redlinger and Walter (1988) and others examined
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the asymptotic behavior of special cases of different parabolic equations with reasonable assumptions
which guaranteed the convergence of the solutions and obtained the asymptotic stable conclusions of
the equilibrium solutions (22; 23; 33; 37). However the adapted replicator diffusion equation we estab-
lished does not satisfy the specific assumptions of the above results. For the linear game, Hadeler (1981)
adapted it to corresponding replicator diffusion equation and proposed a theorem that the solution of
his adapted equation converges uniformly in a bounded region towards a spatially homogeneous func-
tion which is an exponentially stable stationary state of the ordinary differential equation in (27). We
will make a generalization of Hadeler’s result. For the adapted replicator diffusion equation, we show
that this resulting parabolic system with zero flux boundary conditions has the solution that converges
to a spatially homogeneous stationary solution of the original replicator dynamics under appropriate
conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we introduce the ESS of nonlinear
replicator dynamics and derive the necessary and sufficient conditions of payoff functions for ESS.
In section 3.3 some lemmas are set up and the convergence of the solution of the adapted replicator
diffusion equation is proved. Some examples and numerical simulation results are provided in section
3.4. Finally we sum up with the remarks and conclusions.
3.2 ESS in Nonlinear Games
In 1973 Maynard Smith and Price introduced the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
to describe a stable state of the game. Taylor and Jonker (1978) considered a general class of games
which usually include the linear game and provided a general definition of ESS. They defined F (i|s)
be the fitness of strategy i in state s where s = (s1, . . . , sn) is the state vector of the population and
F (q|p) = ∑ qiF (i|p), s ∈ S = {s ∈ Rn : ∑ni=1 si = 1, si ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n}. Then a state p is called
an ESS if for every state q 6= p, if we let p¯ = (1− )p+ q, then F (q|p¯) < F (p|p¯) for sufficiently small
 > 0. Define the matrix A by the formula
aij =
∂
∂pj
F (i|p).
Then an equilibrium point p is a regular ESS if F (i|p) < F (p|p) whenever i /∈ supp(p), and xTAx < 0
whenever supp(x) ⊂ supp(p), x 6= 0, and∑xi = 0.
36
For linear game with payoff matrix U , Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998) denote the payoff for a p-
strategist against a q-strategist to be
pT · Uq =
∑
uijpiqj .
Thus the strategy pˆ is said to be evolutionarily stable if for all p with p 6= pˆ, the inequality
pT · U(p+ (1− )pˆ) < pˆT · U(p+ (1− )pˆ) (3.1)
holds for all sufficient small  > 0. The above inequality is a special case of the definition of ESS
in Taylor and Jonker. Based on the form of linearity on , the above inequality is equivalent to the
following two conditions:
(a).equilibrium condition
pT · Upˆ ≤ pˆT · Upˆ.
(b).stability condtion
p 6= pˆ, pT · Upˆ = pˆT · Upˆ =⇒ pT · Up < pˆT · Up.
Actually Hofbauer mentioned that the ESS is also equivalent to
pˆT · Uq > qT · Uq
for all q 6= pˆ in some neighborhood of pˆ.
However for the nonlinear replicator dynamics, it’s not easy to find the appropriate condition to
guarantee the existence of ESS. In this section, we want to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions
for ESS of the nonlinear replicator dynamics:
dpi
dt
= pi(e
T
i · pi(p)− pT · pi(p)), i = 1, . . . , n, (3.2)
where pi(p) = (pi1(p), . . . , pin(p))T is a vector of bounded nonlinear payoff functions. Assume the
payoff vector pi(·) is C∞ at a small neighborhood of p. Rewrite the inequality for ESS p defined by
Taylor and Jonker, we obtain
pT · pi((1− )p+ q) > qT · pi((1− )p+ q), (3.3)
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where  > 0 is sufficiently small. Take the Taylor expansion for the term pi((1 − )p + q) at point p,
we have
pi((1− )p+ q) = pi(p+ (q − p))
= a0 + a1+
1
2
a2
2 + · · ·+ 1
n!
an
n + · · ·
where a0 = pi(p), a1 = ∇pi(p)·(q−p), a2 = diag((q−p)T, . . . , (q−p)T)diag(∇2pi1(p), . . . ,∇2pin(p))
1n×1 ⊗ (q − p), . . ..
Thus
pT · pi((1− )p+ q) =
∞∑
i=0
1
i!
pTai
i (3.4)
and
qT · pi((1− )p+ q) =
∞∑
i=0
1
i!
qTai
i. (3.5)
In algebra, we know that if two infinite series
∑∞
n=0 cn
n and
∑∞
n=0 dn
n satisfy
∞∑
n=0
cn
n >
∞∑
n=0
dn
n
for sufficient small  > 0, then the inequality implies that
(1a) c0 ≥ d0;
(2a) If c0 = d0,then c1 ≥ d1;
(3a) If c0 = d0, c1 = d1,then c2 ≥ d2;
...
Based on the above result, we can derive that the ESS of the nonlinear replicator dynamics is equivalent
to the following set of conditions:
(1b) pTa0 ≥ qTa0;
(2b) If pTa0 = qTa0,then pTa1 ≥ qTa1;
(3b) If pTa0 = qTa0, pTa1 = qTa1,then pTa2 ≥ qTa2;
...
That is,
(1c) pTpi(p) ≥ qTpi(p);
(2c) If pTpi(p) = qTpi(p),then pT · ∇pi(p)(q − p) ≥ qT · ∇pi(p)(q − p);
(3c) If pTpi(p) = qTpi(p), pT · ∇pi(p)(q − p) = qT · ∇pi(p)(q − p),then pT · diag((q − p)T, . . . , (q −
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p)T)diag(∇2pi1(p), . . . ,∇2pin(p))1n×1⊗(q−p) ≥ qT ·diag((q−p)T, . . . , (q−p)T)diag(∇2pi1(p), . . . ,
∇2pin(p))1n×1 ⊗ (q − p);
...
Define the set of stationary points satisfy the set of conditions including the first (k − 1) ones and
the kth one with inequality strictly holds to be Ek, and the stationary points satisfy all the above set of
infinite conditions to be E∞. Denote the set of ESS to be E . Based on the above derivation, we propose
the following theorem which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of ESS of nonlinear game.
Theorem 3.2.1. Consider the general replicator dynamics (3.2) of nonlinear game for n species with
C∞ payoff functions in a population. Then p is an ESS of the game iff p is a stationary state of (3.2)
and p ∈ E∞, that is, for any q ∈ S and q 6= p, p satisfy all the conditions (1c), (2c), (3c),. . . .
It’s hard to test all the conditions to verify whether a stationary state p is an ESS or not. Thus it’s
necessary to consider subsets of the conditions which are stronger than those in theorem 3.2.1. And
we can see that the sequence of Ek are monotonically nondecreasing as k → ∞. However when the
payoff functions are CN for some integer N > 0, the conditions after (N + 1)th one cannot be verified.
Therefore we have the following theorem
Theorem 3.2.2. For the general replicator dynamics of nonlinear game to n species with C∞ payoff
functions, the stationary point sets Ek are ESS and the sequence of them satisfy the two conditions:
Ek ⊂ Ek+1, and Ek ⊂ E∞ = E for each k ≥ 1. If the payoff functions are CN for some integer N > 0,
then EN ⊂ Ek = EN+1 for k ≥ N + 1, and E1 ⊂ E2 ⊂ . . . ⊂ EN−1 ⊂ EN ⊂ EN+1 ⊂ E .
We can see that when pi(p) is a matrix-times-vector form in terms of variable p, then the first two
conditions are the same as the equilibrium condition and stability condition Hofbauer and Sigmund
propose, that is, Ek = E2 for k ≥ 2. However when pi(p) is not of that form, that is, pi(p) is nonlinear
with respect to p, there are infinite conditions for the nonlinear payoff functions in theorem 3.2.1, and
that’s why Taylor and Jonker consider the stronger form of first two inequalities and introduce the
concept of regular ESS which is also stronger than ESS. That is, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.3. For the same replicator dynamics (3.2) of nonlinear game, p is a regular ESS of the
game only if p is a stationary state of (3.2), and p ∈ E2, that is, for any q ∈ S and q 6= p, the
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two conditions hold: (1) pTpi(p) ≥ qTpi(p); (2) If pTpi(p) = qTpi(p), then pT · ∇pi(p)(q − p) >
qT · ∇pi(p)(q − p).
Proof. p is a regular ESS, then it is also an ESS. Thus p is a stationary state of (3.2). By definition of
regular ESS, we have pTpi(p) > eTi pi(p) where i /∈ supp(p). Then for any q ∈ S and q 6= p, we obtain
qTpi(p) =
∑
i/∈supp(p)
qi · eTi pi(p) +
∑
i∈supp(p)
qi · eTi pi(p)
≤
∑
i/∈supp(p)
qi · pTpi(p) +
∑
i∈supp(p)
qi · eTi pi(p)
=
∑
i/∈supp(p)
qi · pTpi(p) +
∑
i∈supp(p)
qi · pTpi(p)
= pTpi(p)
where the equality holds when supp(q) ⊂ supp(p). If pTpi(p) = qTpi(p), then let x = q − p, we obtain
the second condition.
3.3 Long Time Behavior of Solution to the Adapted Replicator Diffusion Equation
We consider the replicator dynamics model of population for n species where pi is the frequency of
the i-th species, and the payoff function for i-th species is pii(p) which is locally Lyapunov continuous.
Then the differential equations is
dpi
dt
= pi(e
T
i · pi(p)− pT · pi(p)) (3.6)
for i = 1, ..., n. Consider the population distributed in a bounded domain Ω of RN with smooth bound-
ary and incorporate migration and reproductive interaction of neighboring individuals by a diffusion
term with the same diffusion rates
∂pi
∂t
= pi(e
T
i · pi(p)− pT · pi(p)) + ∆pi (3.7)
for i = 1, ..., n. That is,
∂p
∂t
= Ppi(p)− pTpi(p) · p+ ∆p (3.8)
where P = diag(p1, ..., pn). The diffusion rate must be the same for all species, therefore we can
normalized it to one by rescaling the space variables. Also we assume no flux condition on the boundary
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∂Ω and n is the outer normal vector
∂p
∂n
∣∣∣
∂Ω
= 0. (3.9)
This corresponds to a situation where there is some population reservoir with reflecting walls. Hadeler
(1981) considered the linear payoff function pii(p) =
∑n
j=1 fijpj where F = (fij) is the symmetric
payoff matrix with positive elements, thus the replicator dynamics is
dp
dt
= PFp− pTFp · p. (3.10)
After adding the diffusion term, the differential equations becomes
∂p
∂t
= PFp− pTFp · p+ ∆p. (3.11)
If all types of species are present,i.e., pi(x, t) 6≡ 0 for i = 1, ..., n, then this stationary solution is called
the polymorphism. For the adapted linear replicator diffusion equation (3.11), Hadeler investigated the
long time behavior of the solution and proposed the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1. Let the ordinary differential equation (3.10) have an exponentially stable stationary
state with all components positive (stable polymorphism). Then for every initial function p(·, 0), the
solution of the replicator diffusion equation (3.11) converges uniformly in Ω towards a spatially homo-
geneous (i.e., constant) function, which is a stationary state of the ordinary differential equation.
The main tool used in the proof is the establishment of the spatial Lyapunov function and the com-
parison theorem for heat equations. We now state some preliminaries about these.
Lemma 3.3.2. (Comparison principle) For the heat equation
ut −∆u = f (3.12)
in a region Ω with initial condition u(x, 0) = g and Neumann boundary condition ∂u∂n
∣∣
∂Ω
= h. If we
have two solutions u1 and u2 with data satisfying f1 ≥ f2, g1 ≥ g2 and h1 ≥ h2, then u1 ≥ u2
everywhere.
This lemma can be proved via the maximum principle. The following lemma will state the classical
result about the stabilization of the solution of the Neumann prolbem for the heat equation with zero
source .
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Lemma 3.3.3. Consider the heat equation
ut −∆u = 0, (x, t) ∈ Ω×R+;
u(x, 0) = g, x ∈ Ω;
∂u
∂n
= 0, (x, t) ∈ ∂Ω×R+.
(3.13)
If u(x, t) is the solution of the equation and the initial function g satisfies
∫
Ω |g|dx ≤ M for some
M > 0, then u(x, t)→ u¯ as t→∞ where u¯ = ∫Ω gdx/|Ω|.
The above lemma can be proved by the method of separation of variables and fourier series. Next
we are interested in the replicator diffusion equation (3.7) or (3.8) where the replicator term depends
generalized nonlinear functions. Consider the initial condition
p(x, 0) = p0(x) (3.14)
where p0(x) ∈ C2+γ(Ω¯) for some γ > 0. Redheffer et.al. (1983) provided the theorem about the
existence and uniqueness of the solution of the general initial-boundary value problem in (37). This
theorem is the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.4. Let Ω be a bounded open connected subset of Rn with orientable boundary ∂Ω of class
C2+γ . Assume that D ⊂ Rn is open and f : D → Rn is locally Lipchitz continuous, also the matrix
A(x) = (aij(x)) is of class C1+γ(Ω¯) and A ≥ αIm with α > 0. Furthermore, u¯(x) ∈ C2+γ(Ω¯),
∂u¯/∂n = 0 on ∂Ω and u¯(x) ∈ D for x ∈ Ω¯. Then the problem
∂u
∂t
=
m∑
i,j=1
∂
∂xi
(
aij(x)
∂u
∂xj
)
+ f(u) for (x, t) ∈ Ω× J ;
u(x, 0) = u¯(x) x ∈ Ω¯;
∂u
∂n
(x, t) = 0 for (x, t) ∈ ∂Ω× J,
(3.15)
has a unique solution (u1(x, t), u2(x, t), ..., un(x, t)) ∈ Ω¯ × J where J = (0, T ] for any T > 0.If an
a priori estimate u(x, t) ≤ K for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x ∈ Ω¯ can be established, where K is independent of T ,
then the solution exists for all t ≥ 0.
Therefore the long time behavior of the solution for this replicator diffusion equation is stated in the
following theorem.
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Theorem 3.3.5. Let the ordinary differential equation (3.6) have an exponentially stable stationary
state with all components positive (stable polymorphism). Assume the bounded nonlinear payoff func-
tion pi(p) satisfies the following two conditions
[
(∇pi(p)T · p)i − (∇pi(p)T · p)j
][
pii(p)− pij(p)
] ≥ 0,∀i 6= j; (3.16)
xT∇pi(p)x ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ Rn satisfies
n∑
i=1
xi = 0, (3.17)
where the equality in (3.17) holds iff x = 0. Then the solution of the replicator diffusion equation (3.7)
with Neumann boundary condition (3.9) and initial condition (3.14) converges uniformly in Ω towards
a spatially homogeneous (i.e., constant) function, which is a stationary state of the ordinary differential
equation (3.6).
Proof. Denote the state space of the variable to be
S = {p ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
pi = 1, pi ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n}.
Since the population density function p is bounded above by 1, then the existence and uniqueness of the
solution of the replicator diffusion equation is guaranteed by Lemma 3.3.4. Also by the boundedness
of the solution p(x, t), the path {p(·, t), t ≥ t0 > 0} is compact in C1(Ω→ Rn), and C2(Ω→ Rn) as
well.
Define the average payoff functionW (p) : S → RwhereW (p) = pTpi(p) and it’s a Lyapunov function
for (3.6) because
dW (p(t))
dt
= pTt (pi(p) +∇pi(p)T · p)
= (pi(p)TP − (pTpi(p))pT)(pi(p) +∇pi(p)T · p)
=
[
pi(p)TPpi(p)− (pTpi(p))2]+ [pT∇pi(p)Ppi(p)− pT∇pi(p)p · pTpi(p)],
(3.18)
where
pi(p)TPpi(p)− (pTpi(p))2 =
n∑
i=1
pipi
2
i (p)−
( n∑
i=1
pipii(p)
)2 ≥ 0
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by the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and
pT∇pi(p)Ppi(p)− pT∇pi(p)p · pTpi(p)
=
n∑
i=1
pi(∇pi(p)T · p)ipii(p)−
n∑
i=1
pi(∇pi(p)T · p)i
n∑
j=1
pjpij(p)
=
n∑
i=1
pi(∇pi(p)T · p)ipii(p)
n∑
j=1
pj −
n∑
i=1
pi(∇pi(p)T · p)i
n∑
j=1
pjpij(p)
=
1
2
{∑
i 6=j
pipj
[
(∇pi(p)T · p)ipii(p) + (∇pi(p)T · p)jpij(p)− (∇pi(p)T · p)ipij(p)− pii(p)(∇pi(p)T · p)j
]}
=
1
2
{∑
i 6=j
pipj
[
(∇pi(p)T · p)i − (∇pi(p)T · p)j
][
pii(p)− pij(p)
]} ≥ 0.
The above two nonnegative quantities vanish if pii(p) = pij(p), ∀i 6= j, that is, p is stationary since
pt = 0 in (3.6).
Consider a particular solution p(x, t) of the initial value problem (3.8), (3.9) and (3.14). Denote a
spatial Lyapunov function w : Ω×R+ → [−K,K] where K = max{|W (p(x, t))| : (x, t) ∈ Ω×R+}
by
w(x, t) = W (p(x, t)). (3.19)
Then take the partial derivatives, we obtain
wxi = p
T
xipi(p) + p
T∇pi(p)pxi
wxixi = p
T
xixipi(p) + 2p
T
xi∇pi(p)pxi + pT∇pi(p)pxixi
∆w = ∆pTpi(p) + pT∇pi(p)∆p+ 2
N∑
i=1
pTxi∇pi(p)pxi
wt = p
T
t pi(p) + p
T∇pi(p)pt.
It follows that for (x, t) ∈ Ω×R+,
wt −∆w = (pt −∆p)T(pi(p) +∇pi(p)Tp)− 2
N∑
i=1
pTxi∇pi(p)pxi (3.20)
where (pt −∆p)T(pi(p) +∇pi(p)Tp) is in the same form as the right hand side term of (3.18) and for
(x, t) ∈ ∂Ω×R+,
∂w
∂n
= 0. (3.21)
We define the spatial average of w(x, t) to be
I(t) =
∫
Ω
w(x, t)dx/|Ω|. (3.22)
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Then integrate (3.20) we obtain∫
Ω
wtdx−
∫
Ω
∆wdx =
∫
Ω
[
(pt −∆p)T(pi(p) +∇pi(p)Tp)− 2
N∑
i=1
pTxi∇pi(p)pxi
]
dx ≥ 0.
Thus from the Neumann boundary condition we get
dI(t)
dt
=
(∫
Ω
wtdx−
∫
Ω
∂w
∂n
dS
)
/|Ω| =
(∫
Ω
wtdx−
∫
Ω
∆wdx
)
/|Ω| ≥ 0. (3.23)
Since I(t) is bounded above by K = max{|W (p(x, t))| : (x, t) ∈ Ω × R+}, therefore it converges
from below to some I¯ .
Based on Lemma 3.3.2, for every t, τ ≥ 0 the function w(x, t+τ) is bounded below by the solution
v(x, t, τ) of the equation
vt −∆v = 0;
v(x, t, 0) = w(x, t);
∂u
∂n
∣∣∣
∂Ω
= 0.
(3.24)
From Lemma 3.3.3, the solution v(x, t, τ) approximates a constant as τ →∞, that is,
v(x, t, τ)→ I(t). (3.25)
Thus
lim inf
τ→∞ w(x, t+ τ) ≥ I(t).
That is,
w¯(x) = lim inf
t→∞ w(x, t) ≥ limt→∞ I(t) = I¯ . (3.26)
Next we show that
lim
t→∞w(x, t) = I¯ . (3.27)
Assume there is a point x0 ∈ Ω and a sequence {tk}∞k=1 with tk → ∞ such that w(x0, tk) →
I1 > I¯ . Then since w(x, t) is bounded on Ω × R+, we choose a subsequence {tkj}∞j=1 such that
w(x, tkj ) → w1(x) uniformly in Ω. Thus w1(x0) = I1 > I¯ . From (3.26) we know w1(x) ≥ I¯ , but∫
Ωw1(x)dx/|Ω| = limk→∞
∫
Ωw(x, tjk)dx/|Ω| = limk→∞ I(tjk) = I¯ . Contradiction!
Thus w(·, t) converges to a constant I¯ for all x ∈ Ω as t→∞. Then it follows that
wt → 0 (3.28)
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and
∆w → 0. (3.29)
From (3.19) we therefore have
[
(pt −∆p)T(pi(p) +∇pi(p)Tp)− 2
N∑
i=1
pTxi∇pi(p)pxi
]→ 0. (3.30)
Since (pt −∆p)T(pi(p) +∇pi(p)Tp) ≥ 0 and
∑N
i=1 p
T
xi∇pi(p)pxi ≤ 0, then
(pt −∆p)T(pi(p) +∇pi(p)Tp)→ 0 (3.31)
and
N∑
i=1
pTxi∇pi(p)pxi → 0. (3.32)
For any sequence {tk}∞k=1 with tk →∞ there is a subsequence {tkj}∞j=1 such that p(x, tkj ) converges
in C2. From the fact that
∑N
i=1 p
T
xi∇pi(p)pxi ≤ 0 and (3.32), we know that all first derivatives of
p(·, tkj ) approach 0, thus p(·, tkj ) goes to a constant. By (3.18) and (3.32) we know this constant is a
stationary solution of (3.6).
Remark 3.3.6. For linear game with n strategies, that is, pi(p) = Ap, the left hand side of condition
(3.16) is perfect square and condition (3.17) can be derived from the existence of the exponentially
stable stationary state. However for nonlinear games,∇pi(p) depends on local p and is not generally the
constant matrix A any more. Then the existence of exponentially stable stationary state can no longer
derive condition (3.17) as that in linear games. So theorem 3.3.1 is a special case of theorem 3.3.5, and
theorem 3.3.5 still holds without the condition for existence of exponentially stable stationary state.
3.4 Examples and Numerical Simulation Results
For the system described in section 3.3, there is no closed form solution for it, thus we investigate
the finite difference algorithms for studying the dynamics of spatially distributed population based on
the replicator diffusion equations given appropriate initial and boundary conditions. The convergence
and stability analysis of the finite difference schemes will also be studied as followed.
We consider the parabolic system in a two-dimensional space. To construct the finite-difference
methods in a bounded rectangle region, we take a uniform subdivision of the region Ω = [0, A]× [0, B]
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with grid points (xi, yj) = (ih, jh), i = 0, ..., I, j = 0, ..., J where I = A/h, J = B/h. We also
use a uniform subdivision of the time interval [0, T ] with time levels tk = k∆t, k = 1, ...,K where
K = T/∆t. Then the approximate of the solution p(x, t) in a three dimension region Ω × [0, T ] is
denoted by pki,j = (p
k
1,i,j , ..., p
k
n,i,j). We can number the two-dimensional grid in a natural way, that
is, number consecutively from left to right starting from the bottom row, from m = 0, 1, ...,M where
M = (I + 1)(J + 1)− 1. Thus we have the following
pks,m = p
k
s,i,j , s = 1, ..., n;m = i+ j(I + 1); i = 0, ..., I; j = 0, ..., J. (3.33)
Denote pki,j = (p
k
1,i,j , ..., p
k
n,i,j). We use the following notation to simplify the forward differences in
time, the five point central difference approximation of the Laplacian in two dimensions:
∂kφ = (φ
k − φk−1)/∆t,
∆hψ = (ψi,j−1 + ψi,j+1 + ψi−1,j + ψi+1,j − 4ψi,j)/h2.
(3.34)
Next we discuss three two-dimensional linear schemes for the replicator diffusion equation in (3.8),(3.9)
and (3.14). First of all, for k = 1, ...,K and i = 0, ..., I, j = 0, ..., J find pks,i,j , s = 1, ..., n such that
∂kp
k
s,i,j = ∆hp
k−1
s,i,j + p
k−1
s,i,j
(
pis
(
pk−1i,j
)− pk−1i,j pi(pk−1i,j )) (3.35)
with initial conditions
p0i,j = p0,i,j = p0(xi, yj). (3.36)
From a computational point of view, the most convenient way is to use the explicit method in (3.35)
to approximate the solution of the continuous system (3.8). However, this method imposes a severe
restriction on the step size for numerical stability. An alternative approach is the semi-implicit method
in the sense that the Laplacian operator is replaced by an implicit approximation while the reaction term
is approximated by an explicit expression. That is,
∂kp
k
s,i,j = ∆hp
k
s,i,j + p
k−1
s,i,j
(
pis
(
pk−1i,j
)− pk−1i,j pi(pk−1i,j )). (3.37)
The third way is the implicit method that requires some iterative scheme for the computation of nu-
merical solutions and leads to a system of nonlinear algebraic equations which preserves the analogous
qualitative property of the continuous system. The iterative process comes from the following
∂kp
k
s,i,j = ∆hp
k
s,i,j + p
k
s,i,j
(
pis
(
pki,j
)− pki,jpi(pki,j)). (3.38)
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This method can be seen in (25). But its main requirements are the mixed quasi-monotone property in
the replicator reaction term and the existence of a pair of coupled upper and lower solutions which are
hard to be satisfied.
We consider two examples of nonlinear games with two strategies C and D. The game dynamic
model of the nonlinear games is
df
dt
= f(PC(f, h)− fPC(f, h)− hPD(f, h))
dh
dt
= h(PD(f, h)− fPC(f, h)− hPD(f, h)),
(3.39)
where f is the frequency of strategy C players, h is the frequency of strategy D players, and f +
h = 1 for each t. Assume that the fractional fixed point f∗ for the replicator equation in (3.39) is
asymptotically stable, and evolutionarily stable strategy as well. We further suppose that the payoff
functions satisfy the conditions of the theorem 3.3.5 and from this theorem, we know that the solution
of the adapted replicator diffusion equation
∂f
∂t
= ∆f + f(PC(f, h)− fPC(f, h)− hPD(f, h))
∂h
∂t
= ∆h+ h(PD(f, h)− fPC(f, h)− hPD(f, h))
∂f
∂n
∣∣∣
∂Ω
= 0
∂h
∂n
∣∣∣
∂Ω
= 0
(3.40)
given any piecewise smooth initial condition in the bounded compact region Ω goes to a spatially
homogeneous stationary point of (3.39) uniformly as t → ∞. We can also numerically verify this
conclusion on the long time behavior of the adapted replicator diffusion equations. From the constraint
f + h = 1, the replicator diffusion equations can be reduced to
∂f
∂t
= ∆f + f(PC(f, 1− f)− fPC(f, 1− f)− (1− f)PD(f, 1− f))
∂f
∂n
∣∣∣
∂Ω
= 0.
(3.41)
Using the explicit finite difference method, we obtain the following iterative process
∂kf
k
s,i,j = ∆hf
k−1
s,i,j + f
k−1
s,i,j
(
PC
(
fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j
)− fk−1s,i,j PC(fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j )
− (1− fk−1s,i,j )PD(fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j )). (3.42)
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After adding the boundary and initial conditions, the above formula can be simplified and it boils down
to
∂kf
k
s,i,j = ∆hf
k−1
s,i,j + f
k−1
s,i,j
(
1− fk−1s,i,j
)(
PC
(
fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j
)− PD(fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j ))
B(k)[fks,i,j ] = 0
f0s,i,j = p0,i,j ,
(3.43)
where B(k)[fks,i,j ] is a suitable approximations of the Neumann boundary operator B =
∂
∂n at the k-
th time step. Alternatively we apply the semi-implicit approach and similarly we have the iterative
procedure as follows
∂kf
k
s,i,j = ∆hf
k
s,i,j + f
k−1
s,i,j
(
1− fk−1s,i,j
)(
PC
(
fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j
)− PD(fk−1s,i,j , 1− fk−1s,i,j ))
B(k)[fks,i,j ] = 0
f0s,i,j = p0,i,j .
(3.44)
The semi-implicit scheme can be expressed as IJ linear equations at each time step tk, k = 1, ...,K.
It’s computationally efficient to apply the conjugate gradient method to solve the linear system instead
of the solving scheme using high dimensional matrix decomposition. The semi-implicit scheme is a
stable finite-difference approximation of the solution of the parabolic differential equation.
In the numerical simulations, the initial data is set to be p0,i,j = 0.02 if |xi| ≤ A2 , |yj | ≤ A2 ,
p0,i,j = 1 if
(
xi − 3A4
)2
+
(
yj − 3A4
)2 ≤ (A4 )2 and 0.3 otherwise where A means the side length of the
squared region. All codes were implemented in MATLAB 7.14 (R2012a).
3.4.1 Constructed Example
Consider a nonlinear game that is artificially constructed with the following nonlinear payoff func-
tions for two strategies C and D:
PC = − log
(
f +
1
2
)
PD = log
(
f +
1
2
)
.
(3.45)
From the categorization criteria of nonlinear games in (40), we know that this game is a Snowdrift
nonlinear game. And the unique Nash equilibrium is f∗ = 12 , which is both evolutionarily stable and
asymptotical stable. It can be verified that the payoff functions in this game satisfy the conditions (3.16)
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and (3.17) in theorem 3.3.5. Then theoretically the solution of the corresponding adapted converges
uniformly to a stationary state of (3.39). We also verify this conclusion from the simulation study and
the results are provided in Figure 3.1 and 3.2.
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Figure 3.1 Two dimensional approximates for strategy C frequency at different time points. (a)
t = 0.2. (b) t = 1.5.
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Figure 3.2 Long time behavior of the average frequency of strategy C in adapted replicator diffu-
sion equation and comparison of it and replicator dynamics. (a) Replicator dynamics. (b)
Adapted replicator diffusion equation.
Figure 3.1 suggests that the frequencies of strategy C at all locations are becoming homogeneous as
the time increases. That is, the cooperator frequencies tend to the same constant uniformly during the
initial time period. This indicates that the diffusion rate 1 is large and the diffusion effects is significant
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which dominates the mechanism of the replicator diffusion equation by comparing to the replicator
source term. As the frequencies of all individuals at the grids converge to the constant homogeneously,
then there is nearly no gap between the frequency of each grid and that of its neighbors, and thus
the diffusion effects become ignorable and the reaction source effects take over the dominance and
determine the mechanism of the equation. From then on, the diffusion term will be approximately zero
and the adapted replicator diffusion equations behave the same as the replicator dynamics, that is, the
overall solution of the replicator diffusion equation for every spatial location is almost identical to the
solution in the replicator dynamics. This is consistent with the patterns shown in Figure 3.2.
In Figure 3.2, the first plot represents the solution curves of the replicator dynamics with respect to
time and the second plot gives us the average strategy C frequencies of the adapted replicator diffusion
equations. The average frequency of the parabolic systems converge to a constant 0.5 which is the
equilibrium of the games. That means the mechanism of the replicator dynamics and that of adapted
replicator diffusion equations are similar in a well-mixed population. We can therefore conclude that the
frequencies of the strategy C players in the parabolic equations will converge uniformly to the spatial
homogeneous solution of the nonlinear replicator dynamics which is an evolutionarily stable state.
3.4.2 Yeast Example
Consider another example of nonlinear game in a yeast system proposed in (26; 31). There are two
types of strains—cooperator and cheater strains (defector) and Gore et al. found that the interaction
between these two strains could be either snowdrift game or prisoner’s dilemma, and the nature of this
cooperation game depends on the parameters interpreted as the glucose concentration and the histidine
concentration levels. That is, the cooperator strain in the experiments is histidine auxotroph and limiting
the histidine concentration will experimentally increase the cost of cooperation. If the rare strategies
which will often interact with the opposite strategy do comparatively well under certain levels of glucose
and histidine, then there will be coexistence between cooperation and defection and the game becomes
snowdrift game. However if the histidine concentration is low and the glucose concentration is high,
the cheating strains will always do better and the defectors outgrow the cooperators which leads to the
extinction of cooperators and the game will be prisoner’s dilemma game. These can be seen in Figure
3.3.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.3 Game theory models of cooperation in yeast system. (a) A model of cooperation with
experimentally measured concave benefits yields a central region of parameter space that
is a snowdrift game. (b) Fraction of cooperators at equilibrium as a function of the glucose
and histidine concentrations.
They also measured the growth rate as a function of glucose concentration and cooperator strain
fractions and then derived the nonlinear payoff functions for these two types of strains. Thus they
imposed the capture efficiency , cost c and the power of α onto the benefit terms and fitted the payoff
functions with respect to those parameters and cooperator frequency. Thus the payoff functions of
cheater or defector and cooperator are the following
PC = [g + (1− g)(+ f(1− ))]α − c
PD = [g + (1− g)f(1− )]α,
(3.46)
where f is the frequency of cooperator strains in the yeast population. Huang and Wu established the
spatial homogeneous game dynamic model for the yeast system (31). They also established the fact
that the fractional fixed point f∗ for the replicator equation in (3.39) of the yeast game is asymptotically
stable, and evolutionarily stable strategy as well. However the conditions of the theorem 3.3.5 are not
completely satisfied for the nonlinear games with two different set of parameters which suggest it’s
not sufficient to prove that the solution of the adapted replicator diffusion equation given any piecewise
smooth initial condition in the bounded compact region Ω goes to a stationary state uniformly as t→∞.
Even though the convergence of the solution cannot be guaranteed theoretically, we numerically justify
the asymptotical behavior of the solution to the adapted replicator diffusion equation in the yeast system.
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Figure 3.4 Two dimensional approximates for the cooperator strain frequency using different parame-
ter sets at different time points. (a) A = 1, a = 1, g = 0.00, c = 0.0023, T = 5000, I = 20
at t = 0.2. (b) A = 1, a = 1, g = 0.00, c = 0.0023, T = 5000, I = 20 at t = 1.5.
(c) A = 1, a = 1, g = 0.03, c = 0.0254, T = 5000, I = 20 at t = 0.2. (d)
A = 1, a = 1, g = 0.03, c = 0.0254, T = 5000, I = 20 at t = 1.5.
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Figure 3.5 Long time behavior of the average frequency of cooperators in adapted replica-
tor diffusion equations and comparison of replicator dynamics and adapted repli-
cator diffusion equations . (a)-(b) Snowdrift game where the parameter set is
A = 1, a = 1, g = 0.00, c = 0.0023, T = 5000, I = 20, and the exper-
imental equilibrium is 0.6. (c)-(d) Prisoner’s Dilemma where the parameter set is
A = 1, a = 1, g = 0.03, c = 0.0254, T = 5000, I = 20, and the experimental equi-
librium is 0.
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In the numerical schemes, the frequency density of cooperators in (3.44) is calculated with respect
to various parameter sets that were chosen in the yeast experiment of Gore et al. Associated with the
computer implementation, the results of the computer experiments are presented in Figure 3.4 and 3.5.
From the plots in Figure 3.4, we can see that there are two different parameter sets and they cor-
respond to two different types of games: Snowdrift game and Prisoner Dilemma. Even though the
nature of the game are different, they all present the same pattern that the frequencies at all locations
are becoming homogeneous. And similar to the constructed example, the cooperator frequencies tend
to a constant uniformly which is the initial average frequency. It tells us that the diffusion rate is large
and the diffusion effect is dominating the mechanism of the replicator diffusion equation initially. This
may explain the well-mixedness of some biological systems caused by the diffusion or dispersal effects
from internal or external forces. When the frequencies of individuals at all locations converge to the
same constant, the diffusion term approximates zero and the reaction source effect starts to dominate
and decides the mechanism of the dynamics. Afterwards, the spatial term is almost zero and the adapted
replicator diffusion equations behave like the replicator dynamics, that is, the behavior of the solution
at every spatial location in the replicator diffusion equation is almost the same that in the replicator
dynamics. This agrees with the curves shown in Figure 3.5.
The first column in Figure 3.5 represents the solution curves of the replicator dynamics with respect
to time under two different sets of parameters and the second column gives us the average cooperator
frequencies of the adapted replicator diffusion equations in corresponding two types of games. The
spatial average of the solution converges to some constant for each parameter set where the constant is
approximately the equilibriums of corresponding game. Also we compare the cooperator frequencies
in replicator dynamics and the average cooperator frequencies in corresponding adapted replicator dif-
fusion equations in each row of Figure 3.5, we can see that there is no much difference between the two
curves. That means the mechanism of the replicator dynamics is similar to that of adapted replicator
diffusion equations. We further conclude that the frequencies of the cooperator strain in the parabolic
equations will converge uniformly to the spatial homogeneous stationary state of the replicator dynam-
ics in yeast game. So in the perspective of computation, we get some important clues to the behavior
of two yeast strains in the spatially extended environment and this also gives a reasonable geological
interpretation for the uniform spatial convergence in theorem 3.3.5.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we have discussed the equivalent conditions of the evolutionarily stable strategy for
a general class of replicator dynamics. We also establish the theory for the long time behavior of the
solution in the adapted replicator diffusion equations which incorporates the spatial effects. Finally the
construct artificial system and the yeast cooperation system in Gore et al.(2009) are tested out to verify
the long time behavior of the adapted replicator diffusion equations generated from the game dynamics.
Although it’s difficult to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of the existence of evolutionar-
ily stable strategies for the direct form of the payoff functions of all species in a population game based
on the replicator dynamics, we derive the equivalent conditions of ESS from the differential behavior of
the payoff functions at the stationary state indirectly using the Taylor expansion idea. The coefficients
of two Taylor series are compared based on the definition of the ESS and this yields to infinite series of
inequalities involving the infinite differential properties of the payoff functions at the stationary state.
We find that the stronger version of first two inequalities are necessary to the existence of a regular ESS
which is an refinement of ESS. Also these two inequalities are necessary and sufficient for an ESS when
the game is a linear game.
As for the general replicator dynamics of multiple species in a population, the spatial effects deter-
mined by the environment are introduced and the adapted replicator diffusion equation are then gener-
ated from the general replicator equations by adding the same diffusion term for all species. Based on
the lemmas about the convergence of simple heat equation and the existence and uniqueness of a general
class of parabolic equations, we prove the uniform convergence of the solution of the adapted replicator
diffusion equation to the exponentially stable stationary state. This suggests that the cooperation and
competition of several species in a spatially distributed population finally reaches an equilibrium which
is the same as those well mixed population in the same payoff functions situation from the biological
point of view.
The constructed game and the yeast game proposed by Gore et al. are classical population games
within two populations. In the yeast game, Gore et al. examined the wild type strain (cooperator) and
the mutant strain (defector). The authors derived the payoff functions for this yeast system which was
a nonlinear game. The dynamics and equilibrium stability of this game were investigated by Huang
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and Wu (2012) and the results fitted the experimental ones very well. The replicator equations for the
artificial game, and especially for the yeast game, are adapted by adding diffusion terms because of
the nature of strains digesting the dispersal glucose in the environment. And we use the semi-implicit
algorithm to generate the numerical solutions of the two adapted equations. The contour plots of the
frequencies of the strategy C are plotted, and they indicates that it is the diffusion effect that drives
the behaviors of the solutions initially. The latter process are then governed by the replicator source
term and this is justified by the contour plots of cooperator frequencies and the comparison plots of the
frequencies under the well-mixed replicator dynamics and the average frequencies under the adapted
replicator diffusion equations for different types of nonlinear games. The payoff functions in yeast
game don’t satisfy both conditions in theorem 3.3.5, but the numerical experiments still indicates the
long time behavior of the solution, which suggests that the conditions in theorem 3.3.5 may be stronger
for the asymptotic convergence of the solution.
The present modeling study shows the asymptotical behavior of the adapted replicator diffusion
equations under the same diffusion rate situation. It also filling one with the interest in evolutionary
game theory and its applicators from both mathematical and biological perspective. Our future work
will consider the behavior of the solution to the parabolic systems with weaker conditions than those
in theorem 3.3.5 and more general diffusion effects which means the dispersal rate of the species in a
population vary or be more general operator rather than Laplacian, and the methodology of parameter
estimation in such replicator diffusion equations.
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CHAPTER 4. PARAMETER ESTIMATION IN DYNAMICAL METAGENOMIC
MODEL
Abstract
Many biological systems and evolutionary processes can be described by a set of temporal mathe-
matical models, especially evolutionary game models. There is sparse literature for the estimation of
parameters in the game theoretical models, and it’s challenging to infer the parameters from raw data.
We propose a specific model for the temporal evolution of mixed populations, such as those queried in
modern metagenomics. The problem for identifiability of the parameters in the model is addressed. A
simulation study is implemented to test the feasibility and acceptability of the procedure. We will apply
the proposed methodology and techniques to a microbial data set from gut communities of mice. It is
expected that the proposed modeling and estimation approaches be used for a variety of evolutionary
game studies.
4.1 Introduction
In biological systems, it is often of great interest to predict the future prosperity, stability, dominance
or extinction of an individual organism or species, and to describe and interpret the changes among
them in a population as well. With the advent of modern sequencing technology, it is possible to query
microbial community dynamics at previously unattainable scales, many species at frequent sampling
times. In the population-based modeling approaches, the internal states and phenotypic functions are
assumed to be homogeneous across cells within each species. One of the main issues therein is how to
account for interspecies interactions in a direct or indirect way for the prediction of community structure
and functions. A review of static methods for inferring interspecies interactions and approaches for
predicting community structure in a given condition and its dynamic change in response to perturbations
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is presented (63). Our focus is on inference from temporal samples. For the sake of simplicity, we
confine our discussion to well-mixed environments.
Advanced metagenomics techniques allow for the identification of member species in the commu-
nity and estimates of their abundances or relative abundances. Sequence data can be segregated into
bins representing distinct Operational Taxonomic Units (OTU), which may be individual organism or
species, or groups of species that share similar genomes. Microbial relationships can be inferred from
species abundance or relative abundance data. The network of microbial associations can be predicted
in a way using the techniques that include similarity-based methods, regression-based and rule-based
methods. (For a review, see (47)). Another type of model—stoichiometric metabolic networks can be
used to model individual species/taxa in microbial communities of equilibrium. In pioneering work by
Stoylar et al., flux balance analysis (FBA) was applied to analyze the syntrophic relationship between
sulfate-reducing bacteria and methanogens (62). Klitgord and Segre extended the method of Stoylar et
al. to explore interspecies metabolite exchanges for various pairwise combinations of seven bacterial
species (51). To relate microbe abundance with external covariates, nonlinear regression models includ-
ing bioclimatic models and their extended forms are used to predict species abundance as a function of
environmental conditions and its variation across a landscape (46; 52). While most researchers are
familiar for kinetic approaches which deal with absolute concentrations, thermodynamic models poten-
tially work with relative concentrations and may provide more mechanistic predictions on the change of
community structure across conditions. For example, Larowe et al. used thermodynamic modeling to
evaluate and compare the driving forces responsible for microbial anaerobic methane oxidation across
representative marine ecological sites and different consortia (53). Finally species may not be the most
natural units to describe the diversity and dynamics of microbial communities, Taxonomic or phyloge-
netic distinctions among species can become obscure and the dynamics of microbial communities better
explained by focusing on microbial traits. Thus trait-based models, which use differential equations to
represent the rates of change of nutrients, organic pools, etc., can be used for the steady state and dy-
namic analyses of diverse ecosystems. For instance, Boskill et al. introduced a microbial community
trait-based modeling framework to study the nitrification in the microbe-mediated nitrogen cycle (43).
Suppose species abundances or relative frequencies are sampled over time. The Lotka-Volterra
type equations or replicator equations mechanistically model the intrinsic growth rates and interactions
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among the species. The Lotka-Volterra (LV) models are appropriate kinetic models for species abun-
dance data, but abundances in sequence data are often dominated by technical noise. As an alternative,
the replicator equations can model microbial population dynamics for relative abundances. The replica-
tor equation arises out of evolutionary game theory, which was designed to study evolutionary biology
and population interactions. It considers a population of players interacting in a game and each player
or individual has fixed strategies. All the players interact with all others and receive fitness or payoff,
and success in the game is translated into reproductive success. In 1978 Taylor and Jonker introduced
a differential equation for evolutionary game dynamics (64), and later Zeeman, Schuster, Hofbauer and
Sigmund did a general analysis on this type of differential equations (48; 49; 65). Suppose there exist
interactions among n strategies and the payoff for a player with strategy i when interacting with an-
other player choosing strategy j is given by the parameter aij . Then the fully structured n × n matrix
A = [aij ] is called the payoff matrix which characterizes the interaction of n strategies. Let fi denote
the relative frequency of strategy i players in a population. The expected payoff of a strategy i player
can be formulated as Pi =
∑n
j=1 aijfj and the average payoff for the whole population is given by
φ =
∑n
i=1 fiPi. Thus the replicator equations to model the population interactions are
f˙i = fi(Pi − φ) i = 1, ..., n. (4.1)
The above equations are defined on a simplex Sn = {f ∈ Rn :
∑n
i=1 fi = 1; fi ≥ 0, ∀ i}, and they
describe pure selection among the n strategies without mutation.
In this chapter, we explore the use of the replicator equations for studying the interaction of species
in a microbial community sample over time using next generation sequencing applied to metagenomics.
Specifically, we propose a parsimonious mixture model to reduce the number of free parameters. We
combine information across multiple biological replicates, using the Negative Binomial to account for
excess biological variation. We use smoothing spline approximation to the replicator equation solu-
tions to avoid repeated integration. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our model by testing it
on simulation data. We end by discussing future directions that will further improve our estimation
procedure.
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4.2 Motivation
Marino et al. (2014) sequenced the 16S ribosomal gene from DNA isolated from the fecal material
of germfree mice colonized with the cecal contents of conventionally raised animals and modeled these
time-series data to characterize the interactions among the members of complicated murine microbial
communities (54). To characterize the complex microbial communities, they classified the 16S sequence
data into operational taxonomic units (OTU) representing species or higher taxonomic levels. They
then formulated and fitted a system of ordinary differential equations to the OTU relative-abundance
temporal data. The relative magnitudes of the intrinsic growth rates and the interactions between 17
OTUs were quantified by the following generalized Lotka-Volterra equations
dXi(t)
dt
= αiXi(t)
(
1− Xi(t)
K
)
+Xi(t)
(
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
βijXj(t)
)
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4.2)
where αi ≥ 0,
∑
iXi ≤ 1 and n = 17. They concluded that all the OTUs had growth rates significantly
above zero and of the 136 pairs of interactions between the 17 OTUs, 91 were competitive, 22 were
parasitic and 17 were ammensalistic, 4 were commensal, 2 were neutral and none were mutualistic
which indicated the gut environment was highly competitive, and numerous populations kept the others
from dominating the community.
Though the dynamic model (4.2) can quantify the interactions among OTUs, it is not appropriate to
model the relative abundance dynamics. Instead the replicator equations in evolutionary game theory
are a good candidate to demonstrate the temporal process of OTU relative abundances. Even though the
replicator equations and Lotka-Volterra equations are equivalent (Hofbauer, 1998), replicator dynamics
are best used to describe the evolution of species proportions in a population driven by a frequency
dependent fitness comparison while the Lotka-Volterra equations are suitable for describing density
or absolute abundance dynamics of interacting species populations. Furthermore, Marino et al. were
imposing positivity constraints on the intrinsic growth rates αi, which may not be appropriate. Certainly,
interaction parameters for OTUs will be misestimated if the sign of the growth rate is misspecified,
resulting in incorrect inferences about the OTU relationships. For n OTUs in a microbial community,
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Figure 4.1 Observed temporal patterns for each OTU of 17 in each of 5 mice.
the direct application of the replicator dynamics with n equations which are the following
X˙i = Xi
 n∑
j=1
aijXj −
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
ajkXjXk
 i = 1, . . . , n, (4.3)
is not suitable because of the identifiability issue, that is, the payoff matrix [aij ] are not identifiable.
Even though we can reparameterize the payoff matrix in terms of n(n − 1) = 272 parameters which
is large compared to the number of observations for the Marino data, where each OTU is observed at
about 21 time points in 5 mice (Figure 4.1). Without any prior information on the relationship between
the OTUs, we cannot limit the number of parameters to structure the dynamics. However, we observe
similar temporal dynamics of certain OTUs across all mice in Figure 4.1. For instance, OTU 2, 3, 7,
8 and 17 (rare OTU) have the same increasing pattern, while OTU 4 and 10 display the same sudden
disappearance soon after introduction. It is possible that these OTUs belong to related species, or
families that share biological properties. In any case, it would be valuable to cluster OTUs into groups
with similar dynamic patterns and to characterize the interactions among the clustered OTUs.
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4.3 Model
It is assumed that there is a population of n OTUs (n usually is large, i.e., n ≥ 15) in M mice, and
the abundance of the OTUs in each mouse are measured atN time points tj , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. Let yijm
be the noisy count measurement of OTU i at time point tj observed in replicatem. Then Sjm =
n∑
i=1
yijm
is the observed sample size taken at tj in mouse m. Two discrete probability distributions, the Poisson
distribution or Negative-Binomial (NB) distribution are usually proposed to model sequence count data.
However, the Poisson distribution is shown to be appropriate for sequence data only when no biological
replicates are included (44; 55). When there are biological replicates, the sequence count data may
exhibit more variability than expected with a Poisson distribution, i.e. the overdispersion phenomenon
in (42). The NB distribution model for analysis of sequence data allows overdispersion and has been
applied to RNA-seq data analysis. We consider the NB distribution in this article.
4.3.1 Identifiability Analysis
To analyze the identifiability of the parameters of the payoff matrix A = [aij ] in equation (4.1), the
direct test method in (56) is implemented. That is, for the general dynamic system
x˙(t) = f(t,x(t),u(t),θ),
where x(t) is the measurement or output vector, u(t) is the known system input vector and θ is the
parameter vector, it is necessary to verify whether each unique system output corresponds to a unique
set of parameter values, that is,
x(u,θ1) = x(u,θ2)⇒ θ1 = θ2
is satisfied either globally or locally if the model is identifiable. Note that usually f = f(x(t),θ) does
not explicitly depend on t and u(t), therefore, it is equivalent to justify whether
f(x(t),θ1) = f(x(t),θ2)⇒ θ1 = θ2 (4.4)
holds globally or locally.
To test the identifiability of the parameters originated from the payoff matrix in general replicator
dynamics, we use the theorem of equivalence between the replicator equations and the Lotka-Voltera
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equations. Two systems of differential equations are called equivalent if one can be transformed into
another by a certain change of variables. In particular the change of variable transforms solutions of one
set of equations into solutions of another. In general, the problem of equivalence between differential
equations consists in determining whether two equation systems are equivalent up to a given class of
transformations. The theorem of equivalence between them is
Theorem 4.3.1. The general Lotka-Volterra equations describe the interaction of n − 1 species with
n ≥ 3 and are of the form
y˙i = yi(ri +
n−1∑
j=1
bijyj) i = 1, · · · , n− 1, (4.5)
where yi ≥ 0 is the abundance or count of species i, ri is the growth rate of species i, and the interaction
between species i and j is given by bij . The general replicator equations of n strategies are
x˙i = xi
[ n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
ajkxjxk
]
i = 1, · · · , n. (4.6)
Then the Lotka-Volterra equations (4.5) with the parameters ri = ain − ann and bij = aij − anj are
equivalent to the replicator equations (4.6).
The equivalence can be shown with the transformation y =
∑n−1
i=1 yi , xi = yi/(1 + y) for i =
1, · · · , n− 1 and xn = 1/(1 + y). The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A. From the equivalence
of the two equations, we see that the structural identifiability of the parameters {aij : i, j = 1, . . . , n}
in the replicator equations are closely related with that of the parameters {ri, bij : i, j = 1, . . . , n− 1}
in the Lotka-Volterra equations.
To study the structural identifiability of the parameters in the Lotka-Volterra equations, we imple-
ment the direct test in (4.4). Let θ = (r1, · · · , rn−1, b11, · · · , bn−1,n−1), fi(y,θ) = yi(ri+
∑n−1
j=1 bijyj),
i = 1, · · · , n− 1 and f(y,θ) = (f1(y,θ), · · · , fn−1(y,θ)). From f(y,θ) = f(y,θ′), we have
yi
(
ri +
n−1∑
j=1
bijyj
)
= yi
(
r′i +
n−1∑
j=1
b′ijyj
)
, i = 1, · · · , n− 1. (4.7)
Solving the above n− 1 equations, we obtain
ri = r
′
i, i = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1;
bij = b
′
ij , i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n− 1,
which indicates that the parameters θ = (r1, · · · , rn−1, b11, · · · , bn−1,n−1) are identifiable. Thus we
have the following identifiability theorem
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Theorem 4.3.2. For the general Lotka-Volterra equations
y˙i = yi(ri +
n−1∑
j=1
bijyj) i = 1, · · · , n− 1,
the parameters (r1, · · · , rn−1, b11, · · · , bn−1,n−1) are identifiable. From the equivalence of the Lotka-
Volterra equations and the replicator equations of n strategies of the form
x˙i = xi
[ n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
ajkxjxk
]
i = 1, · · · , n,
the parameters {aij , i, j = 1, · · · , n} are not identifiable. However, n(n − 1) combinations of the
parameters {ain − ann, i = 1, · · · , n− 1; aij − anj , i, j = 1, · · · , n− 1} are identifiable.
In real life applications to these models, initial conditions may not be known. If the initial conditions
of the frequencies for all species are considered to be parameters instead of known constants, then the
conclusions on the identifiability of the parameters in the payoff matrix will still hold. There is not any
literature dealing with the identifiability of the initial conditions in differential equations, especially the
Lotka-Volttera type equations and the replicator equations. The identifiability of the initial conditions
are defined in a way which is the same as the parameters in the dynamics. Thus, we conclude that
the initial value parameters are uniquely determined given the output y(t,θ,y0) at initial time t0 since
y0 = y(t0,θ,y0) and if
y(t0,θ1,y0,1) = y(t0,θ2,y0,2),
then
y0,1 = y(t0,θ1,y0,1) = y(t0,θ2,y0,2) = y0,2,
which indicates that y0 is identifiable. So from the perspective of mathematical identifiability, the initial
state parameters y0 = y(t0,θ,y0) are trivially identifiable as long as the states are observed at t0, and
they will not affect the identifiability of the parameters in the payoff matrix.
4.3.2 Dispersion Estimator
For the NB distribution, the variance is parameterized as
V ar(Yijm) = µijm + φijµ
2
ijm (4.8)
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where µijm is the mean of the NB distribution and φij is the dispersion parameter. In the analysis of
sequence data, φij accounts for the mouse-to-mouse variability. Robinson and Smyth (60) described
several methods to estimate φij , and Nelder and Lee compared dispersion estimators and found that
pseudo-likelihood methods are almost always less efficient than quasi-likelihood methods (57). In this
article, we estimate φij by the quasi-likelihood method. As in (61) we estimate φij without imposing
structure on µijm, and then condition on the estimates φˆij in subsequent sections.
Suppose yij1, . . . , yijM are independent and NB(µijm = Sjmλij , φij) distributed, where Sjm is
the total sample size and λij represents the proportion of the population that is OTU i at time tj . In
this simple case, the MLE of λij will depend on φij and maximum likelihood estimation of the two
parameters (λij , φij) proceeds jointly for each i and j. We describe the quasi-likelihood approach for
estimating NB dispersion based on µijm = Sjmλij . The estimating equation is
2
M∑
m=1
{
yijm log
[
yijm
µˆijm
]
− (yijm + φ−1ij ) log
[
yijm + φ
−1
ij
µˆijm + φ
−1
ij
]}
= M − 1, ∀ i, j, (4.9)
where µˆijm = Sjmλˆij and λˆij is the MLE of λij given φij . After estimating φˆij from equation (4.9),
the only remaining unknown parameters are those connect with the mean component in the NB mixture
model considered next.
4.3.3 NB Mixture Model
As suggested from the similarities observed in the dynamic profiles of OTUs in Figure 4.1, we
will use soft clustering to group the OTUs into K groups. Suppose the n OTUs are independently
assigned to these groups with the same prior probability. Let Zi be the latent rando variable indicating
the group of OTU i and P (Zi = k) = pk, k = 1, . . . ,K, ∀ i. We assume that OTUs assigned to the
same group follow identical dynamics. Thus, their relative proportions within the group do not change
over time. In addition, because we observe sequences from OTUs, rather than the OTUs themselves,
OTU i contributes a fixed amount dik to the sequence data originating from group k. Given the group
assignment, the counts of sequences from OTU i at time t)j in mouse m are assumed to be independent
NB, specifically
yijm|Zi = k ∼ NB(sjmdikfkj , φˆij) i = 1, . . . , n, (4.10)
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where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is the group number, pkdik is the relative abundance of sequences from OTU
i in group k with constraint pk
n∑
i=1
dik = 1, fkj is the proportion of group k at time tj , and sjm is the
OTU sample size at time tj in mouse m. The assumption pk
n∑
i=1
dik = 1 for all k yields
E
(
n∑
i=1
yijm
)
=
n∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
pksjmdikfkj
= sjm
K∑
k=1
fkj
(
pk
n∑
i=1
dik
)
= sjm
K∑
k=1
fkj · 1
= sjm,
which suggests that Sjm =
n∑
i=1
yijm is an unbiased estimator of sjm. Also let yjm = (y1jm, y2jm, . . . ,
ynjm) be the OTU counts at time tj in mouse m, then the distribution of yjm for j = 1, . . . , N,m =
1, . . . ,M conditioned on Z1, . . . , Zn is
y1jm, . . . , ynjm|Z1 = k1, . . . , Zn = kn ∼ NB(sjmd1,k1fk1,j , φˆ1j) · · · · · NB(sjmdn,knfkn,j , φˆnj).
To describe the dynamics of the proportions or frequencies of the K groups, we assume replicator
dynamics
f˙i = fi
[ K∑
j=1
aijfj −
K∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
ajkfjfk
]
i = 1, . . . ,K,
where fi(t), i = 1, . . . ,K is the frequency of group i at time t, and aij’s are entries of the payoff matrix.
Since the payoff matrix [aij ] is not identifiable as proved in section 4.3.1, we reparameterize in terms of
K by K matrix [bij ]K×K with the K elements in last row set to be zero. The corresponding replicator
equations are
f˙i = fi
[ K∑
j=1
bijfj −
K−1∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
bjkfjfk
]
i = 1, . . . ,K − 1, (4.11)
with fK = 1 −
∑K−1
i=1 fi. Denote b: = (b11, . . . , bK(K−1)), s: = (s11, . . . , sNM ), d: = (d11, . . . , dnK)
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and p
:
= (p1, . . . , pK), then the joint distribution of y
:
= (y11, . . . ,yNM ) and Z: = (Z1, . . . , Zn) is
L(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
) = P (y
:
,Z
:
|θ
:
)
=
[ N∏
j=1
M∏
m=1
P (yjm|Z: ,θ:)
]
P (Z
:
)
=
K∏
k1=1
. . .
K∏
kn=1
n∏
i=1
[
pki
N∏
j=1
M∏
m=1
Γ(yijm + φˆ
−1
ij )
Γ(φˆ−1ij )Γ(yijm + 1)
( 1
1 + sjmdi,kifki,j φˆij
)φˆ−1ij ·
( sjmdi,kifki,j
φˆ−1ij + sjmdi,kifki,j
)yijm]I[Zi=ki]
,
where θ
:
= (p
:
, b
:
, s
:
,d
:
) and fki,j is the frequencies of group ki in replicator dynamics evaluated at tj .
Then the complete data log-likelihood function is
l(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
) = logL(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
)
=
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
I[Z1 = k1] . . . I[Zn = kn]
{
(log pk1 + . . .+ log pkn) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm+
φˆ−1ij )− log Γ(φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + sjmdi,kifki,j φˆij) + yijm log(sjm ·
di,kifki,j φˆij)
]}
.
The parameters b
:
are the key parameters we would like to estimate. It is computationally intensive to
directly integrate the replicator equations (4.11) to estimate the parameters. We use a strategy originally
introduced by Ramsay et. al (2007), which uses smoothing splinesw(·) to approximate solution curves
f(·). Then the log-likelihood l(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
) can be approximated by
l′(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
∆) =
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
I[Z1 = k1] . . . I[Zn = kn]
{
(log pk1 + . . .+ log pkn) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm+
φˆ−1ij )− log Γ(φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + sjmdi,kiwki,j(c:)φˆij) + yijm log(
sjmdi,kiwki,j(c:)φˆij)
]}
,
where c
:
are the smoothing spline coefficients, θ
:
∆ = (θ
:
, c
:
) and wki,j(c:) = wki(tj |c:). To control
the smoothness of the splines and insure they are close to f(·), we minimize a penalized negative log
likelihood
l∆(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
∆|λ) = l′(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
∆) + λPEN(w|θ
:
∆),
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where the penalty term PEN(w|θ
:
∆) is
PEN(w|θ
:
∆) =
K−1∑
k=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
[
dwk(t|c:)
dt
− gk(w(t|c:), b:)
]2
dt,
and {gk(·)}K−1k=1 are the right hand side terms in equations (4.11).
4.3.4 EM Algorithm
The EM algorithm can be applied to find the MLE of the observed data log likelihoodEZ: |y:
[
l∆(y
:
,Z
:
,
θ
:
∆|λ)
]
by iteratively applying the two-steps:
Expectation step (E step) At iteration t, calculate the expected value of the negative log-likelihood
function with respect to the conditional distribution of Z
:
given y
:
under the current estimate θ
:
∆(t) of
the parameters.
Q(θ
:
∆|θ
:
∆(t)) = EZ: |y
[
l∆(y
:
,Z
:
,θ
:
∆|λ)
]
= −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{
(log pk1 + . . .+ log pkn) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm + φˆ
−1
ij )−
log Γ(φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + sjmdi,kiwki,j(c:)φˆij) + yijm log(sjmdi,ki ·
wki,j(c:)φˆij)
]}
+ λ
K−1∑
k=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
[dwk(t|c)
dt − gk(w(t|c:), b:)
]2
dt,
where p(t)i,ki = P (Zi = ki|yi: ,θ:
∆(t)) =
P (Zi=ki,yi: ,θ:
∆(t))
P (yi: ,θ:
∆(t))
≈
p
(t)
ki
N∏
j=1
M∏
m=1
h(yijm|s(t)jmd(t)i,kiwki,j ,φˆij)
K∑
ki=1
p
(t)
ki
N∏
j=1
M∏
m=1
h(yijm|s(t)jmd(t)i,kiwki,j ,φˆij)
with
h(·|µ, φˆ) being the probability density function of NB distribution. The conditional distribution is ap-
proximate because fk(·) is substituted with wk(·|c:) for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
Minimization step (M step) Find the parameter θ
:
∆ = (p
:
, b
:
, s
:
,d
:
, c
:
) that minimizes the quantity
θ
:
∆(t+1) = arg min
θ:
∆
Q(θ
:
∆|θ
:
∆(t)).
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We perform the minimization in blocks
(m1) s
:
(t+1) = arg min
s
Q((p
:
(t), s
:
,d
:
(t), b
:
(t), c
:
(t))|θ
:
∆(t))
(m2) (p
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1)) = arg min
p
:
,d:
Q((p
:
, s
:
(t+1),d
:
, b
:
(t), c
:
(t))|θ
:
∆(t))
(m3) (b
:
(t+1), c
:
(t+1)) = arg min
b,c
Q((p
:
(t+1), s
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1), b
:
, c
:
)|θ
:
∆(t)).
One full cycle (m1), (m2) and (m3) results in updates θ
:
∆(t) to θ
:
∆(t+1).
For the first optimization problem, the explicit solution of s
:
(t+1) can not be derived and it is neces-
sary to implement the quasi-newton optimization algorithm to solve
min
s
Q((p
:
(t), s
:
,d
:
(t), b
:
(t), c
:
(t))|θ
:
∆(t)). (4.12)
In the second problem, there are no closed form solutions for both p
:
(t+1) and d
:
(t+1). The optimiza-
tion is based on interior point numerical algorithm for the constraint optimization problem
min
p
:
,d:
Q((p
:
, s
:
(t+1),d
:
, b
:
(t), c
:
(t))|θ
:
∆(t))
subject to p
:
≥ 0,d
:
≥ 0,
pk
n∑
i=1
dik = 1, i = 1, . . . ,K.
(4.13)
And the third problem
min
b,c
Q((p
:
(t+1), s
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1), b
:
, c
:
)|θ
:
∆(t)) (4.14)
is tackled by using the inner-outer optimization procedure of (59) which is an iterative inner-outer
quasi-Newton method (BFGS) based optimization algorithm. Details of the optimizations (m1), (m2)
and (m3) are provided in the Appendix C.
4.3.5 Initialization
The EM algorithm has the guaranteed descent property, but it may converge to a local minimum.
It is well known that initial parameter values can impact both the speed of convergence and minimum
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achieved. To propose good initial values, we apply k-means to principal components to assign OTUs
to initial clusters. Specifically, we take time series frequencies for each OTU, standardize them by
centering and then normalizing, and merge the m replicates by concatenating them. We then apply
principal component analysis (PCA) (50), retain the top two components and cluster the OTUs using
k-means. The initial values of s
:
(0) are chosen to be the observed sample sizes Sjm. From the initial
clustered groups, the initial values of p
:
(0) are estimated to be the proportions of OTUs within each
group. And initial guess of d(0)ik can be derived from the mean component of (4.10) when OTU i is
assigned to intial group k, while initial guesses of d(0)sk for the OTU s not assigning to group k are set
equal while satisfying the constraints given p
:
(0). The initial values of b
:
(0) are derived based on least
squares fitting of equations (4.11) to the frequencies of initial K groups. The initial guesses of the
smoothing spline parameters c
:
(0) are computed via the interpolation of logit transformed splines to the
initial group frequencies curves.
4.4 Simulation Study
4.4.1 Data Simulation
We undertook a simulation study to test the feasibility and acceptability of the proposed estimation
procedure. Note, there are 4 types of parameters b
:
, d
:
, s
:
, and p
:
. The control parameters for the simula-
tion are chosen as K = 3, n = 17, N = 21 and M = 5. The dispersion parameters φij’s are randomly
sampled as ηiGamma(0.5, 2), where ηi’s are uniformly sampled in the closed interval [0.5, 2]. We set
b
:
= (−1, 2,−1,−2, 1, 1), p
:
= (0.3, 0.5, 0.2), and sample sjm’s as integers between 2000 and 3000.
For each k, the d
′
ik’s are randomly sampled from an unit simplex {d
′
ik : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, d
′
ik ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
d
′
ik = 1}
and then dik = d
′
ik/pk, so dik satisfy pk
n∑
i=1
dik = 1. Based on the chosen model parameters, we simu-
late the yijm’s independently from the NB mixture model. That is, first we generated the true frequency
curves for the three groups as show in Figure 4.2(a), by numerically solving the replicator equations
(Matlab function: ode45) at N = 21 time points, and then randomly assigned the 17 OTUs to the three
groups with the probability vector p
:
. For OTU i in group ki, we then sampled each yijm from a NB
distribution with mean parameter sjmdi,kifki,j and dispersion parameter φij . The simulated data for 17
OTUs observed at 21 equally spaced time points in 5 mice are shown in Figure 4.3.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4.2 Frequencies of three groups solved by integrating the replicator equations at (a) the true
parameters or (b) the parameters estimated during initialization.
Figure 4.3 Simulated data for 17 OTUs of 5 mice at 21 time points.
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4.4.2 Results
We implemented our estimation procedure and applied it to the simulation data. All estimation is
conditioned on the quasi-likelihood estimates at the dispersion parameters which are found by solving
nN nonlinear estimating equations (4.9). A summary of the estimated dispersion parameters is provided
in Figure 4.4. Most of the dispersion parameters are well estimated; only a few of the large magnitude
dispersion parameters are poorly estimated. Large dispersion parameters tend to be overestimated when
the number of replicates is small (45).
Table 4.1 Initial values of b
:
(0).
b11 b12 b13 b21 b22 b23
Initial values -0.1035 -1.1434 1.1000 -1.4024 1.0779 0.4471
We next compute initial guesses of all parameters. Our initialization scheme estimated payoff matrix
parameters b
:
(0) as shown in Table 4.1, which produce frequency fk(·) curves similar to the truth (Figure
4.2).
Figure 4.4 Summary of estimated dispersion parameters.
The EM algorithm converged in five iterations, using the stop criterion that sum of relative changes
over the four types of parameters is no more than 10−4. A summary of the estimated sjm’s and dik’s
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Figure 4.5 Summary of estimates for parameters sjm and dik.
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of fitted exact solution with solution of differential equations.
Figure 4.7 Standardized residuals for the fitting to the simulated data.
75
are ploted in Figure 4.5. The first plot in the figure suggests that a few sjm are mis-estimated, but most
are reasonably close to the true values. When OTU i has high posterior probability of being in group
k, then there is no information to estimate dil for l 6= k. These are show yellow in scatter plot 4.5.
The remaining dik are well-estimated. The true and estimated parameters in p
:
and b
:
are provided in
Table 4.2. Parameter p
:
is well estimated considering it is based on a sample of only 17 OTUs. For
the estimates of b
:
, we can see that four pairs of interactions between the three groups are estimated
correctly in terms of signs of the interactions while the last two pairs are not. It is possible that the
noisy data error, the smoothing spline approach, or poor initialization resulted in a local minimum and
produced suboptimal estimates of the payoff parameters. There could also be some lack of sensitivity,
or statistical identifiability issues in this simulation. Further investigation is needed to assess the cause.
The temporal dynamics of the frequencies of three groups based the final estimates of the parameters
are shown in Figure 4.6, and from the comparison of the exact frequencies curves and true frequencies
paths for the three groups in the plot, we conclude that the estimated frequencies curves fit the true paths
very well.
Table 4.2 True values and estimates of p
:
and b
:
.
p1 p2 p3 b11 b12 b13 b21 b22 b23
True 0.3 0.5 0.2 -1 2 -1 -2 1 1
Estimates 0.3530 0.4119 0.2351 -0.6494 -1.1295 2.9130 -3.0224 2.4077 1.5635
After fitting the NB mixture model to data, it is important to perform model diagnostics to assess
the goodness of fit and validity of model assumptions. In simulation, we know model assumptions
are satisfied, but the residual plots in Figure 4.7 reveal a few OTUs where the residuals across mice
still show temporal patterns. This dependence in residuals is likely caused by disagreements between
the replicator frequencies fk(·) and the smoothing spline approximats wk(·|c:) because the data were
simulated independently, conditional on the modeled means.
4.5 Discussion and Future Work
The estimation procedure is so far quite slow, so we were only able to perform one complete EM
run. Thus it was impossible to assess what might have failed or what could be improved in the method.
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For the future, it will be helpful to rerun the estimation while holding some subsets of the parameters
at their true values. In this way, we can assess whether the observed misestimations are significantly
impacting the estimation of b
:
, our main parameters of interest. In addition, we chose to use a smoothing
spline approximation with 164 parameters. We should rerun the analysis with more or fewer smoothing
spline parameters.
We used simulated data to assess our method for estimating interaction effects between species in
mixed populations. We assumed the species interacted through replicator dynamics that hypothesize
a specific payoff for interactions between pairs of species. Cooperating species i and j will receive
positive payoffs, aij , aji > 0, from their interaction, while a parasitic species i will negatively impact
its victim j, aji < 0 < aij . Other interactions are also possible. In modern metagenomics datasets,
there are many potentially interacting species, which leads to an explosion in the number of parameters.
However, it is often true that many distinguishable species will interact similarly, so it is plausible to
cluster species in homogeneously reacting groups. Our proposed model allows such grouping. Note,
our grouping is partly genetic (reads are clustered into OTUs) and partly phenotypic (based on temporal
dynamics). We feel this approach is better than pure genetic grouping, which treats species as less
behaviorally plastic than they are. Future extensions could cluster genomes based on both criteria.
It is difficult to assess the performance of our method as the dataset size increases. Unfortunately,
adding new data in any direction, more OTUs, more time points, or more mice, leads to concomitant
increases in the number of parameters. The only way to increase the amount of data without adding
more parameters is to increase sjm. Of course, this also increases the variance. In real data applications,
it may be possible to regularize sjm across times or mice to control the number of parameters. Multiplex
sequences may also help, and it may also work reasonably well to set sjm = Sjm.
Another completely different approach is to dispense with the smoothing spline approximation.
Instead, we can utilize a Newton-Raphson optimization, which should converge in fewer iterations,
thus requiring relatively few numerical integrations of the replication equations and similar equations
for the Hessians. Fortunately, for the cluster model, the payoff matrix is relatively small.
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CHAPTER 5. MARKOV RANDOM FIELD MODEL FOR ANALYSIS OF GAME
DYNAMICS
Abstract
Inverse problem is a well-studied mathematical problem and arise in many branches of science and
mathematics. The conceptual understanding is that the transformation from data to model parameters is
a result of the interaction of a physical system with the object that we wish to infer about. To estimate the
parameters of the payoff matrix for linear game model, we introduce a statistical method—Markov Ran-
dom Field Model which mainly deals with observations on a lattice using appropriate random variable
distribution. The parameter estimation is a process of maximization of the Besag likelihood function
over the parameter space and the inference of the parameters is based a MCMC method. Also we in-
vestigate the spatial effects of interaction region or neighborhood size on the estimated parameters for
given data and analyze the nature of the game that we are interested in.
5.1 Introduction, Notations and Preliminaries
In this section, we develop a spatial-temporal statistical model for symmetric 2 × 2 games, where
the payoff for each player is given by the payoff matrix
C D
C R S
D T P
 (5.1)
where C and D stand for the population of cooperators and defectors, respectively. Consider the game
defined on the lattice Ω = {1, 2, · · · , n}2 ⊂ Z2. The underlying structure of the game dynamics
on [0, T ] × Ω is decomposed into the temporal evolution, which is modeled via Markov chains, and
the intrinsic spatial dependence, which is modeled by the Markov random fields. We focus on the
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discrete time [0, T ] := {0, 1, · · · , T} while the generalization to continuous time can be obtained by
discretizations.
Denote si = (u, v) the point on Ω with horizontal and vertical coordinates u, v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
Let N = n2. Consider Y(t) = {Y (si, t)}Ni=1 to be the set of possible observations of a symmetric 2×2
game on Ω at time t, so that Y(t) is a set of binary random variables on {0, 1}|Ω| and each Y (si, t) is a
binary random variable on {0, 1}.
Ni denotes the neighborhood of location si, i.e. Ni = {sj : sj is in the neighbor of si}, which
is assumed to be invariant with respect to time in our model. Naturally, Y (Ni, t) =
{
Y (sj , t)sj∈Ni
}
denotes the collection of observations in the neighborhood of location si at time point t.
Furthermore, it is noticed that for the locations at which the focal player is surrounded by the same
type of players, the probability of updating the central one with an alternative type is very small. The
corresponding state of the process is ”transiently forbidden”, i.e. there exists state ω ∈ {0, 1}N such
that
P (Yt = ω | Yt−1 has players surrounded by the same type) ≈ 0
which violates both the Besag positivity condition (66) and Kaiser-Cressie support conditions (75) for
the modeling spatial structure with appropriate dependences. To circumvent this difficulty, we define
the set of ”inactive” locations by
It =
{
(si, t) :
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
y(sj , t− 1) = |Ni ∪ {si}| or 0
}
(5.2)
for t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T and the compliment Ict = Ω\It defines the set of ”active” locations. Conditional
on the history information of Yt−1, the sets of inactive locations and active locations are both random
variables. The set of inactive locations is demonstrated in figure 5.1.
It is well known that we can reparameterize the game dynamics by population benefits during in-
teractions to incorporate the Hamiltonian rule in the game model (67; 71). Furthermore, as discussed
in (74) in terms of the equilibriums, the game dynamics defined by the payoff matrix is equivalent to
the corresponding replicator equations with parameters given by the payoff matrix. Hence, we have
the following proposition exclaiming that the game is strategically invariant, by which we mean the
equilibrium of evolution or optimal strategy is unchanged, subject to adding constants to each columns.
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Figure 5.1 Illustration of set of inactive locations. The underlying geometry is 4 nearest neighborhood
with fixed boundary. The highlighted two locations are inactive locations as they are sur-
rounded by the same type of players/observations at time t. The evolution of observations
on active locations may change the inactive location at t to active location at t + 1, which
corresponds to the term ”transient”.
Proposition 5.1.1. Consider the game that is equivalent to the replicator equation associated with the
payoff matrix A
dx
dt
= x ◦ (Ax)− x(x′Ax) (5.3)
defined on simplex Sn = {x ∈ Rn+ ∪ {0} | x · 1 = 1} where 1 = (1, · · · , 1)′. The addition of a constant
dj to the j − th column of payoff matrix A does not change (5.3) on Sn. Hence game defined by A is
strategically invariant subject to adding constants to columns.
Proof. W.L.O.G., adding dj ∈ R to the j − th column of A, so that A˜ = (a1, · · · , aj + dj · 1, · · · , an).
The replicator dynamics (5.3) is therefore rewritten as, for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
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x′i = xi
(
(A˜x)i − x′A˜x
)
⇒ x′i = xi

n∑
k 6=j,k=1
aikxk + (aij + dj)xj
− xi

n∑
l=1
n∑
k=1,k 6=j
alkxlxk +
n∑
l=1
(alj + dj)xlxj

= xi
(
(Ax)i − x′Ax
)
+ djxixj − djxixj
(
n∑
i=1
xl
)
= xi
(
(Ax)i − x′Ax
)
since x ∈ Sn. Hence, the replicator dynamics is invariant under translation by adding constants on each
column.
Therefore, the symmetric game defined by (5.1) is equivalent to the game defined by
C D
C a 0
D 0 b
 (5.4)
where a = R − T and b = P − S, and we can define the local cooperator benefits for location si at
time t by
pii,tC =
a
|Ni ∪ {si}|
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
(1− y(sj , t)) (5.5)
and the local defector benefits for Y (si, t) by
pii,tD =
b
|Ni ∪ {si}|
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
y(sj , t). (5.6)
5.2 Initial Configuration
The initial configuration Y0 = {Y (si, 0)}Ni=1 determines the following process and we define an
auto-logistic model (66) as
P {Y (si, 0) | Y (Ni, 0)} = exp[y(si, 0)Ai(y(Ni, 0))]
1 + exp[y(si, 0)Ai(y(Ni, 0))]
(5.7)
where
Ai(y(Ni, 0)) = log
( κ0
1− κ0
)
+ η0
∑
sj∈Ni
(y(sj , 0)− κ0) (5.8)
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with κ0 ∈ [0, 1], η0 ≥ 0. Hence, we assume that at the initial time point, the player’s conditional
state (either cooperator or defector) at a given location si depends only on the types of players of its
neighborhood Ni. Notice that the first term in Ai(y(Ni, 0)) is the natural parameter function for binary
measure in the exponential form, and κ0, unless the dependence structure η0 is strong, captures the
marginal expectation of initial configuration.
Furthermore, (5.8) satisfies Besag positivity/symmetric condition (66; 72) so that the joint distribu-
tion for the initial configuration is well-defined, i.e.
P {Y0 = y0}
exists for all y0 and let Ω0 denote the collection of values after observations at t = 0, CΩ0 denote the set
of possible configuration for Ω0, there is ∑
CΩ0
P (Ω0) = 1. (5.9)
5.3 Development of Temporal Model via Markov Chain
The classical spatial models of game dynamics on lattices (73; 83) usually focus on modeling the
update rule involving game dynamics with spatial structures such that
P {Y (sj , t)→ Y (si, t+ 1)} = f(pitj , pitNi) (5.10)
where f is some probability mass function with parameters related to the net/effective payoff pitj at
location sj and pitNi in the neighborhood of location si at time t, respectively.
To incorporate the influence of intensity of selection in the game, Fermi update rule is widely
adapted that is defined based on the Fermi distribution with jumping parameter to be a function of the
difference between the local payoffs (83) such that
P {Y (sj , t)→ Y (si, t+ 1)} = 1
1 + exp
[
−β(pitj − piti)
] . (5.11)
Motivated by (5.10) and (5.11), for the time points t ∈ {1, 2 · · · , T}, we model the temporal evolution
of {Yt} by a q = |Ω \ It|−dimensional vector Markov chain with the transition probability
P
{
Yt(s ∈ Ω \ It) | Yt−1(Ω)
}
=
(
exp
[
β(pit−1D − pit−1C ) ◦ yt(s ∈ Ω \ It)
] ) ◦ ( exp [β(pit−1D − pit−1C )]+ Jq×q)−1 (5.12)
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where n × n matrices pit−1C and pit−1D are the local average payoff for the cooperators and defectors at
the time point t − 1, respectively; Yt(s ∈ Ω \ It) denotes the random variables at active locations at
time t and Yt−1(Ω) denotes the process at time point t−1 on the whole observation domain; Jq×q is the
q × q matrix with all component equal to 1; and ◦ is the standard Hadmard product. β is the intensity
of selection over time evolution, and can also be interpreted as the conditional variance of the Markov
chain along time.
In particular, for each si ∈ Ω \ It
P
{
Y (si, t) | Y(Ni, t− 1) ∪ Y (si, t− 1)
}
=
exp
[
β(pii,t−1D − pii,t−1C )y(si, t)
]
exp
[
β(pii,t−1D − pii,t−1C )
]
+ 1
(5.13)
where pii,t−1C and pi
i,t−1
D are the local cooperator’s and defector’s benefits in the neighborhood of si at
time t− 1 as defined in (5.5) and (5.6).
Alternatively, we can rewrite (5.13) into natural exponential form (70; 77) that its Radon-Nikodym
derivative is
f
[
y(si, t) | y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)
]
= exp
[
Ai(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))y(si, t)−B(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))
]
(5.14)
where
Ai(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)) = β(pii,t−1D − pii,t−1C )
=
β
|Ni ∪ {si}|
(
b
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
y(sj , t− 1)− a
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
(1− y(sj , t− 1))
)
(5.15)
= −aβ + β(a+ b)|Ni ∪ {si}|
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
y(sj , t− 1)
and
B(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)) = log
[
1 + exp
[
Ai(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))
]]
. (5.16)
The conditional expectation of Y (si, t) on Y (Ni, t− 1) ∪ Y (si, t− 1) is therefore
E
{
Y (si, t) | Y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)
}
=
exp[Ai(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))]
exp[Ai(y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))] + 1
=
exp
[
β(pii,t−1D − pii,t−1C )
]
exp
[
β(pii,t−1D − pii,t−1C )
]
+ 1
(5.17)
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5.4 Development of Spatial Dependence Model
We adapt the conditional binary Markov random fields (66; 68; 72; 76) on the compliment of set of
inactive locations to model the intrinsic spatial dependence.
Given fixed time point t and location si = (u, v) ∈ Ω, a standard binary Markov random field
is formulated by specifying for each i = 1, 2, · · · , N , a conditional probability mass function in the
natural exponential form that
f
[
y(si, t) | y(Ni, t)
]
= exp[Ai(y(Ni, t))y(si, t)−Bi(y(Ni))] (5.18)
where
Ai(y(Ni, t)) = log
(
κi
1− κi
)
+ η
∑
sj∈Ni
{y(sj , t)− κj} (5.19)
and
Bi(y(Ni)) = log [1 + exp[Ai(y(Ni, t))]] . (5.20)
As discussed in (77; 79), the natural parameter functionsAi(·) represent a centered parameterization for
binary Markov random field in which, unless the dependence structure/small structure is overwhelm-
ingly large, the parameter κi are nearly the marginal expectation of Y (si, t).
As well know, either the positivity condition of Besag (66) or the Markov random field support
condition of Kaiser and Cressie (75) that guarantee the standard model (5.18)-(5.20) to satisfy the
condition of existence of a joint distribution that the possesses the specified conditional (66; 72; 75).
As discussed in the section 5.1 for the spatial evolutionary game dynamics, both Besag condition and
Kaiser-Cressie condition are failed due to the existence of transient forbidden states. We therefore
model the spatial dependence via temporal sequences of conditional binary Markov random field based
on (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.18)-(5.20) to overcome this difficulty.
Consider a fixed time point t and si = (u, v) ∈ Ω \ It, attached to which is its neighborhood
Ni. A binary Markov random field is formulated for the |Ω \ It| active locations using the conditional
distribution (5.18) with natural function Ai(·) in (5.19) replaced by
Ai,t(y(Ni, t), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))
= log
(
κi,t
1− κi,t
)
+ η
∑
sj∈Ni
{y(sj , t)− κj,t}+ β(a+ b)|Ni ∪ {si}|
∑
sj∈Ni∪{si}
y(sj , t− 1)− aβ (5.21)
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where | · | denotes the cardinality of the set as usual, and η models the strength of spatial dependence
while the geometry of Ni models the structure of spatial dependence.
Conditional on Yt−1 = (y(s1, t − 1), y(s2, t − 1), · · · , y(sN , t − 1)), the above model specifies a
joint distribution for {Y (si, t) : si ∈ Ω \ It} as a standard binary Markov random field defined on the
lattice specified by the compliment of It and with neighborhood sets given byNi, while unconditionally
It and Ω \ It are random sets. Hence, for each time point t, only the locations within the compliment
of It will be updated conditional on the neighborhood information from previous time point t − 1 and
the neighborhood information at the contemporary time point t.
In a summary, the complete temporal spatial Markov random field model for evolutionary game
dynamics of 2× 2 games is
P {Y (si, 0) | Y (Ni, 0)} = exp[y(si, 0)Ai(y(Ni, 0))]
1 + exp[y(si, 0)Ai(y(Ni, 0))]
(5.22)
where
Ai(y(Ni, 0)) = log
( κ0
1− κ0
)
+ η0
∑
sj∈Ni
(y(sj , 0)− κ0) (5.23)
and with respect to counting measure ν, in the natural exponential form
P
{
Y (si, t) | Y(Ni, t),Y(Ni, t− 1), Y (si, t− 1)
}
= f
[
y(si, t) | y(Ni, t), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)
]
(5.24)
= exp[Ai(y(Ni, t), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))y(si, t)−Bi(y(Ni), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))] (5.25)
where Ai,t(y(Ni, t), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)) is defined in (5.21) and
Bi,t(y(Ni, t), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1)) = log [1 + exp[Ai(y(Ni, t), y(Ni, t− 1), y(si, t− 1))]] .
We assume, for simplicity, κ0 = κi = κ for each i and η0 = η.
5.5 Existence of Joint Distribution of Spatial-temporal Model
As discussed in (75), specified conditional distribution does not necessarily guarantee the existence
of joint distribution. In this section, we will show the existence of the joint probability distribution
on the spatial-temporal process with the specified conditional structure proposed above by the method
proposed in (79). We have the following result.
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Theorem 5.5.1. Denote the spatial location by {si : i = 1, 2, · · · , N = n2}, the time points by
t = 0, 1, 2 · · · , T , and denote Y (si, t) : i = 1, 2 · · · , N ; t = 0, 1, · · · , T the binary response variables.
Let the set of inactive locations at time t = 1, 2, · · · , T be defined by It in (5.2). Let the joint distribution
of active locations where si ∈ Ω \ It, conditional on Ni, be denoted as
f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
(5.26)
where this joint distribution has conditional as in (5.18) with natural functions Ai,t(·) specified by
(5.21). Then the probability of a sequence of binary random fields over the time point t = 0, 1, 2 · · · , T
is given by
P
{
{Y (si, t) = y(si, t) : i = 1, 2, · · · , N ; t = 0, 1, · · · , T}
}
=
T∏
t=0
f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
(5.27)
and these probabilities define a distribution for possible sequences.
Proof. Let Ωt denote the collection of values after observation of the field at time point t = 0, 1, 2, · · ·T .
Note that there is a duality between the realized values of the field {y(si, t) : i = 1, 2, · · · , n} at time
t and Ωt, by which one implies a unique realization of the other and both identify the inactive locations
for the next time point and therefore also set of the active locations Ω \ It+1. A sequence of binary
fields may therefore be represented as the sequence of collections Ω0,Ω1, · · · ,ΩT such that
P
{
{Y (si, t) = y(si, t), i = 1, 2 · · · , N ; t = 0, 1, · · · , T}
}
= P
{
Ω0,Ω1, · · · ,ΩT
}
. (5.28)
The Markov random field conditional on history, as defined in section 5.4, satisfies the Besag positivity
condition (66; 72) so that f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
is well-defined for each t. Therefore, the
probability of Ωt for t = 1, · · · , T is identified by the duality that
P
{
Ωt|Ωt−1
}
= f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
(5.29)
where f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
is the joint distribution of the conditional binary Markov ran-
dom field defined above.
Notice that the random fields for t ≥ 1 depends on the initial configuration Ω0 that is well-defined
by its form (5.7)-(5.8) and Besag positivity condition (66; 72). The neighborhood collections Ωt follow
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a Markov property as specified in section 5.3 that
P
{
Ω0,Ω1, · · · ,ΩT
}
= P (Ω0)P (Ω1|Ω0) · · ·P (ΩT |ΩT−1)
=
T∏
t=0
f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
. (5.30)
Let CΩt|Ωt−1 denote the set of possible configurations for Ωt given Ωt−1. The conditional probabilities
(5.29) are defined by the well-posed joint distributions and each element of CΩt|Ωt−1 uniquely corre-
sponds to a value in the support of these distribution which is defined by
St = {permutations of {0, 1}|Ω\It|}.
Notice, for each t = 1, 2, · · · , T , with respect to counting measure,
∑
CΩt|Ωt−1
P
{
Ωt | Ωt−1
}
=
∫
St
f
[
{y(si, t) : (si, t) ∈ Ω \ It}
]
dν = 1. (5.31)
Denote the set of all possible configurations of the sequence of binary Markov random fields over the
time t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , T by CT , which is a joint union of Cartesian products of conditional possible
configurations that
CT =
⋃{CΩ0 × CΩ1|Ω0 × CΩ2|Ω1 × · · · × CΩT |ΩT−1} .
Hence, by (5.30) and (5.31), the total probabilities for sequence of random field configurations over all
possible configurations in CT is
∑
CT
P
{
Ω0,Ω1, · · · ,ΩT
}
=
∑
CΩ0×CΩ1|Ω0×CΩ2|Ω1×···×CΩT |ΩT−1
P (Ω0)P (Ω1|Ω0) · · ·P (ΩT |ΩT−1)
=
∑
CΩ0
P (Ω0)
∑
CΩ1|Ω0
P (Ω1|Ω0) · · ·
∑
CΩT |ΩT−1
P (ΩT |ΩT−1)
=
∑
CΩ0
P (Ω0)
=1 (5.32)
by the initial configuration’s well-posedness. The assertion is therefore derived.
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5.6 Future Work
We introduce the main idea on development of Markov Random Field Model, which incorporates
replicator dynamics and mainly deals with observations on a lattice using appropriate random variable
distribution, to estimate the parameters of the payoff matrix for linear game model. In the near future,
a simulation study will be explored and study of different games with respect to planes consist of
paired parameters will be implemented. And the parameter estimation procedure will be a process of
maximization of the Besag likelihood function over the parameter space for the inverse spatial game, and
then the inference of the parameters will be based a MCMC method. Furthermore, model assessment
approaches will be followed to justify the performance of the proposed Markov Random Field model.
Finally we will investigate the spatial effects of interaction region or neighborhood size on the estimated
parameters for given data and analyze the nature of the game that we are interested in. It is expected that
the Markov Random Field model will be useful in applying to a lot of spatial-temporal studies consist
of two species or subpopulations in biological or social systems.
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CHAPTER 6. OPTIMALITY AND STABILITY OF SYMMETRIC
EVOLUTIONARY GAMES WITH APPLICATIONS IN GENETIC SELECTION
A paper published in Journal of Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering
Yuanyuan Huang, Yiping Hao, Min Wang, Wen Zhou, Zhijun Wu
Abstract
Symmetric evolutionary games, i.e., evolutionary games with symmetric fitness matrices, have im-
portant applications in population genetics, where they can be used to model for example the selection
and evolution of the genotypes of a given population. In this paper, we review the theory for obtain-
ing optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evolutionary games, and provide some new proofs and
computational methods. In particular, we review the relationship between the symmetric evolutionary
game and the generalized knapsack problem, and discuss the first and second order necessary and suf-
ficient conditions that can be derived from this relationship for testing the optimality and stability of
the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in different forms from those in previous work and can
be verified more efficiently. We also derive more efficient computational methods for the evaluation
of the conditions than conventional approaches. We demonstrate how these conditions can be applied
to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of genetic selection games including
some in the study of genetic disorders.
6.1 Introduction
We consider an n-strategy evolutionary game defined by a symmetric fitness matrixA ∈ Rn×n. Let
S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1} be the set of all mixed strategies. The problem is to find an optimal
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strategy x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S. (6.1)
We call this problem a symmetric evolutionary game or SEgame for short. The problem has important
applications in population genetics, where it can be used to model and study the evolution of genotypes
in a given population when their corresponding phenotypes are under selection pressures.
The modeling of genetic selection has a long history (89). It may be traced back to the earliest
mathematical work in population genetics in early last century including the Hardy-Weinberg’s Law by
G. H. Hardy and W. Weinberg in 1908 (91; 103) and the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection
by R. A. Fisher in 1930 (90). The work has especially been revived in 1970s when J. Maynard Smith
introduced the game theory to biology and developed the evolutionary game theory for the study of
evolution of population of competing species (93). In this theory, a genetic selection problem can in
particular be modeled as a SEgame (92).
The SEgame has a close relationship with the generalized knapsack problem or GKproblem for
short, which is to find an optimal solution x∗ ∈ Rn for the following maximization problem:
maxx∈Rn xTAx/2 (6.2)
subject to
∑
i xi = 1, x ≥ 0.
The GKproblem has been studied extensively, with applications in solving maximum clique problems
(94), in convex quadratic programming (98), and especially in game theoretic modeling (85).
In this paper, we review the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for symmetric evo-
lutionary games, and provide some new proofs and computational methods. In particular, we review
the relationship between the symmetric evolutionary game and the generalized knapsack problem, and
discuss the first and second order necessary and sufficient conditions that can be derived from this re-
lationship for testing the optimality and stability of the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in
different forms from those in previous work and can be verified more efficiently. We also derive more
efficient computational methods for the evaluation of the conditions than conventional approaches. We
demonstrate how these conditions can be applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a
special class of genetic selection games including some in the study of genetic disorders.
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6.1.1 Further Mathematical Background
A two-player game is said to be symmetric if the players share the same fitness matrix and the same
set of strategies. Let A ∈ Rn×n be the fitness matrix and S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}
the set of all mixed strategies. Let x ∈ S be the strategy played by player I and y ∈ S by player
II. Then, the fitness for player I can be defined by a function pi(x, y) = xTAy and for player II by
pi(y, x) = yTAx. A pair of strategies (x∗, y∗) is said to be optimal if x∗TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗ for all x ∈ S
and y∗TAx∗ ≥ yTAx∗ for all y ∈ S, where x∗ and y∗ are said to be the best response to each other (see
Fig. 6.1).
Figure 6.1 Two-Player Game: A two-player, two-strategy symmetric game is demonstrated. The
strategies for player I are given in vector x = (x1, x2)T , and for player II in y = (y1, y2)T ,
x, y ∈ S = {x ∈ R2 : Σi xi = 1, xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2}. The fitness Ai,j of strategy pair
(xi, yj) is given in the (i, j)-entry of a 2×2 fitness matrix A. A strategy pair (x∗, y∗) is
said to be optimal if x∗TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗ for all x ∈ S and y∗TAx∗ ≥ yTAx∗ for all y ∈ S,
when the game is said to reach the Nash equilibrium.
A special class of symmetric games is to find a strategy x∗ ∈ S which is the best response to itself,
i.e., player I and II play the same strategy x∗ and x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S. This class of
games is often used to model the evolution of a population of competing species, with player I being a
particular individual and player II being a typical individual in the population. A strategy x for player
I means the species type the particular individual prefers to be. It could be a pure species type, i.e.,
x = ei for some i or a mixed one with xi 6= 1 for any i, where ei is the ith unit vector. Note that by
a mixed species type x we mean the frequency of the individual to play species i is xi. On the other
hand, a strategy y for player II means the typical species type of an individual in the population, which
depends on the species composition of the population. More specifically, if the portion for species i in
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the population is yi, then the chance for a typical individual to be species i is also yi. Therefore, y is
also a population profile, and xTAy is basically the fitness for species x in population y. Such a game
is called a population game, or an evolutionary game, or a game against the field (99; 102). The goal
of the game is to find an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S so that in population x∗, an individual cannot find a
better strategy than x∗, i.e., x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S, which is when the population has reached
the so-called Nash equilibrium. Biologically, this is when the population has reached a state so that
the optimal strategy for an individual is a species type consistent with the typical species type of the
population. If the fitness matrix of a symmetric game itself is symmetric, the game is called a doubly
symmetric game (102). An evolutionary game with a symmetric fitness matrix is a doubly symmetric
game, which is what we call a symmetric evolutionary game, i.e., a SEgame as given in (6.1).
6.1.2 Further Biological Background
SEgames can be used to model genetic selection and in particular, allele selection. An allele is one of
several possible forms of a gene. Most of multi-cellular organisms are diploid, i.e., their chromosomes
form homologous pairs. Each pair of chromosomes has a pair of alleles at each genetic locus. Thus,
n different alleles may form n2 different allele pairs, as two alleles in each pair may not be the same.
Different allele pairs are considered to be different genotypes, which may result in different phenotypes
or in other words, different genetic traits (see Fig. 6.2).
The fitness of all different allele pairs or in other words, all different genotypes at a given genetic
locus can then be given in a matrix with the rows corresponding to the choices for the first allele and
the columns to the choices for the second allele in the allele pair. Again, n different alleles will give n
different choices for both the first and second alleles in the allele pair, and hence an n×n fitness matrix.
With such a fitness matrix, a genetic selection game can then be defined with the choices of the first
and second alleles in the allele pair at a given genetic locus as the strategies for player I and II. Here,
player I can be considered as an individual with a specific choice of allele at the given locus. The choice
could be one of the possible alleles or a combination of them with each selected with some chance.
The former corresponds to a pure strategy, while the latter to a mixed one. In any case, if there are n
different alleles, the strategy for player I can be represented by a vector x ∈ Rn, x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1.
On the other hand, player II can be considered as a typical individual in the given population. This
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Figure 6.2 Genetic Selection: In diploid species, there are always two alleles at each genetic locus.
Each pair of alleles determines a certain genotype, which in turn determines a certain phe-
notype. For example, in Wendel’s classical experiment, the color of the flowers depends on
the pairing of the alleles at a specific genetic locus, one for pink color and dominant, and
another for white and recessive. Let the dominant allele be denoted by A and the recessive
one by a. There can be four possible allele pairs, AA, Aa, aA, and aa. Since A is domi-
nant, AA, Aa, and aA will produce pink flowers, while aa will produce white ones. These
genotypic and phenotypic outcomes can be summarized in a 2×2 allele-pairing matrix as
arranged in the figure.
individual could have only one of possible alleles at the given locus or a combination of them with each
selected with some chance. Similar to player I, if there are n different alleles, the strategy for player
II can be represented by a vector y ∈ Rn, y ≥ 0, ∑i yi = 1. This strategy y really is the same as
the composition of alleles at the given locus in the whole population. Therefore, it is also the allele
profile of the population for this particular genetic locus. Let the fitness matrix be given by A ∈ Rn×n.
Let S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}. The average fitness of an allele choice x ∈ S in an
allele population y ∈ S will be xTAy. We then want to find an optimal choice of x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S, i.e., in allele population x∗, any individual with allele choice x other
than x∗ will not have a better average fitness than allele choice x∗ (92). Note that the fitness for allele
pair (i, j) usually is the same as that for (j, i). Therefore, the fitness matrix for genetic selection is
typically symmetric, and the corresponding game is then a SEgame.
6.2 GKproblems vs. SEgames
For an evolutionary game, it is well known that a mixed strategy x∗ ∈ S is optimal for the game
if and only if the fitness x∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i > 0 and x
∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i for all i
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such that x∗i = 0 (99; 102). These conditions also apply to any symmetric evolutionary game, i.e., any
SEgame in (6.1), and can be stated formally as in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2.1. Let A ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric fitness matrix and S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}
the set of all mixed strategies. Then, a strategy x∗ ∈ S is an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1) if
and only if there is a scalar λ∗ such that
x∗i ≥ 0, λ∗ − (Ax∗)i ≥ 0 (6.3)
x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (6.4)
The proof of the above theorem can be found in many text books such as in (99; 102). Since it is
helpful for the understanding of the nature of the optimal strategies of the SEgame, we also provide one
here for the self-containedness of the paper:
Proof. If x∗ ∈ S satisfies the conditions in (6.3) and (6.4), by adding all equations in (6.4), we then
obtain λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Let x ∈ S be an arbitrary strategy. Multiply the second inequality in (6.3) by xi.
Then, by adding all second inequalities in (6.3), we obtain λ∗ − xTAx∗ ≥ 0, i.e., x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗,
since λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Therefore, x∗ is an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1).
If x∗ ∈ S is an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1), then x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for any x ∈ S
and therefore, x∗TAx∗ ≥ eTi Ax∗ = (Ax∗)i for all i. Let λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Then, λ∗ − (Ax∗)i ≥ 0 for
all i. Assume that x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) > 0 for some i. By adding all the left-hand sides of the equations
in (6.4), we then obtain λ∗ > x∗TAx∗, which contradicts to the fact that λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Therefore,
x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) = 0 for all i.
As we have mentioned in Section 6.1, the symmetric evlutionary game, i.e., the SEgame in (6.1) is
closely related to the generalized knapsack problem, i.e., the GKproblem in (6.2). A knapsack problem
is originally referred to as a problem for selecting a set of objects of different sizes and values into
a given sack of fixed size to maximize the total value of objects in the sack. The problem can be
formulated as a linear program, with a linear objective function
∑
i aixi for the total value of the sack,
where xi and ai are the size and unit value of object i, respectively and with a linear constraint
∑
i xi ≤
s, xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n on the total size of the objects that can be put into the sack, where n is the
number of objects and s the size of the sack. The GKproblem in (6.2) can therefore be considered as
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a knapsack problem of n “objects” with the objective function generalized to a symmetric quadratic
form xTAx/2 and with the “sack” restricted in a simplex S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}. If
we interpret the “objects” to be the species fractions in a given population and the matrix A to be the
fitness matrix of the species, the objective function for the GKproblem in (6.2) is exactly half of the
average fitness of the population of the SEgame in (6.1). Therefore, the goal of the GKproblem in (6.2)
is basically to maximize the average fitness of the population of the SEgame in (6.1).
Based on general optimization theory, an optimal solution to the GKproblem in (6.2) must satisfy
certain conditions. We first consider a general constrained optimization problem
minx∈Rn f(x) (6.5)
subject to ci(x) = 0, i ∈ E
ci(x) ≥ 0, i ∈ I
where f(x) is the objective function, ci(x) the constraint functions, E the set of indices for equality
constraints, and I the set of indices for inequality constraints. Assume that f(x) and ci(x) are all
continuously differentiable. Let x be a feasible solution for the problem, i.e., ci(x) = 0, i ∈ E and
ci(x) ≥ 0, i ∈ I . Let E0(x) be the set of indices for the constraints active at x, i.e., E0(x) = E ∪ {i ∈
I : ci(x) = 0} and C0(x) be the Jacobian of the constraints active at x, i.e., C0(x) = {∇ci(x) :
i ∈ E0(x)}T . We then have a set of first-order necessary conditions for an optimal solution to the
general constrained optimization problem in (6.5) as can be stated in the following theorem. Here, we
say that x∗ ∈ Rn is an optimal solution for the general constrained optimization problem in (6.5), if
x∗ is feasible, i.e., x∗ satisfies all the constraints, and if f(x∗) ≤ f(x) for all x feasible in a small
neighborhood U of x∗.
Theorem 6.2.2 ((97)). Let x∗ ∈ Rn be an optimal solution to the general constrained optimization
problem in (6.5). Assume that the gradients of the constraints active at x∗, i.e., the vectors in C0(x∗),
are linearly independent. Then, there must be a set of Lagrange multipliers λ∗ ∈ R|E| and µ∗ ∈ R|I|
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such that
∇xL(x∗, λ∗, µ∗) = 0, (6.6)
ci(x
∗) = 0, i ∈ E,
ci(x
∗) ≥ 0, i ∈ I,
µ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ I,
µ∗i ci(x
∗) = 0, i ∈ I,
where L(x, λ, µ) is called the Lagrangian function of the problem in (6.5),
L(x, λ, µ) = f(x)−
∑
i∈E
λici(x)−
∑
i∈I
µici(x).
The conditions in (6.6) are called the KKT conditions of the general constrained optimization prob-
lem in (6.5) named after W. Karush, H. Kuhn, and A. Tucker, who first discovered and proved the
conditions. As stated in Theorem 6.2.2, an optimal solution x∗ of the general constrained optimization
problem in (6.5) must satisfy the KKT conditions, but a feasible solution x∗ that satisfies the KKT
conditions, called a KKT point, may not always be an optimal solution.
We now apply Theorem 6.2.2 to the GKproblem in (6.2). By changing the maximization problem
to a standard minimization problem, we then have the objective function for this problem f(x) =
−xTAx/2. If we name the nonnegative constraints ci(x) = xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n to be the first to
the nth constraints and the equality constraint cn+1(x) = 1 −
∑
i xi = 0 to be the n+1th constraint,
we then have I = {1, . . . , n} and E = {n + 1}. Let x be a feasible solution for the problem. Let
E0(x) be the set of indices for the constraints active at x, i.e., E0(x) = {i ∈ I : ci(x) = 0} ∪ E and
C0(x) be the Jacobian of the constraints active at x, i.e., C0(x) = {∇ci(x) : i ∈ E0(x)}T . Then,
E0(x) = {i ∈ I : xi = 0} ∪ {n+ 1} and C0(x)T = {ei : i ∈ I, xi = 0} ∪ {−e}, where ei is the ith
unit vector and e =
∑
i ei. For any x ∈ S, there is at least one i ∈ I such that xi 6= 0 since x ≥ 0 and∑
i xi = 1. Therefore, E0 includes the index n+ 1 and a subset of indices {i ∈ I}, and C0(x) contains
the vector −eT and a subset of vectors {eTi : i ∈ I}, which are always linearly independent. We then
have the following first-order necessary conditions for the GKproblem in (6.2):
Theorem 6.2.3. Let A ∈ Rn×n be a symmetric fitness matrix and S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}
the set of all feasible solutions for the GKproblem in (6.2). If x∗ ∈ S is an optimal solution for this
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problem, then there must be a scalar λ∗ such that
x∗i ≥ 0, λ∗ − (Ax∗)i ≥ 0, (6.7)
x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (6.8)
Proof. The Lagrangian function for the GKproblem in (6.2) can be written in the following form:
L(x, λ, µ) = −xTAx/2− λ(1−
∑
i
xi)− µTx.
where x ∈ Rn, λ ∈ R, µ ∈ Rn. Since for this problem the gradients of the active constraints at any
x ∈ S, i.e., the vectors in C0(x), are linearly independent, by Theorem 6.2.2, if x∗ ∈ S is an optimal
solution to the GKproblem in (6.2), then there must be λ∗ ∈ R, µ∗ ∈ Rn such that
−Ax∗ + λ∗e− µ∗ = 0,∑
i
x∗i = 1,
x∗ ≥ 0,
µ∗ ≥ 0,
x∗Tµ∗ = 0.
By substituting µ∗ = λ∗e−Ax∗ in all the formulas, we then have
x∗ ≥ 0, λ∗e−Ax∗ ≥ 0,
x∗T (λ∗e−Ax∗) = 0,
which are equivalent to the conditions in (6.7) and (6.8).
Note that the conditions in (6.3) and (6.4) of Theorem 6.2.1 and in (6.7) and (6.8) of Theorem 6.2.3
are the same. However, it does not imply that the SEgame in (6.1) is equivalent to the GKproblem in
(6.2), because the conditions are necessary and sufficient for an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1)
but only necessary for an optimal solution for the GKproblem in (6.2). Therefore, an optimal solution
for the GKproblem in (6.2) must be an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1), while the converse
may not necessarily be true. We state this conclusion as a corollary from Theorem 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 in
the following.
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Corollary 6.2.4. An optimal solution x∗ ∈ S for the GKproblem in (6.2) must be an optimal strategy
for the SEgame in (6.1), while an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S for the SEgame in (6.1) is only a KKT point
for the GKproblem in (6.2), which is necessary but not sufficient to be optimal for the GKproblem in
(6.2).
In any case, the above two types of problems are closely related. The properties of the optimal
strategies for a SEgame can be investigated by examining the nature of the optimal solutions to the
corresponding GKproblem. For example, the existence of the optimal strategy for a general game,
which usually requires a more involved theoretical proof (96), now becomes much easier to verify for
a SEgame based on the relationship between the SEgame and the GKproblem: There is always an
optimal solution for the GKproblem in (6.2), given the fact that the objective function of the problem is
a continuous function and the feasible set is a bounded and closed simplex. Based on Corollary 6.2.4,
an optimal solution for the GKproblem in (6.2) is an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). Then,
the next corollary follows:
Corollary 6.2.5. There is always an optimal strategy or in other words, a Nash equilibrium for a given
SEgame in (6.1).
The fact that an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1) maximizes the objective function of the
GKproblem in (6.2) has been recognized in (99; 102) and discussed in great detail in (85). However,
they have focused on the equivalence between the two types of problems when the strategy is evolu-
tionarily stable, weak or strong. Here, we have made a clear distinction between them and shown that
the strategies for the SEgame in (6.1) are not necessarily always be optimal solutions of the GKproblem
in (6.2). When not, they can be local minimizers or saddle points of the GKproblem in (6.2). Though
unstable, they can be interesting to analyze as well, as we will mention again in our concluding remarks
in Section 6.8. Besides, we have provided detailed proofs for the necessary and sufficient conditions for
both types of problems. Based on these proofs, we have been able to obtain the Corollary 6.2.5 easily
for the existence of the equilibrium state of the SEgame in (6.1).
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6.3 Second-order Optimality Conditions
We now focus on the GKproblem in (6.2) and derive additional second-order necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for its optimal solutions, and extend them to the solutions for the SEgame in (6.1).
These conditions have been mentioned in several literature (99; 102) and especially analyzed in great
detail in (85). Here we review the conditions, with some given in different forms from those in (85).
They are in fact weaker conditions, but easier to verify, which is important for the later development of
our computational methods for justifying the solutions and their stabilities for the GKproblems as well
as the SEgames. We will comment more on these differences in the end of this section.
Consider again the general constrained optimization problem in (6.5). Let x∗ be an optimal solution
to the problem. Let E0(x∗) be the set of indices for the constraints active at x∗, i.e., E0(x∗) = E∪{i ∈
I : ci(x
∗) = 0} and C0(x∗) be the Jacobian of the constraints active at x∗, i.e., C0(x∗) = {∇ci(x∗) :
i ∈ E0(x∗)}T . We then have the following second-order necessary conditions for x∗ to be an optimal
solution to the problem in (6.5).
Theorem 6.3.1 ((97)). Let x∗ ∈ Rn be an optimal solution to the general constrained optimization
problem in (6.5). Assume that C0(x∗) has full row rank m. Let Z0 ∈ Rn×(n−m) be the null space
matrix of C0(x∗). Then,
yTZT0 ∇2f(x∗)Z0y ≥ 0 for all y ∈ Rn−m, y 6= 0, (6.9)
i.e., the reduced Hessian of f(x) at x∗, ZT0 ∇2f(x∗)Z0, must be positive semi-definite.
Now consider a KKT point x∗ ∈ Rn for the general constrained optimization problem in (6.5).
Let E0(x∗) be the set of indices for the constraints strongly active at x∗, i.e., E0(x∗) = E ∪ {i ∈
I : ci(x
∗) = 0 and µ∗i > 0} and C0(x∗) be the Jacobian of the constraints strongly active at x∗,
i.e., C0(x∗) = {∇ci(x∗) : i ∈ E0(x∗)}T , where µ∗i are the Lagrangian multipliers for the inequality
constraints in the KKT conditions. We then have the following second-order sufficient conditions for
x∗ to be a strict optimal solution to the problem in (6.5), i.e., f(x∗) < f(x) for all feasible solution
x 6= x∗ in some neighborhood U of x∗.
Theorem 6.3.2 ((97)). Let x∗ ∈ Rn be a KKT point for the general constrained optimization problem
in (6.5). Assume that C0(x∗) has full row rank m. Let Z0 ∈ Rn×(n−m) be the null space matrix of
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C0(x∗). If
yTZ0T∇2f(x∗)Z0y > 0 for all y ∈ Rn−m, y 6= 0, (6.10)
i.e., the reduced Hessian of f(x) at x∗, Z0T∇2f(x∗)Z0, is positive definite, then x∗ must be a strict
optimal solution to the problem in (6.5).
We now apply Theorem 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 to the GKproblem in (6.2). By changing the maximization
problem to a standard minimization problem, we then have the objective function for the GKproblem
in (6.2) to be f(x) = −xTAx/2. If we name the nonnegative constraints ci(x) = xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
to be the first to the nth constraints and the equality constraint cn+1(x) = 1 −
∑
i xi = 0 to be the
n+1th constraint, we then have I = {1, . . . , n} and E = {n + 1}. Let x∗ ∈ S be a KKT point
for the GKproblem in (6.2). Let E0(x∗) be the set of indices for the constraints active at x∗, i.e.,
E0(x
∗) = {i ∈ I : ci(x∗) = 0} ∪ E and C0(x∗) be the Jacobian of the constraints active at x∗,
i.e., C0(x∗) = {∇ci(x∗) : i ∈ E0(x∗)}T . Then, E0(x∗) = {i ∈ I : x∗i = 0} ∪ {n + 1} and
C0(x
∗)T = {ei : i ∈ I, x∗i = 0} ∪ {−e}, where ei is the ith unit vector and e =
∑
i ei. For any
x∗ ∈ S, there is at least one i ∈ I such that x∗i 6= 0 since x∗ ≥ 0 and
∑
i x
∗
i = 1. Therefore, E0
includes the index n + 1 and a subset of indices {i ∈ I}, and C0(x∗) contains the vector −eT and a
subset of vectors {eTi : i ∈ I} as the rows, and is of full row rank. Note also that the Hessian of the
objective function ∇2f(x∗) = −A. We then have the following second-order necessary conditions for
x∗ to be an optimal solution to the GKproblem in (6.2).
Theorem 6.3.3. Let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal solution to the GKproblem in (6.2). Let the row rank of
C0(x
∗) be equal to m, and Z0 ∈ Rn×(n−m) the null space matrix of C0(x∗). Then,
yTZT0 AZ0y ≤ 0 for all y ∈ Rn−m, y 6= 0, (6.11)
i.e., the reduced Hessian of the objective function of the GKproblem in (6.2) at x∗, ZT0 AZ0, must be
negative semi-definite.
Now consider a KKT point x∗ ∈ S. Let E0(x∗) be the set of indices for the constraints strongly
active at x∗, i.e., E0(x∗) = {i ∈ I : ci(x∗) = 0 and µ∗i > 0} ∪ E and C0(x∗) be the Jacobian
of the constraints strongly active at x∗, i.e., C0(x∗) = {∇ci(x∗) : i ∈ E0(x∗)}T , where µ∗i are the
Lagrangian multipliers for the inequality constraints in the KKT conditions for the GKproblem in (6.2),
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µ∗i = x
∗TAx∗ − (Ax∗)i (see in the proof for Theorem 6.2.3). Then, E0(x∗) = {i ∈ I : x∗i =
0 and µ∗i > 0} ∪ {n + 1} and C0(x∗)T = {ei : i ∈ I, x∗i = 0 and µ∗i > 0} ∪ {−e}, where ei is
the ith unit vector and e =
∑
i ei. Again, for any x
∗ ∈ S, there is at least one i ∈ I such that x∗i 6= 0
since x∗ ≥ 0 and ∑i x∗i = 1. Therefore, E0 includes the index n + 1 and a subset of indices {i ∈ I},
and C0(x∗) contains the vector −eT and a subset of vectors {eTi : i ∈ I} as rows, and is of full row
rank. Note also that the Hessian of the objective function ∇2f(x∗) = −A. We then have the following
second-order sufficient conditions for x∗ to be a strict optimal solution to the GKproblem in (6.2).
Theorem 6.3.4. Let x∗ ∈ S be a KKT point for the GKproblem in (6.2). Let the row rank of C0(x∗) be
equal to m. Let Z0 ∈ Rn×(n−m) be the null space matrix of C0(x∗). Then x∗ must be a strict optimal
solution to the GKproblem in (6.2) if
yTZ0TAZ0y < 0 for all y ∈ Rn−m, y 6= 0, (6.12)
i.e., the reduced Hessian of the objective function of the GKproblem in (6.2) at x∗, Z0TAZ0, is negative
definite.
Note that the conditions in Theorem 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 are either necessary or sufficient but not both.
In fact, since the GKproblem in (6.2) is a quadratic program, it is possible to establish a second-order
necessary and sufficient condition for its optimal solution. For this purpose, we go back to the general
constrained optimization problem (6.5) again. Let x ∈ Rn be any feasible solution for the problem. We
define the reduced tangent cone T (x) at x to be the set of vectors d ∈ Rn such that
∇ci(x)Td = 0, for all i ∈ E, (6.13)
∇ci(x)Td = 0, for all i ∈ I such that ci strongly active at x, (6.14)
∇ci(x)Td ≥ 0, for all i ∈ I such that ci weakly active at x. (6.15)
Then, based on general optimization theory, we know that if the general constrained optimization prob-
lem in (6.5) is a quadratic program, a feasible solution x∗ ∈ Rn will be a strict optimal solution to the
problem if and only if dT∇2f(x∗)d > 0 for all d ∈ T (x∗), d 6= 0 (86).
Let T0(x∗) = {d ∈ Rn : C0(x∗)d = 0} and T 0(x∗) = {d ∈ Rn : C0(x∗)d = 0}, where C0
and C0 are as defined in Theorem 6.3.1 and Theorem 6.3.2. Then, clearly, T0(x∗) ⊆ T (x∗) ⊆ T 0(x∗).
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In particular, when all the active inequality constraints are strongly active at x∗, C0(x∗) = C0(x∗) and
T0(x
∗) = T 0(x∗). It follows that if the general constrained optimization problem in (6.5) is a quadratic
program, then x∗ will be a strict optimal solution to the problem if and only if dT∇2f(x∗)d > 0 for all
d ∈ T (x∗) = T0(x∗) = T 0(x∗), d 6= 0.
We now consider the GKproblem in (6.2), which is a typical quadratic program and ∇2f(x∗) =
−A. Let Z0 and Z0 be the null space matrices of C0(x∗) and C0(x∗), respectively. If all the active
inequality constraints are strongly active at x∗, C0(x∗) = C0(x∗), T0(x∗) = T 0(x∗), and Z0 = Z0.
Let Z = Z0 = Z0. Then, Z ∈ Rn×(n−m), and T (x∗) = T0(x∗) = T 0(x∗) = {d ∈ Rn : d = Zy :
∀y ∈ Rn−m}, where m is the row rank of C0(x∗) and C0(x∗). It follows that x∗ ∈ S is a strict optimal
solution to the problem if and only if yTZTAZy < 0 for all y ∈ Rn−m, y 6= 0. More accurately, we
have
Theorem 6.3.5. Let x∗ ∈ S be a KKT point for the GKproblem in (6.2). Assume that the active
inequalities in S are all strongly active at x∗. Then, x∗ ∈ S is a strict optimal solution to the GKproblem
in (6.2) if and only if
yTZTAZy < 0 for all y ∈ Rn−m, y 6= 0, (6.16)
i.e., the reduced Hessian of the objective function of the GKproblem in (6.2) at x∗, ZTAZ, is negative
definite.
The second-order optimality conditions presented in this section can be useful for checking the
optimality of the solutions for the GKproblems and hence the strategies for the SEgames beyond the
conditions given in Theorem 6.2.1 and 6.2.3. In order to apply these conditions, all we need to do is to
find the null space matrices Z0 or Z0 and the eigenvalues of the reduced Hessians ZT0 AZ0 or Z
0TAZ0
to see if they are negative semi-definite or negative definite. For example, suppose that we have a KKT
point x∗ ∈ S for the GKproblem in (6.2) at which the only active constraint is the equality constraint
1 −∑i xi = 0. Then, C0(x∗) = C0(x∗) = {−eT }, for which we can construct a null space matrix
Z = Z0 = Z
0 ∈ Rn×(n−1) such that Zi,j = 0 for all i and j, except for Zi,i = 1 and Zi+1,i = −1.
Then the optimality of x∗ can be tested by checking the eigenvalues of the reduced Hessian ZTAZ.
If any of the eigenvalues is positive, x∗ is not optimal, and if all the eigenvalues are negative, x∗ must
be optimal and even strictly optimal. Here, in both cases, x∗ remains to be an optimal strategy for
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the corresponding SEgame in (6.1). However, the stability of the solution may be different, as we will
discuss in greater detail in next section.
Note that the second order necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal solutions of the
GKproblem in (6.2) have been discussed in great detail in (85), where, related to our discussion, there
are two necessary and sufficient conditions: (1) A feasible solution x∗ ∈ S for the GKproblem in (6.2)
is a strict optimal solution if and only if dTAd < 0 for all d ∈ T (x∗), d 6= 0, where T (x∗) is the
reduced tangent cone of the problem at x∗. (2) If all active inequalities for the GKproblem in (6.2)
are strongly active at x∗, then x∗ is a strict optimal solution if and only if ZTAZ is negative definite,
when T (x∗) becomes a linear space defined by matrix Z. In our analysis, corresponding to (1), we
have a necessary condition in Theorem 6.3.3 and sufficient condition in Theorem 6.3.4 separately. They
are not equivalent to, but are in fact weaker than the condition in (1). The reason for doing so is that
the condition in (1) is hard to test. It is equivalent to solving a matrix co-positivity problem, which is
NP-hard in general (95). On the other hand, the condition in Theorem 6.3.3 is equivalent to dTAd < 0
for all d ∈ T0(x∗), which is a smaller cone than T (x∗), and is actually a linear space defined by Z0.
Therefore, the condition is equivalent to ZT0 AZ0 negative definite, which can be verified in polynomial
time (101). Likewise, the condition in Theorem 6.3.4 is equivalent to dTAd < 0 for all d ∈ T 0(x∗),
which is a larger cone than T (x∗), and is actually a linear space defined by Z0. Therefore, the condition
is equivalent to Z0TAZ0 negative definite, which can again be verified in polynomial time. In our anal-
ysis, corresponding to (2), we have an equivalent necessary and sufficient condition in Theorem 6.3.5.
They are equivalent because if all active constraints for the GKproblem in (6.2) are strongly active at
x∗, T (x∗) = T0(x∗) = T 0(x∗) and Z = Z0 = Z0. It follows that dTAd < 0, for all d ∈ T (x∗), d 6= 0
is equivalent to ZTAZ negative definite. This condition is polynomial time verifiable. We do not need
to modify it. The second order optimality conditions in Theorem 6.3.3, 6.3.4, and 6.3.5 are the basis for
the later development of our second order stability conditions in Section 6.5 and computational methods
in Section 6.6.
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6.4 Evolutionarily Stable States
An important concept in evolutionary game theory is the evolutionary stability of an optimal strat-
egy. It characterizes the ability of a population to resist small changes or invasions when at equilibrium.
Let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy. Then, the population is at equilibrium state x∗. Let x ∈ S be another
arbitrary strategy. Mix x∗ and x′ 6= x∗ so that the population changes to a new state, x+ (1− )x∗, for
some small fraction  > 0. Then, x∗ is said to be evolutionarily stable if it remains as a better response
to the new “invaded” population state. More accurately, we have the following definition.
Definition 6.4.1 ((99; 102)). An optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S for an evolutionary game defined by a fitness
matrix A is evolutionarily stable if there is a small number ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any x ∈ S, x 6= x∗,
x∗TA(x+ (1− )x∗) > xTA(x+ (1− )x∗), 0 <  ≤ ′. (6.17)
Usually, it is not easy to prove the evolutionary stability of the optimal strategies for an evolutionary
game based on its definition. A more straightforward condition is to consider the strategies y in a small
neighborhood U of the optimal strategy x∗ and check if no y 6= x∗ prevails x∗ such that yTAy ≥
x∗TAy. It turns out that this condition is necessary and also sufficient:
Theorem 6.4.2 ((99; 102)). An optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S for an evolutionary game is evolutionarily
stable if and only if there is a small neighborhood U of x∗ such that
yTAy < x∗TAy for all y ∈ U ∩ S, y 6= x∗. (6.18)
Note that a SEgame is an evolutionary game. Therefore, the condition in (6.18) also applies to a
SEgame. For a SEgame, x∗TAy = yTAx∗ since A is symmetric. Then, yTAy < x∗TAx∗ for all
y ∈ U ∩ S, y 6= x∗ since yTAx∗ ≤ x∗TAx∗ for all y ∈ S. This implies that if x∗ is an evolutionary
stable strategy for a SEgame, it must be a strict local maximizer of the corresponding GKproblem. It
turns out that the converse is also true. We state this property in the following theorem, and also provide
a slightly different proof from those given in (99; 102).
Theorem 6.4.3 ((99; 102)). An optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S for a SEgame in (6.1) is evolutionarily stable
if and only if it is a strict local maximizer of the corresponding GKproblem in (6.2).
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Proof. Let x∗ ∈ S be an evolutionarily stable strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). Then, the necessary
condition follows directly from Theorem 6.4.2, as we have discussed above.
To prove the sufficiency, we assume that x∗ is a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.2).
Then, there must be a neighborhood U = {y ∈ Rn : ‖y − x∗‖ < ′ < 2} of x∗ such that for any
y ∈ U ∩ S, y 6= x∗, yTAy < x∗TAx∗. Let x ∈ S be any mixed strategy. Let y = x + (1 − )x∗,
0 <  < 1. Note that ‖x − x∗‖ ≤ ‖x‖ + ‖x∗‖ < 2, and ‖y − x∗‖ = ‖x − x∗‖ < 2. Then, for all
 < ′/2 < 1, y ∈ U and yTAy < x∗TAx∗. Note also that
yTAy = (x+ (1− )x∗)TA(x+ (1− )x∗)
= (x∗ + (x− x∗))TA(x∗ + (x− x∗))
= x∗TAx∗ + 2(x− x∗)TA(x∗ + (x− x∗)/2).
It follows that
(x− x∗)TA(x∗ + (x− x∗)/2) < 0 for all  < ′/2 < 1.
Replace /2 by  and ′/4 by ′. Then,
(x− x∗)TA(x∗ + (x− x∗)) < 0 for all  < ′ < 1, i.e.,
xTA(x∗ + (x− x∗)) < x∗TA(x∗ + (x− x∗)) for all  < ′ < 1.
Since the above inequality holds for all x ∈ S, by Definition 6.4.1, x∗ must be an evolutionarily stable
strategy for the SEgame in (6.1).
6.5 Second-order Stability Conditions
By combining Theorem 6.4.3 with the second-order optimality conditions for the optimal solutions
to the GKproblem in (6.2) derived in Section 6.3, we can easily obtain a set of second-order stability
conditions for the optimal strategies for the SEgame in (6.1): Let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy for the
SEgame in (6.1). Let C0(x∗) be a matrix with {eTi : x∗i = 0} and {−eT } being the rows, where ei is
the ith unit vector and e =
∑
i ei.
Theorem 6.5.1. Let x∗ ∈ S be an evolutionarily stable strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). Let the row
rank of C0(x∗) be equal to m. Let Z0 ∈ Rn×(n−m) be the null space matrix of C0(x∗). Then, ZT0 AZ0
must be negative semi-definite.
105
Proof. If x∗ ∈ S is an evolutionarily stable strategy for the SEgame in (6.1), then by Theorem 6.4.3, it
must be a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.2). It follows from Theorem 6.3.3 that ZT0 AZ0
must be negative semi-definite.
Now, let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). Let C0(x∗) be a matrix with
{eTi : x∗i = 0 and µ∗i > 0} and {−eT } being the rows, where ei is the ith unit vector, e =
∑
i ei, and
µ∗i = x
∗TAx∗ − (Ax∗)i.
Theorem 6.5.2. Let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). Let the row rank of C0(x∗)
be equal tom. Let Z0 ∈ Rn×(n−m) be the null space matrix of C0(x∗). If Z0TAZ0 is negative definite,
then x∗ must be an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Proof. If x∗ ∈ S is an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1), then by Corollary 6.2.4, it must be a
KKT point for the GKproblem in (6.2). Therefore, if Z0TAZ0 is negative definite, x∗ must be a strict
local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.2) by Theorem 6.3.4 and an evolutionarily stable strategy for
the SEgame in (6.1) by Theorem 6.4.3.
Finally, let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). If µ∗i > 0 for all i such that
x∗i = 0, i.e., all the active inequalities in S are strongly active at x
∗, then C0(x∗) = C0(x∗), and
Z0 = Z
0. Let Z = Z0 = Z0.
Theorem 6.5.3. Let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1). Assume that the active
inequalities in S are all strongly active at x∗. Then, x∗ ∈ S is an evolutionarily stable strategy for the
SEgame in (6.1) if and only if ZTAZ is negative definite.
Proof. If x∗ ∈ S is an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1), then by Corollary 6.2.4, it must be a
KKT point for the GKproblem in (6.2). Therefore, x∗ is a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in
(6.2) if and only if ZTAZ is negative definite by Theorem 6.3.5 and an evolutionarily stable strategy
for the SEgame in (6.1) by Theorem 6.4.3.
Although Theorem 6.5.1, 6.5.2, and 6.5.3 are simple extensions from Theorem 6.3.3, 6.3.4, and
6.3.5, they have great implications in practice, for they can be used to check the evolutionary stability
of the optimal strategies for the SEgame in (6.1) directly. For example, if the fitness matrixA is positive
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definite, the reduced Hessian ZT0 AZ0 will never be negative semi-definite unless the dimension of the
null space of C0(x∗) is zero or in other words, unless the row rank of C0(x∗) is n. Then, x∗i = 0 for
all but one i, and the optimal and stable strategies of the SEgame in (6.1) can only be pure strategies.
On the other hand, if the fitness matrix A is negative definite, the reduced Hessian Z0TAZ0 will always
be negative definite unless the dimension of the null space of C0(x∗) is zero, and then, all optimal and
non-pure strategies for the SEgame in (6.1) will be evolutionarily stable. Even when C0(x∗) is only of
rank one, i.e.,
∑
i x
∗
i = 1 but x
∗
i > 0 for all i, x
∗ is still evolutionarily stable.
Note that an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1) must be a KKT point of the GKproblem in
(6.2), but it may not be a local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.2). It could be a local minimizer or
saddle point for the GKproblem in (6.2). Even if it is a local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.2), it
may not be evolutionary stable unless it is a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.2). In other
words, as a KKT point for the GKproblem in (6.2), an optimal strategy for the SEgame in (6.1) could
be a local maximizer, local minimizer, or saddle point of the GKproblem in (6.2) while evolutionarily
unstable.
Since the second-order stability conditions in Theorem 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 are derived from Theo-
rem 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, they are in different but weaker forms from those given in (85) as well. As we
have mentioned in the end of Section 6.3, the advantage of introducing these forms is that they can be
checked more efficiently in polynomial time than that given in (85). The latter is equivalent to a matrix
co-positivity problem and can be NP-hard to compute. The condition in Theorem 6.5.3 is equivalent to
the one given in (85) since it can be verified in polynomial time as those in Theorem 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.
6.6 Computational Methods
As we have discussed in previous sections, in order to test the second-order optimality or stability
conditions, all we need to do is to form a reduced Hessian for the objective function of the GKproblem
in (6.2) and see if it is negative semidefinite or negative definite. The Hessian of the objective function
of the GKproblem in (6.2) is basically the fitness matrix A, while the reduced Hessian is ZT0 AZ0 or
Z0TAZ0, where Z0 and Z0 are the null space matrices of C0(x∗) and C0(x∗), respectively, for x∗ ∈ S
to be tested, C0(x∗) = {eTi : x∗i = 0} ∪ {−eT } and C0(x∗) = {eTi : x∗i = 0 and µ∗i > 0} ∪ {−eT }.
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There are three major steps to complete a second-order optimality or stability test: (1) Compute the
null space matrices Z0 or Z0. (2) Form the reduced Hessians ZT0 AZ0 or Z
0TAZ0. (3) Compute the
eigenvalues of the reduced Hessians. In step (1), it can be computationally expensive to find the null
space matrix for a given matrix using a general approach, say the QR factorization, which typically
requires O((n − m)n2) floating-point calculations (101) if Z0 or Z0 is a n × (n − m) matrix. In
step (2), each of the reduced Hessians involves two matrix-matrix multiplications, which also requires
O(2(n −m)n2) floating-point calculations. However, because of the special structures of C0(x∗) and
C0(x∗), the calculations in step (1) and step (2) can actually be carried out in a very simple way, without
much computational cost:
First of all, the matrices C0(x∗) and C0(x∗) do not need any computation. They can be constructed
straightforwardly as follows: First, form an (n + 1) × n matrix with the ith row equal to eTi and the
last row equal to −eT , where ei is the ith unit vector and e =
∑
i ei. Then, for C0(x
∗), remove
row i such that x∗i > 0; for C
0(x∗), in addition to row i such that x∗i > 0, remove row i such that
x∗i = 0 and µ
∗
i = 0. We demonstrate the structure of C0(x
∗) and C0(x∗) in the following matrix form:
C0(x
∗) =

· · ·
· · ·
0 · · · 1 · · · 0
· · ·
· · ·
−1 · · · −1 · · · −1

⇐ eTi such that x∗i = 0
C0(x∗) =

· · ·
· · ·
0 · · · 1 · · · 0
· · ·
· · ·
−1 · · · −1 · · · −1

⇐ eTi such that x∗i = 0 and µ∗i > 0
Next, given the simple structure of C0(x∗) and C0(x∗), we in fact do not have to compute the null
space matrices Z0 and Z0, either. They can also be constructed easily: First, form an n × n identity
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matrix with row k replaced by −eT for some k such that x∗k > 0. Then, remove the kth column; in
addition, for Z0, also remove column j such that x∗j = 0; for Z
0, only remove column j such that
x∗j = 0 and µ
∗
j > 0. The following are the matrix forms of Z0 and Z
0:
Z0 =

1 0 · · · 0 0
· · ·
−1 · · · −1 · · · −1
· · ·
0 0 · · · 0 1

⇐ row k such that x∗k > 0 for some k
(Remove column k. In addition, also remove column j such that x∗j = 0.)
Z0 =

1 0 · · · 0 0
· · ·
−1 · · · −1 · · · −1
· · ·
0 0 · · · 0 1

⇐ row k such that x∗k > 0 for some k
(Remove column k. In addition, remove only column j such that x∗j = 0 and µ
∗
j > 0.)
It is easy to see that Z0 or Z0 are of full column rank n−m, where m is the row rank of C0(x∗) or
C0(x∗). It is also easy to verify that C0(x∗)Z0 = 0 and C0(x∗)Z0 = 0, and therefore, Z0 and Z0 can
indeed be used as null space matrices of C0(x∗) and C0(x∗), respectively. Yet, the construction of Z0
and Z0 does not have computational cost at all.
Finally, with Z0 and Z0 as given above, the computation of the reduced Hessians ZT0 AZ0 or
Z0TAZ0 does not require full matrix-matrix multiplications. Let H = ZTAZ with Z = Z0 or Z0. We
show howH can be calculated with less computational cost: LetB = AZ. Then,H = ZTAZ = ZTB.
Let Bj and Zj be column j of B and Z, respectively. Assume that Zj = ei − ek for some i. Then,
Bj = AZj can be obtained by subtracting column k from column i of A with n floating-point cal-
culations. Since B has only n −m columns, the computation of B requires n(n −m) floating-point
calculations. Let Hi and ZiT be row i of H and ZT . Also assume that ZiT = eTj − eTk for some j.
Then, Hi = ZiTB can be obtained by subtracting row k from row j of B with n −m floating-point
calculations. Since H has only n − m rows, the computation of H requires (n − m)2 floating-point
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calculations. By putting the calculations for B and H together, we then obtain the computation for the
whole reduced Hessian ZTAZ to be (n−m)(2n−m) floating-point calculations, which is much less
costly than full matrix-matrix multiplications.
6.7 Games for Genetic Selection
A genetic selection problem and in particular, the problem for allele selection at single or multiple
genetic loci can be formulated as a symmetric evolutionary game. Recall that the fitness of different
allele pairs or in other words, different genotypes at a given genetic locus can be given in a matrix with
the rows corresponding to the choices for the first allele and the columns to the choices for the second
allele in the allele pairs. If there are n different alleles, there will be n different choices for both the
first and second alleles, and the fitness matrix will be an n × n matrix. With such a fitness matrix, the
allele selection game can be defined with the choices of the first and second alleles as the strategies
for player I and player II of the game, where player I can be considered as a specific individual and
player II as a typical individual in the given population. If there are n different alleles, the strategy
for player I can be represented by a vector x ∈ Rn, x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1, and the strategy for player
II by a vector y ∈ Rn, y ≥ 0, ∑i yi = 1. Let the fitness matrix be given by A ∈ Rn×n. Let
S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}. The average fitness of an allele choice x ∈ S in an allele
population y ∈ S will be xTAy. We then want to find an optimal choice of x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S, (6.19)
i.e., in allele population x∗, any individual with allele choice x other than x∗ will not have a better
average fitness than allele choice x∗. Note that the fitness for allele pair (i, j) usually is the same as
that for (j, i). Therefore, the fitness matrix for allele selection is typically symmetric, and the game in
(6.19) is then a SEgame.
As we have discussed in previous sections, the selection game in (6.19) can be studied with a
generalized knapsack problem:
maxx∈Rn xTAx/2 (6.20)
subject to
∑
i xi = 1, x ≥ 0.
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By Corollary 6.2.4, an optimal strategy of the selection game in (6.19) is equivalent to a KKT point
of the GKproblem in (6.20), and by Theorem 6.4.3, if it is evolutionarily stable, it must correspond
to a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.20), and vice versa. In addition, the optimality
and stability conditions derived in previous sections all apply to the selection game in (6.19). We
demonstrate the applications of these conditions with several example selection games including some
from the study of genetic disorders.
We first consider a genetic locus with two alleles, one dominant and another recessive. Many genetic
traits are due to the genotypic differences in a specific locus of two alleles. For example, in the well-
known Mendel’s experiment, the color of the flowers depends on the pair of alleles at certain genetic
locus, one for pink color and dominant, and another for white and recessive. Let the dominant allele be
denoted by A and recessive one by a. There can be four possible allele pairs, AA, Aa, aA, and aa.
Since A is dominant, AA, Aa, and aA will produce pink flowers, while aa will produce white ones
(see Fig. 6.2). According to the Hardy-Weinberg Law, if pink flowers and white flowers have the same
selection chance, the distributions of the genotypes AA, Aa, aA, and aa and the alleles A and a in the
population will not change over generations. Otherwise, different genotypes may have different fitness,
and some may be selected while others eliminated (88).
Indeed, some alleles, either dominant or recessive, may cause genetic disorders. When they are
dominant, both homozygote and heterozygote pairs containing the dominant allele will cause the dis-
orders. When they are recessive, only the homozygote pairs of two recessive alleles will cause the
problem. In either case, the genotypes that cause the genetic disorders will have lower fitness than those
that do not. For example, cystic fibrosis is a disease caused by a recessive allele. The normal allele
or the dominant one codes for a membrane protein that supports the transportation of ions for cells.
It functions normally even when in the heterozygote form with one abnormal allele. However, if both
alleles are the recessive ones, there will not be normal membrane protein expressions, giving rise to
the cystic fibrosis disease. A further example is the Huntington’s disease, a degenerative disease of the
nerve system, caused by a lethal dominant allele. Both homozygote and heterozygote pairs of alleles
containing the dominant allele will be harmful. Only the homozygote pairs of the recessive alleles will
be normal. Fortunately, this harmful allele is rare in human population (88).
111
We now use a 2× 2 matrix A to represent the fitness of the four possible pairs of alleles, with A1,1
for AA, A1,2 for Aa, A2,1 for aA, and A2,2 for aa. We assume that the fitness values for Aa and aA
are the same. Therefore, A1,2 = A2,1, and A is a symmetric matrix. Let x = (x1, x2)T be the strategy
for choosing between allele A and a. We then have a SEgame for this allele selection problem, to find
an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S, (6.21)
where S = {x ∈ R2 : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1}. We have also a corresponding GKproblem:
maxx∈R2 xTAx/2 (6.22)
subject to
∑
i xi = 1, x ≥ 0.
We analyze the solutions and their stabilities of this game for the following three cases:
Case 1. A1,1 = A1,2 = A2,1 > A2,2: Here, the fitness of the homozygote pair AA is the same as that
of the heterozygote pairs Aa and aA, but the fitness of the homozygote pair aa is lower than all other
cases. This is a case such as that for the cystic fibrosis disease, when the recessive gene causes illness.
In this case, the SEgame in (6.21) has a single solution x∗ = (1, 0)T , and x∗TAx∗ = A1,1. This implies
that the population will eventually reach an equilibrium state with only the dominant gene A left. Let
x ∈ S be any other possible strategy. It is easy to verify that
xTAx = A1,1x
2
1 +A1,2x1x2 +A2,1x1x2 +A2,2x
2
2 < A1,1 = x
∗TAx∗,
for all x 6= x∗, i.e, x2 > 0. Therefore, x∗ is a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.22), and
by Theorem 6.4.3, it is an evolutionarily stable state.
Case 2. A1,1 = A1,2 = A2,1 < A2,2: Here, the fitness of the homozygote pairAA is equal to that of the
heterozygote pairsAa and aA, but lower than that of the homozygote pair aa. This is a case such as that
for the Huntington’s disease, when the dominant gene causes illness. In this case, the SEgame in (6.21)
has two solutions: x∗ = (1, 0)T with x∗TAx∗ = A1,1 and x∗ = (0, 1)T with x∗TAx∗ = A2,2. The first
solution implies that the population may eventually reach an equilibrium state with only the dominant
gene A left. The second solution implies that the population may eventually reach an equilibrium state
with only the recessive gene a left. Let x ∈ S be any other possible strategy. For the first solution
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x∗ = (1, 0)T , It is easy to verify that
xTAx = A1,1x
2
1 +A1,2x1x2 +A2,1x1x2 +A2,2x
2
2 > A1,1 = x
∗TAx∗,
for all x 6= x∗, i.e, x2 > 0. Therefore, x∗ is not even a local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.22),
and by Theorem 6.4.3, it is not evolutionarily stable. For the second solution x∗ = (0, 1)T , It is easy to
verify that
xTAx = A1,1x
2
1 +A1,2x1x2 +A2,1x1x2 +A2,2x
2
2 < A2,2 = x
∗TAx∗,
for all x 6= x∗, i.e, x1 > 0. Therefore, x∗ is a strict local maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.22), and
by Theorem 6.4.3, it is an evolutionarily stable state.
Case 3. A1,2 = A2,1 > A1,1 > A2,2: Here, the fitness of the homozygote pairs AA and aa are
lower than that of the heterozygote pairs Aa and aA. Such a case could happen for example in the
study of malaria infection, where A represents the wild-type gene, while a represents the mutated gene.
Individuals withAA types are susceptible to malaria infection, while those withAa and aA types appear
to be able to resist the infection. However, when aa types are formed, the individuals will develop a
serious disease called the sickle cell disease. In any case, the SEgame in (6.21) has a single solution
x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2), x∗1 > 0, x∗2 > 0, and
x∗1 = (A1,2 −A2,2)/(A1,2 +A2,1 −A1,1 −A2,2)
x∗2 = (A1,1 −A1,2)/(A1,2 +A2,1 −A1,1 −A2,2)
Since both x∗1 > 0 and x∗2 > 0, it is easy to construct a null space matrix Z = (1,−1)T , and see that
ZTAZ = A1,1 + A2,2 − A1,2 − A2,1 < 0. Therefore, by Theorem 6.3.5, x∗ must be a strict local
maximizer of the GKproblem in (6.22), and by Theorem 6.4.3 or 6.5.3, it is an evolutionarily stable
state.
Next, we consider a more complicated case related to genetic mutations for malaria infections. In
Africa and Southeast Asia, where human population has been exposed to serious malaria infection,
certain genetic mutations have survived for a gene that codes the hemoglobin proteins of blood cells.
These mutations resist malaria infection, but may cause other serious illness as well when in homozy-
gote forms such as the sickle cell disease. Here we consider three well-studied allele forms of this gene,
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the wild type, S-mutation, and C-mutation, denoted by W , S, and C alleles. The normal genotype
would be WW , but subnormal ones include WS, WC, and SC, which may have malaria resistance
functions. Other forms, SS and CC, may cause other illness. These functions can be described with a
3 × 3 fitness matrix A, with rows corresponding to the choices of W , S, and C for the first allele, and
the columns to the choices of W , S, and C for the second allele, when forming the allele pairs or in
other words, the genotypes. Based on an estimate given in (100), this fitness matrix can be defined as
follows:
W S C
W 0.89 1.00 0.89
S 1.00 0.20 0.70
C 0.89 0.70 1.31
From this matrix, we see that the genotypeWS has good fitness, whileCC is the best. The genotype
WW is not very good because it is susceptible to malaria infection, while SS is the worse because it
causes the sickle cell disease. We may wonder how the alleles will eventually distribute in the population
under such selection pressures. We have solved a SEgame with this fitness matrix and obtained three
solutions: x(1) = (0, 0, 1)T , x(2) = (0.879, 0.121, 0)T , and x(3) = (0.832, 0.098, 0.070)T . The first
solution suggests that the population may end up with all C alleles since the genotype CC seems have
the best fitness. The second solution suggests a large portion of W alleles, with a small percentage of
S alleles, which increases the resistance to malaria infection, yet does not have a large chance for SS
combinations. The third solution means that the three alleles may co-exist.
We have also solved a corresponding GKproblem with the above matrix A, using a Matlab code.
It turned out that we have only found two local maximizers for the GKproblem corresponding to x(1)
and x(2). At least, computationally, we have not found x(3) as a local maximizer, which suggests that
x(1) and x(2) may be evolutionarily stable, while x(3) may not. Indeed, at solution x(3), the only active
constraint for the GKproblem is
∑
i xi = 1. The null space matrix Z for the Jacobian of this equation
can be constructed as
Z =

1 0
0 1
−1 −1
 .
114
We then have the reduced Hessian of the GKproblem to be
ZTAZ =
 0.42 0.72
0.72 0.11
 ,
and the eigenvalues of this reduced Hessian are −0.4715 and 1.0015. By Theorem 6.3.5, x(3) is not a
local maximizer of the GKproblem and hence by Theorem 6.4.3 or 6.5.3, it is not evolutionarily stable.
Based on the above analysis, we would predict that x(3) for the co-existing of three alleles in the
population will never happen because it is unstable. The solution x(1) corresponds to a global maximizer
of the GKproblem. Based on our simulation (not shown), it also has a large attraction region in the sense
that most solutions would converge to x(1) unless the initial value for C allele is very small, say less
than 5%. In current population, C allele is indeed rare and therefore, the population does not have much
chance to evolve to this state. The population have typically a large percentage of W alleles, a small
percentage of S alleles, and some rare C alleles, and therefore, we would predict that x(2) will be the
most likely and stable state of the population in the end.
6.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have reviewed the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for SEgames,
and provided some new proofs and computational methods. In particular, we have reviewed the rela-
tionship between the SEgame and the GKproblem, and discussed the first and second order necessary
and sufficient conditions that can be derived from this relationship for testing the optimality and stabil-
ity of the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in different forms from those in previous work
and can be verified more efficiently. We have also derived more efficient computational methods for the
evaluation of the conditions than conventional approaches. We have demonstrated how these conditions
can be applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of genetic selection
games including some in the study of genetic disorders. Further studies can be pursued in the following
possible directions though:
First, novel methods can be developed for solving special types of SEgames and especially for ob-
taining the evolutionarily stable strategies for the games by solving some special classes of GKproblems.
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For example, if the fitness matrix for a SEgame is negative definite, then the corresponding GKprob-
lem is a strictly convex quadratic program and can be solved efficiently using some special algorithms
(87). Further, the solution is guaranteed to be a strict local maximizer for the GKproblem and hence an
evolutionarily stable strategy for the SEgame. A more complicated case is when the fitness matrix is
positive definite. Then, only pure strategies may be evolutionarily stable. A special algorithm can then
be developed to only find the solutions for the GKproblem that correspond to the pure strategies of the
SEgame.
Second, in Theorem 6.3.5 and 6.5.3, we have stated two optimality and stability conditions. They
are necessary and sufficient, but require all active constraints to be strongly active at x∗, whenC0(x∗) =
C0(x∗), T0(x∗) = T 0(x∗), and Z0 = Z0. However, in practice, this assumption may not hold. A more
general necessary and sufficient condition, without the above assumption, is to require dTAd < 0
for all d ∈ T (x∗), d 6= 0, where T (x∗) is the reduced tangent cone at x∗, as given in (85). As
we have mentioned in previous sections, this condition is not easy to test. It is equivalent to testing
the copositivity of a matrix, which is difficult in general (84; 95). But still, an efficient algorithm
may be developed for SEgames and GKproblems for small sizes of problems or problems with special
structures.
Third, it is not so hard to verify that the GKproblem is NP-hard in general, because the maximum
clique problem can be formulated as a GKproblem (94; 98). However, how to extend this result to the
SEgame is not so clear, because the SEgame is not exactly equivalent to the GKproblem. Several related
questions are asked: is any maximal clique a local maximizer of the GKproblem for the maximum
clique problem? If not, what condition is needed? If yes, is it a strict local maximizer? Is the maximum
clique a global maximizer? Is it an evolutionarily stable strategy for the corresponding SEgame? We
are interested in all these questions and are trying to find their answers.
Fourth, though not equivalent, the correspondence between the SEgame and GKproblem is interest-
ing. A similar relationship may be found between a class of nonlinear games and nonlinear optimization
problems. Indeed, we can define an n-strategy two-player game by a fitness function xTpi(y) with pi(y)
being a nonlinear function. The game then becomes a nonlinear game. If pi(y) is a gradient field,
i.e., there is a function f(y) such that ∇f(y) = pi(y), then, an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗Tpi(x∗) ≥ xTpi(x∗) for all x ∈ S corresponds to an optimal solution x∗ ∈ S such that f(x∗) ≥ f(x)
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for all x in a small neighborhood of x∗, x ∈ S. Then, it would be interesting to see what additional
relationships between the SEgame and GKproblem can be extended to their nonlinear cases.
Finally, we have demonstrated the applications of SEgames to allele selection at single genetic loci.
They can be extended to alleles at multiple genetic loci, if there is no mutation or recombination. In
this case, an individual can be identified by a sequence of alleles at the multiple loci. In other words,
a selection strategy will be a choice of a specific sequence of alleles. This would certainly increase the
strategy space substantially. For example, if there are two loci G1 and G2, with two possible alleles A
and a for G1 and two other possible ones B and b for G2, then there will be four possible sequences
of alleles for the two loci: AB, Ab, aB, ab, each corresponding to one pure strategy. In general, if
there are m loci Gi, i = 1, . . . ,m, with mi possible alleles for Gi, then there will be n =
∏
i=1:mmi
possible sequences of alleles. The number of pure strategies and hence the dimension of the game will
be n, which can be a large number. In any case, in practice, mutation and recombination often are
not negligible, and therefore, our model must incorporate such effects. The topics could include other
so-called linkage disequilibrium factors, but they are all beyond the scope of this paper (100). We will
pursue these issues in our future efforts.
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CHAPTER 7. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL NETWORK GAMES
A paper submitted to Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Min Wang, Yuanyuan Huang, Yiping Hao, Wen Zhou, Zhijun Wu
Abstract
Species make social contacts and form social networks. The latter may have great impacts on the
evolution of a population, such as preserving certain genetic features, sharing knowledge and informa-
tion, preventing invasions, etc. In this paper, we show that the evolution of a population over a social
network can be modeled as a symmetric evolutionary game. Its equilibrium states can therefore be ob-
tained and analyzed by solving an optimization problem called the generalized knapsack problem. We
show that an equilibrium state often corresponds to a social clique, when the population is distributed
evenly on the clique. However, an equilibrium state may or may not be evolutionarily stable, whether
it is on a clique or not. Only those stable ones may be observable or sustainable in nature. We ana-
lyze several different types of equilibrium states and prove a set of conditions for their stabilities. We
show in particular that the equilibrium states on cliques are evolutionarily stable except for special cir-
cumstances, while non-clique equilibrium states are unstable in general. Therefore, the optimal clique
strategies should have an evolutionary advantage over the non-clique ones.
7.1 Introduction
Species make social contacts and form social networks. The evolution of a population over a social
network can be of great biological or social interest, and be studied as a so-called social network game
with the adjacent matrix of the network being the payoff or fitness matrix. Individuals or species in a
social network interact with those they connect. They tend to maximize their social activities, which
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then drive the population to migrate to nodes or sites with the most possible ”social connections”. As
such, the social network must play an essential role in evolution, for preserving certain genetic features,
sharing knowledge and information, or preventing invasions, etc. (109; 112; 117; 119).
In this paper, we show that a social network game is in fact a symmetric evolutionary game or
SEgame for short. Its equilibrium states can therefore be obtained and analyzed by solving an opti-
mization problem called the generalized knapsack problem or GKproblem for short. Based on this
connection, we show that an equilibrium state often corresponds to a social clique, when the population
is distributed evenly on the clique. However, an equilibrium state may or may not be evolutionarily
stable, whether it is on a clique or not. Only those stable ones may be observable or sustainable in
nature. We analyze several different types of equilibrium states and prove a set of conditions for their
stabilities. We show in particular that the equilibrium states on cliques are evolutionarily stable except
for special circumstances, while non-clique equilibrium states are unstable in general. Therefore, the
optimal clique strategies should have an evolutionary advantage over the non-clique ones. These prop-
erties have not been discussed formally in literature before, but can be interesting for the understanding
of the behaviors of social networks of either biological, or cultural, or economic types.
7.2 Social Network Games
The social activities of a population can be described by a social network, with the nodes repre-
senting the social sites and the links the social channels. The population is distributed over the social
sites. The individuals at different social sites may be different species, different cultural groups, dif-
ferent races, or different countries. They make social contacts through the social channels. The types
of social contacts may include mating, making friends, communication, sharing knowledge, sharing
religious beliefs, or trading. The results from socializing over a social network may include increasing
social connections, genetic and cultural diversities, group protection, economic welfare, but also spread
of rumors or diseases (109; 112; 117; 119) (see Fig. 7.1).
A network can be represented by a graph G = (V,E) of n nodes V = {i = 1, . . . , n} and m edges
E = {(i, j) : There is a link between node i and j}. The connectivity of graphG can be described by
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Social site Social channel 
Figure 7.1 Social Networks: A social network consists of social sites and social channels. A popu-
lation is distributed over the social sites. The individuals at different social sites may be
different species, cultural groups, races, or countries. They make social contacts through
the social channels. The types of social contacts may be mating, communication, sharing
knowledge, or trading. The results from socializing over a social network may include
increasing social connections, genetic or cultural diversities, economic welfare, but also
spread of rumors or diseases.
a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, with Ai,j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E, and Ai,j = 0 if (i, j) /∈ E, i, j = 1, . . . , n. Note that
we only consider simple networks, i.e., there is no links connecting a node to itself. Therefore, Ai,i = 0
for all i = 1, . . . , n. The matrix A is called the adjacency matrix of G (see Fig. 7.2).
Let y ∈ Rn be a population profile, with yj being the fraction of species occupying node j,
∑
j yj =
1. Then, y shows how the population is distributed over the network. If an individual decides to stay
at node i, the average social contacts he or she can make with the individuals at other nodes would
be (Ay)i =
∑
j Ai,jyj . Let x be the strategy of the individual to join the network, with xi being the
frequency to stay with node i,
∑
i xi = 1. Then, the average social contacts that this individual can
make would be xTAy =
∑
i xi(Ay)i =
∑
i,j xiAi,jyj . We call this value x
TAy the social benefit
or payoff of individual x in population y over network G. Given population y, we assume that each
individual wants to maximize his or her social payoff by choosing an optimal strategy x.
Note that the choice of strategy x for each individual depends on profile y of the population, but
once a decision is made, y may be changed due to a change in x. An equilibrium state will be reached
in the end, when an optimal strategy x∗ is found such that strategy x∗ prevails in population y = x∗,
i.e., x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all strategy x. Indeed, in such a state, strategy x∗ are optimal and will not
change, while the population will remain to be x∗. As such, the evolution of a population over a social
120
!
0" 1" 1" 1" 1" 0" 0" 0"
1" 0" 1" 1" 0" 1" 0" 0"
1" 1" 0" 1" 1" 1" 0" 0"
1" 1" 1" 0" 1" 1" 0" 0"
1" 0" 1" 1" 0" 0" 1" 1"
0" 1" 1" 1" 0" 0" 1" 1"
0" 0" 0" 0" 1" 1" 0" 1"
0" 0" 0" 0" 1" 1" 1" 0"
Graph G 
1"
2"
3"
4"
5"
6"
7" 8"
Matrix A 
Figure 7.2 Graph Representation: A network can be represented by a graph G = (V,E) where
E =
{
(i, j) : There is a link between node i and j
}
and V = {i = 1, . . . , n}. The con-
nectivity of graph G can be described by a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, with Ai,j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E,
and Ai,j = 0 if (i, j) /∈ E, i, j = 1, . . . , n. The matrix A is called the adjacency matrix of
G.
network can be modeled as an evolutionary game (110; 116; 120). We call it a social network game or
SNgame for short. We call x∗ an optimal strategy or equilibrium state of the game.
With a goal of maximizing the social activities, a population often migrates to sites with the most
possible connections among the sites. Such a group of sites corresponds to a subgraph in the network
with a dense set of edges among its nodes. The best one would be a complete subgraph. We call it a
social clique. More specifically, we say that a state x is a social clique if xi > 0 for all node i in the
clique and xi = 0 otherwise. In this state, the population is distributed over a clique. Of course, not all
the cliques are optimal choices for a game.
7.3 Social Network Games as Symmetric Evolutionary Games
Consider a social network game (SNgame) on a network G = (V,E), |V | = n, |E| = m. Let
S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1} be the set of all mixed strategies for the game. Then, the goal of
the game is to find an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for all x ∈ S, (7.1)
where A is the adjacency matrix of G and is used as the payoff matrix of the game. Since A is always
symmetric, the SNgame in (7.1) is a symmetric evolutionary game (SEgame). A general set of opti-
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mality and stability conditions for the SNgame in (7.1) can therefore be derived from the theory for the
SEgame:
7.3.1 Optimality Conditions
For any evolutionary game, it is well known that a mixed strategy x∗ ∈ S is optimal if and only
if it satisfies a set of complementarity conditions: x∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i > 0 and
x∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i = 0. These conditions also apply to any symmetric evolutionary
game (SEgame) including the SNgame in (7.1), and can be given more specifically in the following
form.
Theorem 7.3.1. A strategy x∗ ∈ S is an optimal strategy for the SNgame in (7.1) if and only if there is
a scalar λ∗ such that
x∗i ≥ 0, λ∗ − (Ax∗)i ≥ 0 (7.2)
x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (7.3)
The proof for the theorem is straightforward and can be found in standard texts (110; 116; 120).
Since it is helpful for the understanding of the game, we still provide one here for the self-containedness
of the paper:
Proof. If x∗ ∈ S satisfies the conditions in (7.2) and (7.3), by adding all equations in (7.3), we then
obtain λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Let x ∈ S be an arbitrary strategy. Multiply the second inequality in (7.2) by xi.
Then, by adding all second inequalities in (7.2), we obtain λ∗ − xTAx∗ ≥ 0, i.e., x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗,
since λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Therefore, x∗ is an optimal strategy for the SNgame in (7.1).
If x∗ ∈ S is an optimal strategy for the SNgame in (7.1), then x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx∗ for any x ∈ S
and therefore, x∗TAx∗ ≥ eTi Ax∗ = (Ax∗)i for all i. Let λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Then, λ∗ − (Ax∗)i ≥ 0 for
all i. Assume that x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) > 0 for some i. By adding all the left-hand sides of the equations
in (7.3), we then obtain λ∗ > x∗TAx∗, which contradicts to the fact that λ∗ = x∗TAx∗. Therefore,
x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) = 0 for all i.
A SEgame is always related to an optimization problem called the generalized knapsack problem
(GKproblem) (105; 111; 115). So is a SNgame in (7.1). The GKproblem corresponding to a SNgame
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in (7.1) is to find an optimal solution x∗ ∈ Rn for the following maximization problem:
maxx∈Rn xTAx/2, (7.4)
subject to
∑
i xi = 1, x ≥ 0,
whereA is as defined in the SNgame in (7.1). Since the problem is to maximize the social payoff xTAx,
we call it the social payoff problem or SPproblem for short.
The SPproblem in (7.4) is a constrained optimization problem. Based on general optimization
theory, the optimal solution to a constrained optimization problem must satisfy certain conditions (107;
114). We say that a vector x ∈ Rn is a feasible solution for the SPproblem in (7.4) if it satisfies all
the constraints of the problem, and that a vector x∗ ∈ Rn is an optimal solution for the SPproblem
in (7.4) if it is feasible for the problem and x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx for all x ∈ Rn feasible in a small
neighborhood U of x∗. Note that x is feasible for the SPproblem in (7.4) is equivalent to x ∈ S, with
S = {x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0, ∑i xi = 1} as defined for the SNgame in (7.1). Note also that x∗ is optimal
for the SPproblem in (7.4) is equivalent to x∗ is a local maximizer of the problem.
Theorem 7.3.2. If x∗ ∈ Rn is an optimal solution for the SPproblem in (7.4), then there must be a
scalar λ∗ such that
x∗i ≥ 0, λ∗ − (Ax∗)i ≥ 0, (7.5)
x∗i (λ
∗ − (Ax∗)i) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n. (7.6)
Proof. Note that the Lagrangian function for the SPproblem in (7.4) can be written in the following
form:
L(x, λ, µ) = −xTAx/2− λ(1−
∑
i
xi)− µTx.
where x ∈ Rn, λ ∈ R, µ ∈ Rn. Then, by the first-order necessary conditions for constrained
optimization, if x∗ ∈ Rn is an optimal solution for the SPproblem in (7.4), there must be a scalar
123
λ∗ ∈ R and a vector µ∗ ∈ Rn such that
∇xL(x∗, λ∗, µ∗) = −Ax∗ + λ∗e− µ∗ = 0,∑
i
x∗i = 1,
x∗ ≥ 0,
µ∗ ≥ 0,
x∗Tµ∗ = 0.
By substituting µ∗ = λ∗e−Ax∗ in all the formulas, we then have
x∗ ≥ 0, λ∗e−Ax∗ ≥ 0,
x∗T (λ∗e−Ax∗) = 0,
which are equivalent to the conditions in (7.5) and (7.6).
The first-order necessary conditions for a constrained optimization problem are also called the KKT
conditions (107; 114). Vectors that satisfy the KKT conditions are called KKT points. An optimal solu-
tion for a constrained optimization problem must be a KKT point, but a KKT point may not necessarily
be an optimal solution. Based on the above proof, the conditions in Theorem 7.3.2 are basically the
KKT conditions for the SPproblem in (7.4). Therefore, an optimal solution for the SPproblem in (7.4)
must be a KKT point for the problem, but a KKT point that satisfy those conditions may not necessarily
be an optimal solution.
Notice that the conditions in (7.2) and (7.3) are the same as those in (7.5) and (7.6). However,
it does not imply that the SNgame in (7.1) is equivalent to the SPproblem in (7.4), because they are
necessary and sufficient for a strategy to be optimal for the SNgame in (7.1) but only necessary for a
solution to be optimal for the SPproblem in (7.4). We give a clear distinction between the two problems
in the following corollary.
Corollary 7.3.3. An optimal solution x∗ ∈ S for the SPproblem in (7.4) must be an optimal strategy for
the SNgame in (7.1), while an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S for the SNgame in (7.1) is only a KKT point for
the SPproblem in (7.4), which is necessary but not sufficient to be optimal for the SPproblem in (7.4).
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7.3.2 Stability Conditions
An important concept in evolutionary game theory is the evolutionary stability of an optimal strategy
or equivalently, an equilibrium state. It characterizes the ability of a population to resist small changes
or invasions when at equilibrium. Consider a general evolutionary game defined by a payoff matrix
A. Let x∗ ∈ S be an equilibrium state for the game. Let x ∈ S be another arbitrary state. Mix x∗
and x 6= x∗ so that the population changes to a new state, x + (1 − )x∗, for some small fraction
 > 0. Then, x∗ is said to be evolutionarily stable if it remains as a better response to the new “invaded”
population state. More accurately, we have the following definition.
Definition 7.3.4 ((110; 116; 120)). An equilibrium state x∗ ∈ S for an evolutionary game is evolution-
arily stable if there is a small number ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any x ∈ S, x 6= x∗,
x∗TA(x+ (1− )x∗) > xTA(x+ (1− )x∗), 0 <  ≤ ′. (7.7)
Usually, it is not easy to prove the evolutionary stability of an equilibrium state if just based on its
definition. A more straightforward condition is to consider the states y in a small neighborhood U of
the equilibrium state x∗ and check if no y 6= x∗ prevails x∗ such that yTAy ≥ x∗TAy. It turns out that
this condition is necessary and also sufficient:
Theorem 7.3.5 ((110; 116; 120)). An equilibrium state x∗ ∈ S for an evolutionary game is evolution-
arily stable if and only if there is a small neighborhood U of x∗ such that
yTAy < x∗TAy for all y ∈ U ∩ S, y 6= x∗. (7.8)
Note that a SNgame is an evolutionary game. Therefore, the condition in (7.8) also holds for any
of its evolutionarily stable states. For a SNgame, x∗TAy = yTAx∗ since A is symmetric. Then,
yTAy < yTAx∗ for all y ∈ U ∩ S, y 6= x∗. It follows that yTAy < x∗TAx∗ for all y ∈ U ∩ S,
y 6= x∗ since yTAx∗ ≤ x∗TAx∗ for all y ∈ S. This implies that if x∗ is an evolutionarily stable state
for a SNgame, it must be a strict local maximizer of the corresponding SPproblem. It turns out that the
converse is also true:
Theorem 7.3.6. An equilibrium state x∗ ∈ S for a SNgame in (7.1) is evolutionarily stable if and only
if it is a strict local maximizer of the corresponding SPproblem in (7.4).
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The theorem is actually true for any symmetric evolutionary game (SEgame) and its corresponding
generalized knapsack problem (GKproblem), for which a proof can be found in some standard literature
(110; 116; 120). Based on this theorem, we can check the stability of an equilibrium state for the
SNgame more directly based on the strictness of the state as a local maximizer of the corresponding
SPproblem. Though, it is not a simple matter to see if a local maximizer is strict or not. Here, we provide
a necessary and sufficient condition for the strictness of a local maximizer from general optimization
theory, which we may need to justify some of our results later.
Theorem 7.3.7 ((105; 111)). Let x∗ ∈ Rn be a KKT point for the SPproblem in (7.4). Assume that the
active inequalities of the SPproblem at x∗ are all strongly active. Then, x∗ is a strict local maximizer of
the SPproblem if and only if ZTAZ is negative definite, where Z is the null space matrix of the Jacobian
of the active constraints of the SPproblem at x∗.
7.4 Cliques as Equilibrium States
As we have mentioned in our introduction section, with a goal of maximizing the social activities, a
population would often migrate to sites with the most possible connections among them. Such a group
of sites corresponds to a subgraph in the network with a dense set of edges among its nodes. The best
one would be a complete subgraph. We call it a social clique. More specifically, we say that a state x is
a social clique if xi > 0 for all node i in the clique and xi = 0 otherwise. In this state, the population is
distributed over a clique. However, the cliques are not always optimal choices for a game. Even when
they are, they may not necessarily be stable states.
7.4.1 Is a Clique an Equilibrium State?
The answer is NOT ALWAYS. See for example the game on graph G in Fig. 7.3. Notice that the
nodes {1, 2, 3} form a clique. If it is an equilibrium state, the values for x∗1, x∗2, and x∗3 should be the
same, i.e., x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = 1/3, and x∗i = 0 for all i = 4, . . . , 8. Then, x
∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i = 2/3 for
all i such that x∗i > 0, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3. However, x
∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i does not hold for all i such that
x∗i = 0, i.e., i = 4, . . . , 8, since x
∗TAx∗ = 2/3 < (Ax∗)4 = 1. By Theorem 7.3.1, x∗ cannot be an
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equilibrium state for the game. In general, let C = (VC , EC) be a clique of graph G = (V,E), VC ⊆ V
and EC = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ VC}. We then have the following theorem.
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Figure 7.3 Social Cliques: In graph G, the nodes {1, 2, 3} form a clique. Let x∗ be a strategy for
choosing this clique, x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = 1/3 and x∗i = 0 for all i = 4, . . . , 8. Then,
x∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i = 2/3 for all i such that x∗i > 0, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3. However,
x∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i does not hold for all i such that x∗i = 0, i.e., i = 4, . . . , 8, since
x∗TAx∗ = 2/3 < (Ax∗)4 = 1. By Theorem 7.3.1, x∗ cannot be an optimal strategy for
the SNgame on graph G.
Theorem 7.4.1. Let x∗ ∈ S be a strategy on a clique C of graph G. Then, x∗ cannot be an optimal
strategy for the SNgame in (7.1) if C is contained in a larger clique of G.
Proof. If x∗ is optimal for the SNgame, then the population must be distributed evenly over C, with
x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC and x∗i = 0 for all i /∈ VC , where k = |VC |. Since Ai,j = 1 for all i 6= j ∈ VC
and Ai,i = 0 for all i ∈ VC , x∗TAx∗ =
∑
i,j∈VC x
∗
iAi,jx
∗
j = (k − 1)/k. If C is contained in a larger
clique of G, there must be a node l ∈ V \VC such that (l, j) ∈ E for all j ∈ VC . Then, Al,j = 1
for all j ∈ VC , and (Ax∗)l =
∑
j∈VC Al,jx
∗
j = 1 > x
∗TAx∗. This is a contradiction to the fact that
(Ax∗)i ≤ x∗TAx∗ for all i ∈ V , as implied by Theorem 7.3.1. Therefore, x∗ cannot be an optimal
strategy for the game.
The above theorem can also be justified more intuitively as the following: If a clique C is contained
in a larger clique of G, we can always find a node, say l, not in C, and have a strategy x on this node,
x = el, such that xTAx∗ > x∗TAx∗, i.e., strategy x to occupy only node l prevails strategy x∗ to
occupy all the nodes in C, given the population distributed as x∗ over C. Then, x∗ is not optimal.
Moreover, clique C and node l in fact form a larger clique H of size k + 1, and strategy y∗ on H has
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a better payoff than strategy x∗ on C, because y∗TAy∗ = k/(k + 1) while x∗TAx∗ = (k − 1)/k.
Therefore, the population would certainly expand from C to H , for better social payoff, and so forth.
7.4.2 Is a Maximal Clique an Equilibrium State?
The answer is YES. See for example the game on graph G again in Fig. 7.4. The nodes {1, 2, 3, 4}
form a maximal clique. It is easy to verify that the strategy x∗ on this clique is optimal: If we let
x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = x∗4 = 1/4 and x∗i = 0 for all i = 5, . . . , 8. Then, x
∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i = 3/4 for
all i such that x∗i > 0, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and also, x
∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i = 0, i.e.,
i = 5, . . . , 8. Then, x∗ satisfies all the conditions in Theorem 7.3.1, and it must be an optimal strategy
for the game. In general, we have the following theorem.
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Figure 7.4 Maximal Cliques: The nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} in G form a maximal clique. Let x∗ be a strategy
on this clique, x∗1 = x∗2 = x∗3 = x∗4 = 1/4 and x∗i = 0 for all i = 5, . . . , 8. Then,
x∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i = 3/4 for all i such that x∗i > 0, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, 4, and also,
x∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i = 0, i.e., i = 5, . . . , 8. Then, x∗ satisfies all
the conditions in Theorem 7.3.1, and must be an optimal strategy for the SNgame on G.
Theorem 7.4.2. Let C be a clique of G. Let x∗ ∈ S be a strategy on C, x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC ,
x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VC , and k = |VC |. If C is a maximal clique, then x∗ is an optimal strategy for the
SNgame in (7.1).
Proof. Since Ai,j = 1 for all i 6= j ∈ VC and Ai,i = 0 for all i ∈ VC , for any l ∈ VC , (Ax∗)l =∑
j∈VC Al,jx
∗
j = (k − 1)/k = x∗TAx∗. If C is a maximal clique of G, for any l ∈ V \VC , the number
of edges from l to C is fewer than k. In other words, (l, j) /∈ E for some j ∈ VC . Then, Al,j = 0 for
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some j ∈ VC , and (Ax∗)l =
∑
j∈VC Al,jx
∗
j ≤ (k − 1)/k = x∗TAx∗. By Theorem 7.3.1, x∗ must be
an optimal strategy for the SNgame in (7.1).
Note that an optimal strategy for the SNgame in (7.1) may not always be on a maximal clique. For
example, for the game on graph G in Fig. 7.5, the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} do not form a clique, but the
strategy x∗, x∗1 = x∗3 = x∗4 = 1/4, x∗2 = x∗5 = 1/8, and x∗i = 0 for i = 6, 7, 8, is in fact optimal: It is
easy to verify that x∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i = 3/4 for all i such that x∗i > 0, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and also,
x∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i = 0, i.e., i = 6, 7, 8. Then, x∗ satisfies all the conditions in
Theorem 7.3.1, and must be an optimal strategy for the game. We discuss non-clique optimal strategies
in greater detail later.
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Figure 7.5 Non-Clique Strategies: The nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in G do not form a clique, but the strategy
x∗, x∗1 = x∗3 = x∗4 = 1/4, x∗2 = x∗5 = 1/8, and x∗i = 0 for i = 6, 7, 8, is in fact optimal: It is
easy to verify that x∗TAx∗ = (Ax∗)i = 3/4 for all i such that x∗i > 0, i.e., i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
and also, x∗TAx∗ ≥ (Ax∗)i for all i such that x∗i = 0, i.e., i = 6, 7, 8. Then, x∗ satisfies
all the conditions in Theorem 7.3.1, and must be an optimal strategy for the SNgame on G.
7.4.3 Is a Maximal Clique a Local Maximizer?
A maximal clique is an equilibrium state for the SNgame in (7.1), but it may or may not be stable,
which is important to know in practice. By Theorem 7.3.6, an equilibrium state for the SNgame in
(7.1) is evolutionarily stable if and only if it is a strict local maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4).
Unfortunately, in some circumstances, a maximal clique may not even be a local maximizer of the
SPproblem in (7.4). For example, for the game on graph G in Fig. 7.6, the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} form a
maximal clique. It is an equilibrium state for the game, but not a local maximizer of the corresponding
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SPproblem: Let x∗ represent the equilibrium state on this clique, x∗i = 1/4 for all i = 1, . . . , 4 and
x∗i = 0 for all i = 5, . . . , 8. Construct a new state x = x
∗ + p, where p = (−2, 0, 0, 0, , , 0, 0)T for a
small  > 0. Then, it is easy to verify that xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , 8,
∑
i xi = 1, and
xTAx = x∗TAx∗ + pTAp = x∗TAx∗ + 22 > x∗TAx∗,
for all small  > 0. As  goes to zero, x is arbitrarily close to x∗, yet xTAx > x∗Ax∗. Therefore,
x∗ cannot be a local maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4). Notice in this example that in G, there is
a bigger clique, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, attaching to 3 nodes of the clique {1, 2, 3, 4}, which is in fact a critical
factor for why the latter cannot be a local maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4). In general we have the
following theorems.
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Figure 7.6 Maximal Cliques vs. Local Maximizers: The nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} inG form a maximal clique.
It is an equilibrium state for the SNgame on G, but not a local maximizer of the corre-
sponding SPproblem: Let x∗ be the equilibrium state on this clique, x∗i = 1/4 for all
i = 1, . . . , 4 and x∗i = 0 for all i = 5, . . . , 8. Construct a new state x = x
∗ + p, where
p = (−2, 0, 0, 0, , , 0, 0)T for a small  > 0. Then, it is easy to verify that xi ≥ 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , 8,
∑
i xi = 1, and x
TAx = x∗TAx∗ + 22 > x∗TAx∗ for all small  > 0. As
 goes to zero, x is arbitrarily close to x∗, yet xTAx > x∗Ax∗. Therefore, x∗ cannot be a
local maximizer for the corresponding SPproblem.
Theorem 7.4.3. Let C be a maximal clique of graph G. Let x∗ ∈ S be a strategy on C for the SNgame
in (7.1), x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC , x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VC , and k = |VC |. Then, x∗ is a local
maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), only if there is no larger clique attaching to k − 1 nodes of C.
Proof. Assume that x∗ is a local maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), but there is a larger clique
H attaching to k − 1 nodes of C. Assume without loss of generality that H is of size k + 1. Then,
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there must be two nodes i, j ∈ VH\VC each connected with the same set of k − 1 nodes of C, and
both are also connected to each other, i.e., (i, j) ∈ EH . Let l be the node in C not connected with
node i and j. Define a vector p ∈ Rn, with pl = −2, pi = pj = , and pr = 0 for all r 6= i, j, l,
where 0 ≤  ≤ 1/2k. Then, x = x∗ + p satisfies all the constraints for the SPproblem in (7.4). Note
that (Ax∗)l = (Ax∗)i = (Ax∗)j = (k − 1)/k. Therefore, pTAx∗ = 0. It follows that xTAx =
x∗TAx∗ + pTAp = x∗TAx∗ + 22 > x∗TAx∗ for all  > 0. Then, x∗ cannot be a local maximizer of
the SPproblem in (7.4).
In fact, the above condition for not having a larger attached clique is also sufficient for the strategy
on a maximal clique for the SNgame to be a local maximizer of the corresponding SPproblem. However,
the proof is more mathematically involved. We provide a justification in the following.
Theorem 7.4.4. Let C be a maximal clique of graph G. Let x∗ ∈ S be a strategy on C for the SNgame
in (7.1), x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC , x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VC , and k = |VC |. Then, x∗ is a local
maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), if there is not larger clique attaching to k − 1 nodes of C.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let VC = {1, . . . , k}. Then, x∗i = 1/k for all i = 1, . . . , k and x∗i = 0
for all i > k. We show that there is a small neighborhood U of x∗ such that xTAx ≤ x∗TAx∗ for all x
feasible in U .
Let U = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x− x∗‖ < r} for some r > 0. If x ∈ U , then x = x∗ +  for some  ∈ Rn,
‖‖ < r. Let S = {x ∈ Rn : ∑i xi = 1, xi ≥ 0}. If x ∈ S, then x = x∗ +  for some  ∈ Rn,∑
i i = 0, i ≥ −1/k for all i = 1, . . . , k, and i ≥ 0 for all i > k.
Let x ∈ U ∩ S. Define vector x+ ∈ Rk, + ∈ Rk, and 0 ∈ Rn−k, with x+i = 1/k, i = 1, . . . , k.
We can then write x∗ = (x+, 0)T ,  = (+, 0)T , and x = (x+ + +, 0)T , with +i ≥ −1/k for all
i = 1, . . . , k, 0i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n− k,
∑
i 
+
i +
∑
i 
0
i = 0, and ‖‖ < r for some r > 0.
Let A be decomposed into four submatrices, {A(i,j) : i, j = 1, 2} with A(1,1) = A1:k,1:k, A(1,2) =
A1:k,k+1:n, A(2,1) = Ak+1:n,1:k, and A(2,2) = Ak+1:n,k+1:n. Then,
xTAx = x+TA(1,1)x+ + 2x+TA(1,1)+ + +TA(1,1)+
+2x+TA(1,2)0 + 2+TA(1,2)0 + 0TA(2,2)0.
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Since C is a clique ofG, the elements inA(1,1) are all equal to 1 except for those along the diagonal,
and therefore, x∗TAx∗ = x+TA(1,1)x+ = (k − 1)/k. So, in order to prove xTAx ≤ x∗TAx∗, all we
need to do is to show
2x+TA(1,1)+ + +TA(1,1)++
2x+TA(1,2)0 + 2+TA(1,2)0 + 0TA(2,2)0 ≤ 0. (7.9)
or equivalently,
+TA(1,1)+ + 2+TA(1,2)0 + 0TA(2,2)0
≤ −2x+TA(1,1)+ − 2x+TA(1,2)0. (7.10)
Let
∑
i 
0
i = s0. Then s0 ≥ 0, and
∑
i 
+
i = −s0. It follows that −2x+TA(1,1)+ = 2(k − 1)s0/k.
However, since C is a maximal clique, there are at most k − 1 elements equal to 1 in each of the
columns of A(1,2). Therefore, 2x+TA(1,2)0 ≤ 2(k − 1)s0/k. We now consider two cases of this
inequality separately, one for strictly less than (<) and another for exactly equal to (=):
(i) First assume 2x+TA(1,2)0 < 2(k − 1)s0/k. Then, the right-hand side of inequality (7.10) is
greater than zero, and
−2x+TA(1,1)+ − 2x+TA(1,2)0 = Ls0 = O(s0) = O(‖‖),
for some constant L > 0. On the other hand, the left-hand side of inequality (7.10) is basically an
expanded form of TA. Therefore,
+TA(1,1)+ + 2+TA(1,2)0 + 0TA(2,2)0 = λ‖‖2 = O(‖‖2),
where λ is a number between the largest and smallest eigenvalues of A. It follows that there must be
a number r > 0 such that when ‖‖ ≤ r, the left-hand side of (7.10) will always be smaller than the
right-hand side of (7.10).
(ii) Now assume 2x+TA(1,2)0 = 2(k − 1)s0/k. Inequality (7.10) then becomes
+TA(1,1)+ + 2+TA(1,2)0 + 0TA(2,2)0 ≤ 0. (7.11)
Let A¯(1,1) = eeT − A(1,1), where e is a vector of all 1’s in Rk, A¯(2,2) = ffT − A(2,2), where f is a
vector of all 1’s in Rn−k, and A¯(1,2) = efT −A(1,2). Then, inequality (7.11) transforms to
−+T A¯(1,1)+ − 2+T A¯(1,2)0 − 0T A¯(2,2)0 ≤ 0. (7.12)
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Since the elements of A(1,1) are all 1’s except for those along the diagonal, A¯(1,1) is an identity
matrix, and
−+T A¯(1,1)+ = −∑i +2i . (7.13)
Also, since 2x+TA(1,2)0 = 2(k − 1)s0/k, there must be exactly k − 1 elements equal to 1 in each
of the columns of A(1,2) and hence one element equal to 1 in each of the columns of A¯(1,2). Then,
−2+T A¯(1,2)0 = −2∑i +i (∑j∈Di 0j ) ≤∑i +2i +∑i(∑j∈Di 0j )2 (7.14)
=
∑
i 
+2
i +
∑
j 
02
j +
∑
l
∑
i 6=j∈Dl 
0
i 
0
j ,
where Dl is the set of nodes in V \VC connecting to the same k− 1 nodes of C except for node l ∈ VC .
Now, since there is no larger clique attaching to k − 1 nodes of C, any two nodes i 6= j ∈ V \VC
connecting to the same k − 1 nodes in C do not have a link between them and therefore, A(2,2)i,j =
A
(2,2)
j,i = 0, and A¯
(2,2)
i,j = A¯
(2,2)
j,i = 1 for all i 6= j ∈ Dl, l ∈ VC . Given the fact that all diagonal
elements of A¯(2,2) are 1’s,
0T A¯(2,2)0 ≥
∑
j
02j +
∑
l
∑
i 6=j∈Dl
0i 
0
j . (7.15)
By combining (7.13), (7.14), and (7.15), the inequality (7.12) then follows.
As a KKT point for the SPproblem in (7.4), a maximal clique strategy x∗ for the SNgame in (7.1)
may be a local minimizer, saddle point, or local maximizer (107; 114). Only when it is a strict local
maximizer, it is evolutionarily stable. When it is just a local maximizer, it is weakly evolutionarily stable
in the sense that it will not be a worse response than any other strategy x in an “invaded” population
(x+(1− )x∗) (110; 120). Formally, we have the following definition for weak evolutionary stability:
Definition 7.4.5 ((110; 116; 120)). An equilibrium state x∗ ∈ S for an evolutionary game is weakly
evolutionarily stable if there is a small number ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for any x ∈ S, x 6= x∗,
x∗TA(x+ (1− )x∗) ≥ xTA(x+ (1− )x∗), 0 <  ≤ ′. (7.16)
Now, the next question would be under what condition a maximal clique strategy can be a strict
local maximizer of the SPproblem, and we can then claim its evolutionary stability. We answer this
question in the following subsection.
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7.4.4 Is a Maximal Clique a Strict Local Maximizer?
A maximal clique strategy for the SNgame in (7.1) is a local maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4)
unless there is a larger clique attached to it. It is also a strict local maximizer except in some special
situations. For example, in graph G in Fig. 7.7, the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} form a maximal clique. Since
it is not attached with any larger clique with any 3 of its nodes, the strategy x∗ on this clique for the
SNgame on G, x∗i = 1/4 for all i = 1, . . . , 4 and x
∗
i = 0 for all i = 5, . . . , 8, is a local maximizer of
the corresponding SPproblem, and x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx for any x ∈ S in a small neighborhood U of x∗.
However, if we choose x 6= x∗ such that x1 = x3 = x4 = 1/4, x2 = 1/4 − , x5 = , and xi = 0 for
i = 6, 7, 8, we see for any U that x ∈ S ∩U for sufficiently small  > 0, and xTAx = x∗TAx∗ = 3/4.
Therefore, x∗ cannot be a strict local maximizer for the SPproblem. Notice that in graph G, node 5 is
connected with 3 nodes, node 1, 3, 4, of clique {1, 2, 3, 4}, which makes it possible to construct the
strategy x ∈ S ∩ U on node 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 so that xTAx = x∗TAx∗. In general, we have the following
necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximal clique strategy to be a strict local maximizer of the
SPproblem.
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Figure 7.7 Strict Local Maximizer: The nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} in G form a maximal clique. The strategy
x∗ on this clique for the SNgame on G, x∗i = 1/4 for all i = 1, . . . , 4 and x
∗
i = 0 for all
i = 5, . . . , 8, is a local maximizer of the corresponding SPproblem, and x∗TAx∗ ≥ xTAx
for any x ∈ S in a small neighborhood U of x∗. However, if we choose x 6= x∗ such that
x1 = x3 = x4 = 1/4, x2 = 1/4− , x5 = , and xi = 0 for i = 6, 7, 8, we see for any U
that x ∈ S ∩ U for sufficiently small  > 0, and xTAx = x∗TAx∗ = 3/4. Therefore, x∗ is
not a strict local maximizer for the SPproblem.
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Theorem 7.4.6. Let C be a maximal clique of graph G. Let x∗ ∈ S be a strategy on C for the SNgame
in (7.1), x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC , x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VC , and k = |VC |. Then, x∗ is a strict local
maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), only if there is no node in V \VC connected to k − 1 nodes of C.
Proof. Assume that x∗ is a strict local maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), and there is a node
l ∈ V \VC connected to k − 1 nodes of C, i.e., (l, j) ∈ E\EC for k − 1 node j ∈ VC . Then,
(Ax∗)l = (k − 1)/k. Let l′ ∈ VC be the node that node l is not connected to. Since l′ ∈ VC ,
(Ax∗)l′ = (k − 1)/k. Now, construct a strategy x = x∗ + p, with pl = , pl′ = −, and pi = 0 for all
i 6= l, l′. Then, x ∈ S ∩ U for sufficiently small  > 0, while
xTAx = x∗TAx∗ + 2pTAx∗ + pTAp = x∗TAx∗,
since pTAx∗ = (Ax∗)l − (Ax∗)l′ = 0, and pTAp = (Al,l − 2Al,l′ + Al′,l′)2 = 0. This is a
contradiction to the assumption that x∗ is a strict local maximizer for the SPproblem. So there cannot
be any node in V \VC connected to k − 1 nodes of C.
Theorem 7.4.7. Let C be a maximal clique of graph G. Let x∗ ∈ S be a strategy on C for the SNgame
in (7.1), x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC , x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VC , and k = |VC |. Then, x∗ is a strict local
maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), if there is no node in V \VC connected to k − 1 nodes of C.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let’s assume that VC = {1, . . . , k}. Then, x∗i = 1/k for all i =
1, . . . , k and x∗i = 0 for all i > k. Since there is no node in V \VC connected to k− 1 nodes of C, there
is no larger clique attaching to any of k− 1 nodes of C, either. It follows from Theorem 7.4.4 that x∗ is
a local maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4). Since there is no node in V \VC connected to k− 1 nodes
of C, the active constraints of the SPproblem at x∗ are all strongly active. Therefore, by Theorem 7.3.7,
in order to prove that x∗ is a strict local maximizer of the SPproblem, all we need to show is that ZTAZ
is negative definite, where Z is a null space matrix of the Jacobian matrix of the active constraints of
the SPproblem at x∗.
The active constraints of the SPproblem at x∗ include all xi ≥ 0 for i > k and
∑
i xi = 0. Then, the
null space matrix Z for the Jacobian of this set of constraints is an n×(k−1) matrix and can be defined
as follows: Z1,j = −1 and Zj+1,j = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , (k− 1), and all other elements Zi,j = 0 (111).
Let A¯ be the first k rows and k columns of A, and Z¯ the first k rows of Z. Then, ZTAZ = Z¯T A¯Z¯.
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Since C is a clique, the elements of A¯ are all 1’s but 0’s along the diagonal. Therefore, A¯ = eeT − I ,
where e ∈ Rk is a vector of all 1’s and I a k × k identity matrix. Then,
ZTAZ = Z¯T A¯Z¯ = Z¯T (eeT − I)Z¯ = −Z¯T Z¯
is negative definite, proving that x∗ is a strict local maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4).
We have now learned that a strategy on a maximal clique C of size k is optimal for a SNgame, when
the population is distributed evenly on the clique, and the network reaches equilibrium. The equilibrium
is at least weakly evolutionarily stable unless there is a larger clique attached to k − 1 nodes of C. In
the latter case, the population would in some sense be able to migrate easily to the neighboring larger
clique, to achieve a higher social payoff. It is evolutionarily stable unless there is a node not in C but
connected to k − 1 nodes of C or equivalently, there is a clique of size k attached to k − 1 nodes of C.
In the latter case, again, the population would in some sense be able to swing easily to the neighboring
clique without losing any social payoff.
7.4.5 Is a Maximum Clique an Optimal and Stable Strategy?
Given a graph G, the maximum clique is a maximal clique of the largest size in G. Is a strategy on
such a clique an optimal strategy for a SNgame on G? If yes, is it evolutionarily stable? The answer
for the first question is easy: Since the maximum clique is a maximal clique, the strategy is certainly
optimal. In addition, since there is no larger cliques in G than the maximum clique, there cannot be any
larger clique attaching to it, and by Theorem 7.4.3 and 7.4.4, the strategy must be a local maximizer
of the corresponding SPproblem and be at least weakly evolutionarily stable. However, there could be
a node which is not in the clique, but connects to k − 1 nodes of the clique, for a maximum clique of
size k. Therefore, by Theorem 7.4.6 and 7.4.7, the strategy can be a strict local maximizer and hence be
evolutionarily stable unless there is a node not in the clique but connected to k − 1 nodes of the clique.
For example, in graph G in Fig. 7.7, the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4} form a maximum clique. The strategy on this
clique is optimal, but it is not a strict local maximizer of the corresponding SPproblem because node 5
connects to 3 nodes of the clique, node 2, 3, 4, and therefore, it is not evolutionarily stable.
Let C be a maximum clique of size k of graph G. Then, the strategy x∗ on C for the SNgame in
(7.1), x∗i = 1/k for all i ∈ VC and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VC , is a local maximizer of the SPproblem
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in (7.4), with the maximum equal to x∗TAx∗/2 = (k − 1)/2k. However, Motzkin and Straus 1965
showed that the global maximum of a SPproblem is always equal to (k − 1)/2k, where k is the size of
the maximum clique of G (113). Therefore, x∗ on C must be a global maximizer of the SPproblem in
(7.4). In general, we have the following two theorems:
Theorem 7.4.8. Let H be a subgraph of G and x∗ a strategy on H , x∗ > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗ = 0
for all i ∈ V \VH . If x∗ is a global maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4), then the global maximum
x∗TAx∗/2 of the problem must equal to (k − 1)/2k, where k is the size of the maximum clique C
contained in H .
Theorem 7.4.9. The strategy x∗ on a maximum clique C of G for the SNgame in (7.1) is a global
maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4) with the global maximum equal to (k − 1)/2k, where k is the size
of C.
Note that a global maximizer may not necessarily be on a maximum clique, as given in the above
theorem. In particular, a global maximizer can be in a form with more than k nonzero components
including those corresponding to the nodes of a maximum clique. However, once a global maximizer is
obtained, we can always apply a simple procedure, as described below, to recover one that corresponds
to a maximum clique.
Let x∗ ∈ Rn be a global maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4) with the maximum equal to (k −
1)/2k, x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VH , where H is a subgraph of G, and
l = |H| ≥ k. Based on Motzkin and Straus 1965, H must contains a maximum clique of size k (113).
If l > k, then H must be incomplete, and there must be i, j ∈ VH , (i, j) /∈ EH .
Define p ∈ Rn, with pi = c, pj = −c, and pr = 0 for all r 6= i, j, where −x∗i ≤ c ≤ x∗j . Then
y∗ = x∗ + p remains feasible for all the constraints of the SPproblem in (7.4), and
y∗TAy∗ = (x∗ + p)TA(x∗ + p) = x∗TAx∗ + 2x∗TAp+ pTAp.
Since x∗ is a global maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4), it must satisfy the KKT conditions of the
SPproblem in (7.4). In particular, there must be a number λ∗ such that (Ax∗)r = λ∗ for all r ∈ VH . It
follows that 2x∗TAp = 2λ∗(c− c) = 0. Since (i, j) /∈ EH , Ai,j = Aj,i = 0, and pTAp = 0. It follows
that y∗TAy∗ = x∗TAx∗, and y∗ remains to be a global maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4). If we set
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c = x∗j (or c = −x∗i ), we then obtain y∗ with fewer nonzero components, corresponding to a subgraph
of H with node j ∈ VH (or i ∈ VH ) and its connected edges eliminated.
The above procedure can be repeated for the new maximizer y∗ and reduced subgraph H until a
complete subgraph of size k is reached. The whole process would require only l − k steps, for there
are only l − k nodes to be eliminated from a starting subgraph H . An example is given in Fig. 7.8
to demonstrate how the procedure works. In the first graph on the top, the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} form
a subgraph H , and x∗ ∈ S, x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VH , is a global
maximizer for the SPproblem. However, H is not a maximum clique. Since node 2 and 6 are not
connected, we therefore add 1/8 to x2 but subtract it from x6. We then obtain a reduced subgraph
H , with VH = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, EH = {(i, j) ∈ E : i, j ∈ VH}, as shown in the second graph to
the top. The solution x∗ ∈ S, x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VH , remains to
be a global maximizer for the SPproblem. Next, since node 1 and 5 are still not connected, we then
add 1/8 to x1 but subtract it from x5 to obtain a further reduced subgraph H , with VH = {1, 2, 3, 4},
EH = {(i, j) ∈ E : i, j ∈ VH}, as shown in the graph in the bottom. The solution x∗ ∈ S, x∗i > 0 for
all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VH , again remains to be a global maximizer for the SPproblem,
but this time, H is a maximum clique of G.
Based on Theorem 7.4.8 and 7.4.9 and the above graph reduction procedure, it is clear that the
maximum clique of a given graph G can be found by solving a SPproblem to its global maximum and
then followed by performing a graph reduction process. The latter requires only linear time, therefore,
solving a SPproblem to its global maximum is at least as hard as the problem of finding a maximum
clique for a graphG. We know that the latter problem is NP-hard (104; 108). It follows that the problem
to find a global maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4) must be NP-hard. This fact has been aware to
some extent in the field of evolutionary game theory, but not been formally justified. We state it as a
theorem in the following. The proof follows straightforwardly from our discussions.
Theorem 7.4.10. The problem to find a global maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4) and equivalently,
the problem to find an equilibrium state of maximum payoff for the SNgame in (7.1) is NP-hard.
Note that the graph reduction procedure described above can also be reversed, i.e., starting from
a global maximizer of the SPproblem on a maximum clique, we can extend it to a global maximizer
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on a general subgraph that contains the clique. Key to this process is to make sure that in every step,
an extended subgraph can be found such that every pairs of unconnected nodes in the subgraph are
connected with the same set of nodes in the subgraph (as justified in Theorem 7.4.11). For example,
in Fig. 7.8, the subgraph formed by nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} in the second graph from the bottom has two
nodes separated, node 1 and 5, and both are connected with the same set of nodes in the subgraph,
{2, 3, 4}. Let x∗ be the global maximizer for the graph at the bottom of the figure. Then, by adding
a small number c = 1/8 to x∗5 and subtract it from x∗1, we obtain a global maximizer on the subgraph
formed by the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Likewise, we can further extend this subgraph to {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} to
obtain another global maximizer for the problem as shown in the graph on the top of the figure.
Theorem 7.4.11. Let x∗ ∈ Rn be a global maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH
and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VH , where H is a subgraph of G, with node l, l′ ∈ VH not connected. Then,
node l and l′ must connect to the same set of nodes in VH .
Proof. Since x∗ is a global maximizer for the SPproblem in (7.4), x∗TAx∗ = (k − 1)/2k, where k is
the size of the maximum clique contained in H . Define p ∈ Rn, pl = c, pl′ = −c, and pr = 0 for all
r 6= l, l′, with −xl ≤ c ≤ xl′ . Then, x = x∗ + p is also a global maximizer, and xTAx = x∗TAx∗ =
(k − 1)/2k. Then, by Theorem 7.3.2, (Ax)i = xTAx for all i ∈ VH , i 6= l, l′. However,
(Ax)i =
∑
j∈VH
Ai,jxj =
∑
j∈VH
Ai,jx
∗
j +Ai,lc−Ai,l′c = x∗TAx∗ +Ai,lc−Ai,l′c.
It follows that Ai,lc − Ai,l′c = 0 and Ai,l = Ai,l′ for all i ∈ VH , i 6= l, l′, i.e., node l and l′ are
connected to the same set of nodes in H .
7.4.6 Non-Clique Equilibrium States
There could be many non-clique equilibrium states for a given SNgame. Some of them can be
derived directly from the equilibrium states on maximal cliques as shown in the example in Fig. 7.5. In
general, they are not as stable as the states on cliques. For example, in Fig. 7.8, the optimal strategies
shown in the top two graphs are non-clique equilibrium states. They are extended from a maximum-
clique strategy and are global maximizers of the corresponding SPproblem. However, they are not
strict maximizers, so they are only weakly evolutionarily stable. There are also non-clique strategies
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that are not directly extended from a maximal clique strategy. For example, for the SNgame in Fig.
7.9, at equilibrium, the population is distributed on two disconnected cliques, with x∗i = 1/8 for all
i = 1, . . . , 8. Note at this state, the only active constraint for the corresponding SPproblem is the
equality constraint,
∑
i xi = 1. A null space matrix Z for the Jacobian of this constraint can be defined
as
Z =

−1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1

.
Then, it is easy to verify that
ZTAZ =

−2 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −2 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −2 −1 −1 −1 −1
−1 −1 −1 0 1 1 1
−1 −1 −1 1 0 1 1
−1 −1 −1 1 1 0 1
−1 −1 −1 1 1 1 0

.
Let u = (1, 1, 1,−1,−1,−1,−1)T . Then, uTZTAZu = 24 > 0. Therefore, ZTAZ cannot be nega-
tive semidefinite. By the second-order necessary condition for constrained optimization (107; 114), x∗
cannot be a local maximizer of the SPproblem. It follows that x∗ cannot even be weakly evolutionarily
stable.
In general, a non-clique equilibrium state cannot be evolutionarily stable, and is at best a weakly
evolutionarily stable state, as can be further justified in Theorem 7.4.12. On the other hand, equilibrium
states on maximal cliques are evolutionarily stable except for some special circumstances, as we have
shown in previous subsections. In this sense, the optimal clique strategies must have an evolutionary
advantage over the non-clique optimal strategies.
Theorem 7.4.12. An optimal strategy x∗ on a non-clique subgraph H of G for the SNgame in (7.1)
cannot be a strict local maximizer of the corresponding SPproblem in (7.4) and hence be evolutionarily
stable.
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Proof. Let x∗ ∈ S be an optimal strategy for the SNgame in (7.1), x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0
for all i ∈ V \VH , where H is a non-clique subgraph of G. Assume that x∗ is a local maximizer of
the corresponding SPproblem in (7.4), i.e., there is a small neighborhood U of x∗ such that x∗TAx∗ ≥
yTAy for all y ∈ U ∩ S. We show that x∗ is not a strict local maximizer, i.e., there is no neighborhood
U of x∗ such that x∗TAx∗ > yTAy for all y ∈ U ∩ S.
Since H is a non-clique subgraph, there must be i, j ∈ VH , (i, j) /∈ EH . Define p ∈ Rn, with
pi = , pj = −, and pr = 0 for all r 6= i, j. Then, by choosing  > 0 sufficiently small in between
−x∗i and x∗j , we can have y = x∗ + p ∈ U ∩ S for any neighborhood U of x∗. Note that
yTAy = (x∗ + p)TA(x∗ + p) = x∗TAx∗ + 2x∗TAp+ pTAp.
Since x∗ is a local maximizer of the SPproblem in (7.4), it must satisfy the KKT conditions of the
SPproblem in (7.4). In particular, there must be a number λ∗ such that (Ax∗)r = λ∗ for all r ∈ VH .
It follows that 2x∗TAp = 2λ∗( − ) = 0. Since (i, j) /∈ EH , Ai,j = Aj,i = 0, and pTAp = 0. It
follows that yTAy = x∗TAx∗. This simply implies that we cannot find any small neighborhood U of
x∗ such that x∗TAx∗ > yTAy for all y ∈ U ∩ S. Therefore, x∗ cannot be a strict local maximizer of
the SPproblem and hence be evolutionarily stable.
7.5 Conclusion
The optimal strategies or in other words, the equilibrium states of a social network game tend to
be developed around the network cliques or their extensions. Not all cliques are optimal choices for
a game, however. Only maximal cliques or some of their extensions may be selected at equilibrium.
Yet, these optimal strategies may or may not be evolutionarily stable. There are non-clique equilibrium
states as well, but they are certainly evolutionarily unstable. In this paper, we have conducted a detailed
analysis on the clique and non-clique strategies of the social network games. We have in particular
found the optimality and stability conditions on these strategies and provided rigorous mathematical
justifications.
A social network game is a symmetric evolutionary game and therefore, corresponds to a gener-
alized knapsack problem. An optimal strategy for the social network game is a KKT point for the
corresponding generalized knapsack problem, which could be a local minimizer, saddle point, local
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maximizer, or strict local maximizer. The strategy is evolutionarily unstable if it is a local minimizer or
saddle point of the generalized knapsack problem, and is evolutionarily stable if it is a strict local max-
imizer. It is weakly evolutionarily stable if it is a non-strict local maximizer. These properties form the
theoretical basis for analyzing the optimal strategies of the social network games. In non-mathematical
terms, the results from our analysis can be summarized as follows.
• First, we have shown that the strategy on an arbitrary clique will not be optimal if the clique is
contained in a larger clique. In general, the population on a social network would extend from a
smaller clique to a larger one whenever possible, for achieving a higher social payoff (Fig. 7.3).
• The strategy on a maximal clique is always optimal, when the population is distributed evenly
over the nodes of the clique. A maximal clique is not necessarily a maximum clique, but still, the
network can reach equilibrium on such a clique (Fig. 7.4).
• Not every optimal strategy is on a maximal clique. A non-clique optimal strategy can be obtained
when a maximal clique can be expanded to a certain larger subgraph (Fig. 7.5).
• As an optimal strategy, a maximal clique strategy is only a KKT point for the generalized knap-
sack problem. It may be a local minimizer, saddle point, local maximizer, or strict local maxi-
mizer, each with a different stability condition.
• When a larger clique is attached to k− 1 nodes of a maximal clique of size k, the strategy on this
maximal clique cannot even be a local maximizer for the corresponding generalized knapsack
problem. It is therefore evolutionarily unstable. In this situation, the population, although at
equilibrium, will still be able to extend from this maximal clique to its neighboring larger clique
and then achieve a higher social payoff (Fig. 7.6).
• If there is no larger attached clique, the maximal clique strategy corresponds to a local maximizer
of the generalized knapsack problem, and it is at least weakly evolutionarily stable.
• If there is still a clique of the same size attached to k − 1 nodes of the maximal clique, the
strategy on this maximal clique is not a strict local maximizer. Therefore, it can only be weakly
evolutionarily stable. In this situation, the population, although at equilibrium, will still be able to
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extend from this maximal clique to its neighboring clique without losing any social payoff (Fig.
7.7).
• If there is no attached clique of the same size, the maximal clique strategy corresponds to a strict
local maximizer of the generalized knapsack problem, and is evolutionarily stable. This is a stable
state of the network, when the population remains on the clique, and any change would reduce
the social payoff.
• The strategy on a maximum clique is certainly an optimal strategy and also has the maximum
payoff. However, it is a global maximizer of the generalized knapsack problem, which is compu-
tationally hard to obtain. Therefore, a maximum clique strategy may not be found easily in nature
as well.
• The strategy on a maximum clique is at least weakly evolutionarily stable, for it always corre-
sponds to a global maximizer of the generalized knapsack problem. It is evolutionarily stable
when it is a strict global maximizer.
• When it is not a strict global maximizer, there is a procedure to change from this clique strategy to
a larger non-clique one, and vice versa. In this situation, the population can spread its distribution
from the maximum clique to a larger subgraph that contains the clique or vice versa (Fig. 7.8).
• A non-clique optimal strategy is evolutionarily unstable in general, and is at best weakly evo-
lutionarily stable (Fig. 7.9). The optimal cliques strategies are evolutionarily stable except for
special circumstances, and therefore, should have an evolutionary advantage over the non-clique
ones.
The study on social cliques has a long history in network science and especially in social network
analysis (109; 112; 117; 119). The maximum clique problem has been a classical subject in graph
theory and combinatorial optimization (104), where the work was focused on the computation of the
maximum clique of a given graph. The problem has been formulated and solved as a generalized
knapsack problem in (113; 115). The relationship between the symmetric evolutionary game (SEgame)
and the generalized knapsack problem (GKproblem) has been recognized in evolutionary game theory
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in early 1980s, and the equivalence of the evolutionary stable state of the SEgame and the strict local
maximizer of the GKproblem was then established (110; 116; 120). Later, the clique problem has been
studied as a symmetric evolutionary game or a generalized knapsack problem in (106; 118), where
the number of stable equilibria for the corresponding SEgame and the number of local maxima of the
corresponding GKproblem were analyzed. Along this line, we have in this paper considered the clique
problem as a social network game, and performed an in-depth analysis on the equilibrium states of the
game. We have analyzed several different types of equilibrium states and proved a set of conditions for
their stabilities. We have shown in particular that the equilibrium states on cliques are evolutionarily
stable except for special circumstances, while non-clique equilibrium states are unstable in general.
Therefore, the equilibrium states on cliques should have an evolutionary advantage over the non-clique
ones. The results from our analysis are believed to be interesting for the understanding of the behaviors
of social networks of either biological, or cultural, or economic types.
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Figure 7.8 Recovering Maximum Cliques: In the graph on top, the nodes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} form a sub-
graph H , and x∗ ∈ S, x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for all i ∈ V \VH , is a global
maximizer for the SPproblem. However, H is not a maximum clique. Since node 2 and
6 are not connected, we therefore add 1/8 to x2 but subtract it from x6. We then obtain a
reduced subgraph H , with VH = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, EH = {(i, j) ∈ E : i, j ∈ VH}, as shown
in the second graph to the top. The solution x∗ ∈ S, x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for
all i ∈ V \VH , remains to be a global maximizer for the SPproblem. Next, since node 1 and
5 are still not connected, we then add 1/8 to x1 but subtract it from x5 to obtain a further
reduced subgraphH = (VH , EH), VH = {1, 2, 3, 4},EH = {(i, j) : i, j ∈ VH}, as shown
in the graph in the bottom. The solution x∗ ∈ S, x∗i > 0 for all i ∈ VH and x∗i = 0 for all
i ∈ V \VH , again remains to be a global maximizer for the SPproblem, but this time, H is
a maximum clique of G.
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Figure 7.9 Non-Clique Equilibrium States: One of the equilibrium states of the SNgame on graph G
in the figure is when the population is distributed on the two disconnected cliques, with
x∗i = 1/8 for all i = 1, . . . , 8. It is easy to verify that this strategy is not a local maximizer
of the corresponding SPproblem and thereby, is not even weakly evolutionarily stable.
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CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We study the spatial effects on evolution of models, optimality and stability of symmetric game and
its applications, and parameter estimation in game theoretic modeling of the biological and social sys-
tems. In summary, we categorize the types of nonlinear games and investigate the simulation study of
spatial effects on the evolution of cooperation in a nonlinear yeast game. We also incorporate the spatial
diffusion effects in the replicator dynamics of nonlinear game models, and prove the asymptotic behav-
ior of the solution to the corresponding adapted replicator diffusion equation. Furthermore, we apply
the statistical techniques and methodologies to solve the inverse problem in evolutionary game dynam-
ics, that is, the NB mixture model and Markov random field model incorporating replicator equations
are built where penalized approximated negative log-likelihood method with generalized smoothing
approach and Besag pseudo-likelihood method are implemented to facilitate the estimation and infer-
ence of model parameters. Finally, the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for symmetric
evolutionary games is explored, and new proofs and computational methods are provided. Also the
symmetric evolutionary game is applied to model the evolution of a population over a social network,
and several different types of equilibrium states corresponding to social cliques are analyzed with a set
of conditions for their stabilities proved.
8.1 2D Yeast Cooperation Game
Evolutionary game theory has achieved tremendous success in modeling biological systems. How-
ever almost all the successes have been focus on the linear games. The first applicable nonlinear game
model is proposed by Gore et al. in 2009 and later the mathematical theory, especially the theoretical
properties of this model is developed by us. We now make a further investigation of this nonlinear game
from the perspective of 2D simulation and the contributions of this project can be listed as follows.
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First of all, we have reviewed and generalized three types of linear games whose definitions are
based on the comparative relationship of the elements in the so-called payoff matrix. The generalized
nonlinear game are defined with nonlinear payoff functions instead of matrix-based linear functions.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift game for nonlinear games are conceptualized from the perspec-
tive of payoff functions’ curves and intercepts of payoff functions which are comparably same to those
in matrix games, except the skewness and concavity of the curves. Parameters in payoff matrix as now
replaced by environmental or internal parameters in nonlinear payoff functions. We also study the repli-
cator dynamics of nonlinear games and would expect the nonlinear games can be widely use for a large
group of systems.
Secondly, the combination of numerical simulation and evolutionary game theory has been proved
to be useful to study the linear game models and how the spatial effects impact the evolution of co-
operation. We extend the combined model to the field of nonlinear game models where rare scientist
has considered before. We find that the spatial structure on a 2D lattice tends to promote the evolution
of cooperation in both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift Game, which is a little different from those
found in matrix games since Christoph shows that spatial effects increase the proportion of cooperation
in Prisoner’s Dilemma while this doesn’t hold for Snowdrift Game in matrix games. We also compare
the deterministic and stochastic update rules and conclude that their results are different from each other
but tend to coincide as neighborhood size increases.
Thirdly, we propose the difference equations for the 2D simulation that are implemented in Section
2.5. Then we analyze some basic properties of the difference equations for the systems of players. The
invasion conditions are provided given four structures for two different situations with the neighborhood
size N = 4. We find some interesting patterns for the inequalities of the invasion conditions under
different combinations of parameters from the experimental data Gore et.al collected and those patterns
convince us the promotion of cooperation in the numerical experiments. We also make a generalization
based on neighborhood sizes and update rules and concluding results are discussed.
Finally, this project invites more interest from both mathematical and biological communities in
evolutionary game theory and its applications. It’s an extension of the work about the game dynamic
model for yeast system proposed by Huang and Wu (2012). Further development of our work can be
fascinating, such as the rigorous theoretical properties for the 2D model on the lattice and so on.
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8.2 ESS in Nonlinear Game and the Asymptotic Behavior of Solution to Adapted
Replicator Diffusion Equation
In this project, we have discussed the equivalent conditions of the evolutionarily stable strategy for
a general class of replicator dynamics. We also establish the theory for the long time behavior of the
solution in the adapted replicator diffusion equations which incorporates the spatial effects. Finally the
construct artificial system and the yeast cooperation system in Gore et al.(2009) are tested out to verify
the long time behavior of the adapted replicator diffusion equations generated from the game dynamics.
Although it’s difficult to find the necessary and sufficient conditions of the existence of evolutionar-
ily stable strategies for the direct form of the payoff functions of all species in a population game based
on the replicator dynamics, we derive the equivalent conditions of ESS from the differential behavior of
the payoff functions at the stationary state indirectly using the Taylor expansion idea. The coefficients
of two Taylor series are compared based on the definition of the ESS and this yields to infinite series of
inequalities involving the infinite differential properties of the payoff functions at the stationary state.
We find that the stronger version of first two inequalities are necessary to the existence of a regular ESS
which is an refinement of ESS. Also these two inequalities are necessary and sufficient for an ESS when
the game is a linear game.
As for the general replicator dynamics of multiple species in a population, the spatial effects deter-
mined by the environment are introduced and the adapted replicator diffusion equation are then gener-
ated from the general replicator equations by adding the same diffusion term for all species. Based on
the lemmas about the convergence of simple heat equation and the existence and uniqueness of a general
class of parabolic equations, we prove the uniform convergence of the solution of the adapted replicator
diffusion equation to the exponentially stable stationary state. This suggests that the cooperation and
competition of several species in a spatially distributed population finally reaches an equilibrium which
is the same as those well mixed population in the same payoff functions situation from the biological
point of view.
The constructed game and the yeast game proposed by Gore et al. are classical population games
within two populations. In the yeast game, Gore et al. examined the wild type strain (cooperator) and
the mutant strain (defector). The authors derived the payoff functions for this yeast system which was
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a nonlinear game. The dynamics and equilibrium stability of this game were investigated by Huang
and Wu (2012) and the results fitted the experimental ones very well. The replicator equations for the
artificial game, and especially for the yeast game, are adapted by adding diffusion terms because of
the nature of strains digesting the dispersal glucose in the environment. And we use the semi-implicit
algorithm to generate the numerical solutions of the two adapted equations. The contour plots of the
frequencies of the strategy C are plotted, and they indicates that it is the diffusion effect that drives
the behaviors of the solutions initially. The latter process are then governed by the replicator source
term and this is justified by the contour plots of cooperator frequencies and the comparison plots of the
frequencies under the well-mixed replicator dynamics and the average frequencies under the adapted
replicator diffusion equations for different types of nonlinear games. The payoff functions in yeast
game don’t satisfy both conditions in theorem 3.3.5, but the numerical experiments still indicates the
long time behavior of the solution, which suggests that the conditions in theorem 3.3.5 may be stronger
for the asymptotic convergence of the solution.
The present modeling study shows the asymptotical behavior of the adapted replicator diffusion
equations under the same diffusion rate situation. It also filling one with the interest in evolutionary
game theory and its applicators from both mathematical and biological perspective. Our future work
will consider the behavior of the solution to the parabolic systems with weaker conditions than those
in theorem 3.3.5 and more general diffusion effects which means the dispersal rate of the species in a
population vary or be more general operator rather than Laplacian, and the methodology of parameter
estimation in such replicator diffusion equations.
8.3 Parameter Estimation in Dynamical Metagenomic Model
In this project, we explore the use of the replicator equations for studying the interaction of species
in a microbial community sample over time using next generation sequencing applied to metagenomics.
Specifically, we propose a parsimonious mixture model to reduce the number of free parameters. We
combine information across multiple biological replicates, using the Negative Binomial to account for
excess biological variation. We use smoothing spline approximation to the replicator equation solu-
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tions to avoid repeated integration. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our model by testing it
on simulation data. We end by discussing future directions that will further improve our estimation
procedure.
The estimation procedure is so far quite slow, so we were only able to perform one complete EM
run. Thus it was impossible to assess what might have failed or what could be improved in the method.
For the future, it will be helpful to rerun the estimation while holding some subsets of the parameters
at their true values. In this way, we can assess whether the observed misestimations are significantly
impacting the estimation of b
:
, our main parameters of interest. In addition, we chose to use a smoothing
spline approximation with 164 parameters. We should rerun the analysis with more or fewer smoothing
spline parameters.
We used simulated data to assess our method for estimating interaction effects between species in
mixed populations. We assumed the species interacted through replicator dynamics that hypothesize
a specific payoff for interactions between pairs of species. Cooperating species i and j will receive
positive payoffs, aij , aji > 0, from their interaction, while a parasitic species i will negatively impact
its victim j, aji < 0 < aij . Other interactions are also possible. In modern metagenomics datasets,
there are many potentially interacting species, which leads to an explosion in the number of parameters.
However, it is often true that many distinguishable species will interact similarly, so it is plausible to
cluster species in homogeneously reacting groups. Our proposed model allows such grouping. Note,
our grouping is partly genetic (reads are clustered into OTUs) and partly phenotypic (based on temporal
dynamics). We feel this approach is better than pure genetic grouping, which treats species as less
behaviorally plastic than they are. Future extensions could cluster genomes based on both criteria.
It is difficult to assess the performance of our method as the dataset size increases. Unfortunately,
adding new data in any direction, more OTUs, more time points, or more mice, leads to concomitant
increases in the number of parameters. The only way to increase the amount of data without adding
more parameters is to increase sjm. Of course, this also increases the variance. In real data applications,
it may be possible to regularize sjm across times or mice to control the number of parameters. Multiplex
sequences may also help, and it may also work reasonably well to set sjm = Sjm.
Another completely different approach is to dispense with the smoothing spline approximation.
Instead, we can utilize a Newton-Raphson optimization, which should converge in fewer iterations,
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thus requiring relatively few numerical integrations of the replication equations and similar equations
for the Hessians. Fortunately, for the cluster model, the payoff matrix is relatively small.
8.4 Markov Random Field Model for Analysis of Game Dynamics
Inverse problem is a well-studied mathematical problem and arise in many branches of science and
mathematics. The conceptual understanding is that the transformation from data to model parameters
is a result of the interaction of a physical system with the object that we wish to infer about. To
estimate the parameters of the payoff matrix for linear game model, we introduce the main idea on
development of Markov Random Field Model, which incorporates replicator dynamics and mainly deals
with observations on a lattice using appropriate random variable distribution, to estimate the parameters
of the payoff matrix for linear game model. In the near future, a simulation study will be explored and
study of different games with respect to planes consist of paired parameters will be implemented. And
the parameter estimation procedure will be a process of maximization of the Besag likelihood function
over the parameter space for the inverse spatial game, and then the inference of the parameters will
be based a MCMC method. Furthermore, model assessment approaches will be followed to justify
the performance of the proposed Markov Random Field model. Finally we will investigate the spatial
effects of interaction region or neighborhood size on the estimated parameters for given data and analyze
the nature of the game that we are interested in. It is expected that the Markov Random Field model
will be useful in applying to a lot of spatial-temporal studies consist of two species or subpopulations
in biological or social systems.
8.5 Optimality and Stability of Symmetric Evolutionary Games with Applications in
Genetic Selection
In this project, we have reviewed the theory for obtaining optimal and stable strategies for SEgames,
and provided some new proofs and computational methods. In particular, we have reviewed the rela-
tionship between the SEgame and the GKproblem, and discussed the first and second order necessary
and sufficient conditions that can be derived from this relationship for testing the optimality and stabil-
ity of the strategies. Some of the conditions are given in different forms from those in previous work
152
and can be verified more efficiently. We have also derived more efficient computational methods for the
evaluation of the conditions than conventional approaches. We have demonstrated how these conditions
can be applied to justifying the strategies and their stabilities for a special class of genetic selection
games including some in the study of genetic disorders. Further studies can be pursued in the following
possible directions though:
First, novel methods can be developed for solving special types of SEgames and especially for
obtaining the evolutionarily stable strategies for the games by solving some special classes of GKprob-
lems. For example, if the fitness matrix for a SEgame is negative definite, then the corresponding
GKproblem is a strictly convex quadratic program and can be solved efficiently using some special al-
gorithms. Further, the solution is guaranteed to be a strict local maximizer for the GKproblem and hence
an evolutionarily stable strategy for the SEgame. A more complicated case is when the fitness matrix is
positive definite. Then, only pure strategies may be evolutionarily stable. A special algorithm can then
be developed to only find the solutions for the GKproblem that correspond to the pure strategies of the
SEgame.
Second, in Theorem 6.3.5 and 6.5.3, we have stated two optimality and stability conditions. They
are necessary and sufficient, but require all active constraints to be strongly active at x∗, whenC0(x∗) =
C0(x∗), T0(x∗) = T 0(x∗), and Z0 = Z0. However, in practice, this assumption may not hold. A more
general necessary and sufficient condition, without the above assumption, is to require dTAd < 0 for all
d ∈ T (x∗), d 6= 0, where T (x∗) is the reduced tangent cone at x∗, as given in Bomze’s paper(2002). As
we have mentioned in previous sections, this condition is not easy to test. It is equivalent to testing the
copositivity of a matrix, which is difficult in general. But still, an efficient algorithm may be developed
for SEgames and GKproblems for small sizes of problems or problems with special structures.
Third, it is not so hard to verify that the GKproblem is NP-hard in general, because the maximum
clique problem can be formulated as a GKproblem. However, how to extend this result to the SEgame is
not so clear, because the SEgame is not exactly equivalent to the GKproblem. Several related questions
are asked: is any maximal clique a local maximizer of the GKproblem for the maximum clique problem?
If not, what condition is needed? If yes, is it a strict local maximizer? Is the maximum clique a global
maximizer? Is it an evolutionarily stable strategy for the corresponding SEgame? We are interested in
all these questions and are trying to find their answers.
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Fourth, though not equivalent, the correspondence between the SEgame and GKproblem is interest-
ing. A similar relationship may be found between a class of nonlinear games and nonlinear optimization
problems. Indeed, we can define an n-strategy two-player game by a fitness function xTpi(y) with pi(y)
being a nonlinear function. The game then becomes a nonlinear game. If pi(y) is a gradient field,
i.e., there is a function f(y) such that ∇f(y) = pi(y), then, an optimal strategy x∗ ∈ S such that
x∗Tpi(x∗) ≥ xTpi(x∗) for all x ∈ S corresponds to an optimal solution x∗ ∈ S such that f(x∗) ≥ f(x)
for all x in a small neighborhood of x∗, x ∈ S. Then, it would be interesting to see what additional
relationships between the SEgame and GKproblem can be extended to their nonlinear cases.
Finally, we have demonstrated the applications of SEgames to allele selection at single genetic loci.
They can be extended to alleles at multiple genetic loci, if there is no mutation or recombination. In
this case, an individual can be identified by a sequence of alleles at the multiple loci. In other words,
a selection strategy will be a choice of a specific sequence of alleles. This would certainly increase the
strategy space substantially. For example, if there are two loci G1 and G2, with two possible alleles A
and a for G1 and two other possible ones B and b for G2, then there will be four possible sequences
of alleles for the two loci: AB, Ab, aB, ab, each corresponding to one pure strategy. In general, if
there are m loci Gi, i = 1, . . . ,m, with mi possible alleles for Gi, then there will be n =
∏
i=1:mmi
possible sequences of alleles. The number of pure strategies and hence the dimension of the game will
be n, which can be a large number. In any case, in practice, mutation and recombination often are not
negligible, and therefore, our model must incorporate such effects. The topics could include other so-
called linkage disequilibrium factors, but they are all beyond the scope of this project. We will pursue
these issues in our future efforts.
8.6 Optimal Strategies for Social Network Games
The optimal strategies or in other words, the equilibrium states of a social network game tend to be
developed around the network cliques or their extensions. Not all cliques are optimal choices for a game,
however. Only maximal cliques or some of their extensions may be selected at equilibrium. Yet, these
optimal strategies may or may not be evolutionarily stable. There are non-clique equilibrium states
as well, but they are certainly evolutionarily unstable. In this project, we have conducted a detailed
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analysis on the clique and non-clique strategies of the social network games. We have in particular
found the optimality and stability conditions on these strategies and provided rigorous mathematical
justifications.
A social network game is a symmetric evolutionary game and therefore, corresponds to a gener-
alized knapsack problem. An optimal strategy for the social network game is a KKT point for the
corresponding generalized knapsack problem, which could be a local minimizer, saddle point, local
maximizer, or strict local maximizer. The strategy is evolutionarily unstable if it is a local minimizer or
saddle point of the generalized knapsack problem, and is evolutionarily stable if it is a strict local max-
imizer. It is weakly evolutionarily stable if it is a non-strict local maximizer. These properties form the
theoretical basis for analyzing the optimal strategies of the social network games. In non-mathematical
terms, the results from our analysis can be summarized as follows.
• First, we have shown that the strategy on an arbitrary clique will not be optimal if the clique is
contained in a larger clique. In general, the population on a social network would extend from a
smaller clique to a larger one whenever possible, for achieving a higher social payoff (Fig. 7.3).
• The strategy on a maximal clique is always optimal, when the population is distributed evenly
over the nodes of the clique. A maximal clique is not necessarily a maximum clique, but still, the
network can reach equilibrium on such a clique (Fig. 7.4).
• Not every optimal strategy is on a maximal clique. A non-clique optimal strategy can be obtained
when a maximal clique can be expanded to a certain larger subgraph (Fig. 7.5).
• As an optimal strategy, a maximal clique strategy is only a KKT point for the generalized knap-
sack problem. It may be a local minimizer, saddle point, local maximizer, or strict local maxi-
mizer, each with a different stability condition.
• When a larger clique is attached to k− 1 nodes of a maximal clique of size k, the strategy on this
maximal clique cannot even be a local maximizer for the corresponding generalized knapsack
problem. It is therefore evolutionarily unstable. In this situation, the population, although at
equilibrium, will still be able to extend from this maximal clique to its neighboring larger clique
and then achieve a higher social payoff (Fig. 7.6).
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• If there is no larger attached clique, the maximal clique strategy corresponds to a local maximizer
of the generalized knapsack problem, and it is at least weakly evolutionarily stable.
• If there is still a clique of the same size attached to k − 1 nodes of the maximal clique, the
strategy on this maximal clique is not a strict local maximizer. Therefore, it can only be weakly
evolutionarily stable. In this situation, the population, although at equilibrium, will still be able to
extend from this maximal clique to its neighboring clique without losing any social payoff (Fig.
7.7).
• If there is no attached clique of the same size, the maximal clique strategy corresponds to a strict
local maximizer of the generalized knapsack problem, and is evolutionarily stable. This is a stable
state of the network, when the population remains on the clique, and any change would reduce
the social payoff.
• The strategy on a maximum clique is certainly an optimal strategy and also has the maximum
payoff. However, it is a global maximizer of the generalized knapsack problem, which is compu-
tationally hard to obtain. Therefore, a maximum clique strategy may not be found easily in nature
as well.
• The strategy on a maximum clique is at least weakly evolutionarily stable, for it always corre-
sponds to a global maximizer of the generalized knapsack problem. It is evolutionarily stable
when it is a strict global maximizer.
• When it is not a strict global maximizer, there is a procedure to change from this clique strategy to
a larger non-clique one, and vice versa. In this situation, the population can spread its distribution
from the maximum clique to a larger subgraph that contains the clique or vice versa (Fig. 7.8).
• A non-clique optimal strategy is evolutionarily unstable in general, and is at best weakly evo-
lutionarily stable (Fig. 7.9). The optimal cliques strategies are evolutionarily stable except for
special circumstances, and therefore, should have an evolutionary advantage over the non-clique
ones.
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The study on social cliques has a long history in network science and especially in social network
analysis. The maximum clique problem has been a classical subject in graph theory and combinatorial
optimization, where the work was focused on the computation of the maximum clique of a given graph.
The problem has been formulated and solved as a generalized knapsack problem. The relationship be-
tween the symmetric evolutionary game (SEgame) and the generalized knapsack problem (GKproblem)
has been recognized in evolutionary game theory in early 1980s, and the equivalence of the evolution-
ary stable state of the SEgame and the strict local maximizer of the GKproblem was then established.
Later, the clique problem has been studied as a symmetric evolutionary game or a generalized knap-
sack problem, where the number of stable equilibria for the corresponding SEgame and the number
of local maxima of the corresponding GKproblem were analyzed. Along this line, we have in this
project considered the clique problem as a social network game, and performed an in-depth analysis on
the equilibrium states of the game. We have analyzed several different types of equilibrium states and
proved a set of conditions for their stabilities. We have shown in particular that the equilibrium states on
cliques are evolutionarily stable except for special circumstances, while non-clique equilibrium states
are unstable in general. Therefore, the equilibrium states on cliques should have an evolutionary ad-
vantage over the non-clique ones. The results from our analysis are believed to be interesting for the
understanding of the behaviors of social networks of either biological, or cultural, or economic types.
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APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREMS
Here the proof of the theorem in Section 4.3.1 is provided.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1.1 Let y =
∑n−1
i=1 yi. From the transformation xi = yi/(1 + y) for
i = 1, · · · , n− 1 and xn = 1/(1 + y), we have
y˙ =
n−1∑
i=1
y˙i
=
n−1∑
i=1
yi(ri +
n−1∑
j=1
bijyj)
=
n−1∑
i=1
yi(ain − ann) +
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
(aij − anj)yiyj
=
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi(1 + y)− anny +
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
(aij − anj)xixj(1 + y)2
= (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi − anny + (1 + y)2
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj − (1 + y)2
n−1∑
i=1
xi
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
= (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi − anny + (1 + y)2
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj − y(1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj .
Thus ( 1
1 + y
)′
= − y˙
(1 + y)2
= − 1
1 + y
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + ann
y
(1 + y)2
−
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj +
y
1 + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj .
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For i = 1, · · · , n− 1, we have
x˙i =
( yi
1 + y
)′
= yi
( 1
1 + y
)′
+
y˙i
1 + y
= yi
[
− 1
1 + y
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + ann
y
(1 + y)2
−
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj +
y
1 + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
]
+
1
1 + y
yi(ri +
n−1∑
j=1
bijyj)
= −xi
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + annxi
y
1 + y
− (1 + y)xi
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj + yxi
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj + xi(ain − ann) + (1 + y) ·
xi
n−1∑
j=1
(aij − anj)xj
= xi
[
−
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi +
anny
1 + y
− (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj + ain − ann + (1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
(aij−
anj)xj
]
= xi
[
−
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi +
anny
1 + y
− (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj + ain − ann + (1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
aijxj−
(1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
]
= xi
[
(1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
aijxj + ain − (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj − (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
ainxixn − (1 + y)annx2n − (1 + y) ·
n−1∑
j=1
anjxjxn
]
= xi
[
(1 + y)
n∑
j=1
aijxj − (1 + y)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijxixj
]
= (1 + y)
{
xi
[ n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijxixj
]}
.
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For i = n, we have
x˙n =
( 1
1 + y
)′
= − 1
1 + y
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + ann
y
(1 + y)2
−
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj +
y
1 + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
= −xn
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + annxn
y
(1 + y)
− xn(1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj + yxn
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
= xn
[− n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + ann
y
(1 + y)
− (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
]
= xn
[− n−1∑
i=1
ainxi + ann
y
(1 + y)
− (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj + y
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj
]
= xn
[
(1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj −
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj + ann
1
1 + y
[(1 + y)− 1]−
n−1∑
i=1
ainxi − (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj
]
= xn
[
(1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
anjxj − (1 + y)
n−1∑
j=1
anjxjxn + (1 + y)annxn − (1 + y)annx2n − (1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
ainxixn−
(1 + y)
n−1∑
i=1
n−1∑
j=1
aijxixj
]
= xn
[
(1 + y)
n∑
j=1
anjxj − (1 + y)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijxixj
]
= (1 + y)
{
xn
[ n∑
j=1
anjxj −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijxixj
]}
.
After the transformation, we obtain
x˙i = (1 + y)
{
xi
[ n∑
j=1
aijxj −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aijxixj
]}
i = 1, . . . , n, (A.1)
which are equivalent to the replicator equations.
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APPENDIX B. LOGIT TRANSFORMATION IN EM ALGORITHM
In EM algorithm of Chapter 4, the expression of p
:
(t+1) is formulated. However, there are no explicit
expressions for the formulas of (s
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1), b
:
(t+1), c
:
(t+1)), and we can use numerical optimization
algorithms to compute them. That is, the first step of the EM algorithm can be implemented by trust re-
gion reflective method within the constrained optimization toolbox, and the second step can be achieved
by the generalized profiling estimation procedure—iterative inner and outer criterion optimization al-
gorithm. In the second step of the EM algorithm, the inner criteria is
H(c
:
(b
:
)) = −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{
(log p
(t+1)
k1
+ . . .+ log p
(t+1)
kn
) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm + φˆ
−1
ij )
− log Γ(φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + s(t+1)jm d(t+1)i,ki wki,j(c:)φˆij) + yijm log(s
(t+1)
jm ·
d
(t+1)
i,ki
wki,j(c:)φˆij)
]}
.
And the outer criteria is
J(c
:
, b
:
|λ) = −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{
(log p
(t+1)
k1
+ . . .+ log p
(t+1)
kn
) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm + φˆ
−1
ij )
− log Γ(φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + s(t+1)jm d(t+1)i,ki wki,j(c:)φˆij) + yijm log(s
(t+1)
jm ·
d
(t+1)
i,ki
wki,j(c:)φˆij)
]}
+ λ
K−1∑
m=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
[dwm(t|c)
dt − gm(w(t|c:), b:)
]2
dt,
where w(t) will be described in later sessions. The partial derivatives of J(c
:
, b
:
|λ) with respect to
ckp, k = 1, . . . ,K − 1; p = 1, . . . ,M are
∂J
∂ckp
= −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{ n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[−(φˆ−1ij + yijm) s(t+1)jm d(t+1)i,ki φˆij1+s(t+1)jm d(t+1)i,ki wki,j(c)φˆij ∂wki,j(c)∂ckp + yijm ·
1
wki,j(c:)
∂wki,j(c)
∂ckp
]}
+ 2λ
K−1∑
m=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
[
w˙m(t|c:)− gm(w(t|c:,p:))
][∂w˙m(t|c)
∂ckp
−
K−1∑
s=1
∂gm
∂ws
∂ws
∂ckp
]
dt.
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And the second partial derivatives of J(c
:
, b
:
|λ) with respect to c
:
are
∂2J
∂ckp∂clq
= −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
(φˆ−1ij + yijm)
(s
(t+1)
jm d
(t+1)
i,ki
φˆij)
2
(1+s
(t+1)
jm d
(t+1)
i,ki
wki,j(c)φˆij)
2
∂wki,j(c)
∂ckp
·
∂wki,j(c)
∂clq
− (φˆ−1ij + yijm)
s
(t+1)
jm d
(t+1)
i,ki
φˆij
1+s
(t+1)
jm d
(t+1)
i,ki
wki,j(c)φˆij
∂2wki,j(c)
∂ckp∂clq
− yijm 1
wki,j(c:)
2
∂wki,j(c)
∂ckp
∂wki,j(c)
∂clq
+
yijm
1
wki,j(c:)
∂2wki,j(c)
∂ckp∂clq
]}
+ 2λ
K−1∑
m=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
{[∂w˙m(t|c)
∂clq
−
K−1∑
s=1
∂gm
∂ws
∂ws
∂clq
][∂w˙m(t|c)
∂ckp
−
K−1∑
s=1
∂gm
∂ws
·
∂ws
∂ckp
]
+
[
w˙m(t|c:)− gm(w(t|c:,p:))
][∂2w˙m(t|c)
∂ckp∂clq
−
K−1∑
s=1
(
∂ws
∂ckp
K−1∑
r=1
∂2gm
∂ws∂wr
∂wr
∂clq
+ ∂gm∂ws
∂2ws
∂ckp∂clq
)]
}
dt.
The second partial derivatives of J(c
:
, b
:
|λ) with respect to c
:
and b
:
are
∂2J
∂ckp∂bz
= 2λ
K−1∑
m=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
[
− ∂gm∂bz
(∂w˙m(t|c)
∂ckp
−
K−1∑
s=1
∂gm
∂ws
∂ws
∂ckp
)
−
K−1∑
s=1
∂2gm
∂ws∂bz
∂ws
∂ckp
(
w˙m − gm(w)
)]
dt.
In the model description part, the frequencies can be approximated by smoothing splines (polyno-
mials, trigonometric functions, etc.). However, the frequencies are always non-negative while the direct
applications of those splines may yield to negative approximates. To tackle this technical problem, we
introduce the logistic transformation(one minor issue is that the smoothing splines could be very close
but not equal to 0 when the true frequencies are 0 at some time sub-interval):
log
w1
wK
=
M∑
j=1
c1jφ1j(t)
...
log
wK−1
wK
=
M∑
j=1
cK−1,jφK−1,j(t)
log
wK
wK
= 0.
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That is,
w1 =
exp
(
M∑
j=1
c1jφ1j(t)
)
1+
K−1∑
k=1
exp
(
M∑
j=1
ckjφkj(t)
)
...
wK−1 =
exp
(
M∑
j=1
cK−1,jφK−1,j(t)
)
1+
K−1∑
k=1
exp
(
M∑
j=1
ckjφkj(t)
)
wK =
1
1+
K−1∑
k=1
exp
(
M∑
j=1
ckjφkj(t)
) .
Then the partial derivatives of wi, i = 1, . . . ,K with respect to ckp, k = 1, . . . ,K − 1; p = 1, . . . ,M
are as follows.
∂w1
∂ckp
= −w1(t)wk(t)φkp(t) + I[k = 1]wk(t)φkp(t)
...
∂wK−1
∂ckp
= −wK−1(t)wk(t)φkp(t) + I[k = K − 1]wk(t)φkp(t)
∂wK
∂ckp
= −wK(t)wk(t)φkp(t).
And the second partial derivatives of wi, i = 1, . . . ,K with respect to c are
∂2w1
∂ckp∂clq
= w1(t)
(
2wk(t)wl(t)− I[k = 1]wl(t)− I[l = 1]wk(t)− I[k = l]wk(t) + I[k = 1]I[l = 1]
) ·
φkp(t)φlq(t)
...
∂2wK−1
∂ckp∂clq
= wK−1(t)
(
2wk(t)wl(t)− I[k = K − 1]wl(t)− I[l = K − 1]wk(t)− I[k = l]wk(t)+
I[k = K − 1]I[l = K − 1])φkp(t)φlq(t)
∂2wK
∂ckp∂clq
= wK(t)
(
2wk(t)wl(t)− I[k = l]wk(t)
)
φkp(t)φlq(t).
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The derivatives of wi, i = 1, . . . ,K with respect to t are
w˙1(t) = w1(t)
M∑
j=1
c1jφ˙1j(t)− w1(t)
(K−1∑
k=1
[
wk(t)
M∑
j=1
ckjφ˙kj(t)
])
...
w˙K−1(t) = wK−1(t)
M∑
j=1
cK−1,jφ˙K−1,j(t)− wK−1(t)
(K−1∑
k=1
[
wk(t)
M∑
j=1
ckjφ˙kj(t)
])
w˙K(t) = −wK(t)
(K−1∑
k=1
[
wk(t)
M∑
j=1
ckjφ˙kj(t)
])
.
And the partial derivatives of w˙i, i = 1, . . . ,K with respect to c are
∂w˙1
∂ckp
=
∂w1
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
c1j φ˙1j(t) + w1I[k = 1]φ˙1p(t)− ∂w1
∂ckp
(K−1∑
s=1
[
ws
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− w1
(K−1∑
s=1[ ∂ws
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− w1wkφ˙kp(t)
...
∂w˙K−1
∂ckp
=
∂wK−1
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
cK−1,j φ˙K−1,j(t) + wK−1I[k = K − 1]φ˙K−1,p(t)− ∂wK−1
∂ckp
(K−1∑
s=1
[
ws ·
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− wK−1
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂ws
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− wK−1wkφ˙kp(t)
∂w˙K
∂ckp
=
∂wK
∂ckp
(K−1∑
s=1
[
ws
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− wK
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂ws
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− wKwkφ˙kp(t).
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Also the second partial derivatives of w˙i, i = 1, . . . ,K with respect to c are
∂2w˙1
∂ckp∂clq
=
∂2w1
∂ckp∂clq
M∑
j=1
c1j φ˙1j(t) +
∂w1
∂clq
I[k = 1]φ˙1p(t) +
∂w1
∂ckp
I[l = 1]φ˙1q(t)− ∂
2w1
∂ckp∂clq
(K−1∑
s=1[
ws
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂w1
clq
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂ws
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂w1
ckp
(K−1∑
s=1
[∂ws
∂clq
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− w1
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂2ws
∂ckp∂clq
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂w1
∂ckp
wkφ˙lq(t)− ∂w1
∂clq
wkφ˙kp(t)− w1 ∂wk
∂clq
φ˙kp(t)
− w1 ∂wl
∂ckp
φ˙lq(t)
...
∂2w˙K−1
∂ckp∂clq
=
∂2wK−1
∂ckp∂clq
M∑
j=1
cK−1,j φ˙K−1,j(t) +
∂wK−1
∂clq
I[k = K − 1]φ˙K−1,p(t) + ∂wK−1
∂ckp
I[l = K − 1] ·
φ˙K−1,q(t)− ∂
2wK−1
∂ckp∂clq
(K−1∑
s=1
[
ws
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂wK−1
clq
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂ws
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
−
∂wK−1
ckp
(K−1∑
s=1
[∂ws
∂clq
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− wK−1
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂2ws
∂ckp∂clq
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂wK−1
∂ckp
wk ·
φ˙lq(t)− ∂wK−1
∂clq
wkφ˙kp(t)− wK−1 ∂wk
∂clq
φ˙kp(t)− wK−1 ∂wl
∂ckp
φ˙lq(t)
∂2w˙K
∂ckp∂clq
= − ∂
2wK
∂ckp∂clq
(K−1∑
s=1
[
ws
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂wK
clq
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂ws
∂ckp
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂wK
ckp
(K−1∑
s=1[∂ws
∂clq
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− wK
(K−1∑
s=1
[ ∂2ws
∂ckp∂clq
M∑
j=1
csj φ˙sj(t)
])
− ∂wK
∂ckp
wkφ˙lq(t)− ∂wK
∂clq
wkφ˙kp(t)
− wK ∂wk
∂clq
φ˙kp(t)− wK ∂wl
∂ckp
φ˙lq(t)
165
APPENDIX C. INNER-OUTER ITERATIVE PROCEDURE IN EM ALGORITHM
In the profiling procedure of estimation for (b
:
, c
:
) conditioned on (s
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1),p
:
(t+1)) at (t+1)-th
iteration of Chapter 4, λ are being fixed manually and the nuisance parameters are the implicit functions
c
:
which are in terms of the structural parameters b
:
. Each time b
:
are changed, an inner function criterion
J(c
:
|b
:
, s
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1),p
:
(t+1);λ,θ
:
∆(t))
= −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{
(log p
(t+1)
k1
+ . . .+ log p
(t+1)
kn
) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm + φˆ
−1
ij )− log Γ(
φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + s(t+1)jm d(t+1)i,ki wki,j(c:)φˆij) + yijm log(s
(t+1)
jm d
(t+1)
i,ki
wki,j(c:) ·
φˆij)
]}
+ λ
K−1∑
m=1
∫
[t1,tN ]
[dwm(t|c)
dt − gm(w(t|c:), b:)
]2
dt
is optimized with respect to c
:
alone. The estimating function c
:
is regularized by incorporating a penalty
term in J that controls the size of the extent that w(t|c
:
) = c
:
′φ fails to satisfy the differential equation
exactly. A data fitting criterion
H(c
:
(b
:
))|s
:
(t+1),d
:
(t+1),p
:
(t+1);λ,θ
:
∆(t))
= −
K∑
k1=1
· · ·
K∑
kn=1
p
(t)
1,k1
. . . p
(t)
n,kn
{
(log p
(t+1)
k1
+ . . .+ log p
(t+1)
kn
) +
n∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
[
log Γ(yijm + φˆ
−1
ij )− log Γ(
φˆ−1ij )− Γ(yijm + 1)− (φˆ−1ij + yijm) log(1 + s(t+1)jm d(t+1)i,ki wki,j(c:)φˆij) + yijm log(s
(t+1)
jm d
(t+1)
i,ki
wki,j(c:) ·
φˆij)
]}
is then optimized with respect to the structural parameters b
:
alone. The dependence of H on b
:
is
implicitly through the involvement of c
:
(b
:
) in defining the fit wi(t|c:). Here we refer to J,H as inner
and outer criteria respectively. In the outer estimation step, the gradient dHdb is
dH
db
:
=
∂H
∂c
:
dc
:
db
:
.
166
Since c
:
(b
:
) is not available explicitly, we apply the implicit function theorem to obtain
dc
:
db
:
= −
(
∂2J
∂2c
:
2
)−1
∂2J
∂b
:
∂c
:
,
dH
db
:
= −∂H
∂c
:
(
∂2J
∂2c
:
2
)−1
∂2J
∂b
:
∂c
:
.
The details of the inner-outer iterative procedure is the following:
(1): Given c
:
(t+1),1 = c
:
(t) and b
:
(t+1),1 = b
:
(t), the optimization of J with respect to c
:
conditioned on
b
:
(t+1),1 yields the first estimate c
:
(t+1),2,1 of c
:
, dcdb and
dH
db ;
(2): Based on b
:
(t+1),1 and dHdb in step (1), use BFGS optimal search formula to derive estimate b:
(t+1),2,1
of b
:
;
(3): Repeat steps (1) and (2) by halving BFGS step length until the step size of change in b
:
from BFGS
formula is sufficiently small or the criteria H is not bigger that its value at b
:
(t+1),1 of 1st outer iteration
(stopping criteria, total B-1 inner iterations). Let the estimates of b
:
and c
:
be b
:
(t+1),2,B and c
:
(t+1),2,B
respectively, and denote b
:
(t+1),2,B = b
:
(t+1),2 and c
:
(t+1),2,B = c
:
(t+1),2;
(4): Repeat steps (1), (2) and (3) such that either the gradient of H with respect to b
:
or the change
in outer criteria H is small enough (total M-1 outer iterations). Suppose the estimates obtained are
b
:
(t+1),M and c
:
(t+1),M , then denote b
:
(t+1),M = b
:
(t+1) and c
:
(t+1),M = c
:
(t+1).
167
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 211, 1390–1396.
[2] Diggle, S., Griffin, A., Campbell, G. and West, S. (2007). Cooperation and conflict in quorum-
sensing bacterial populations. Nature, 450, 411–414.
[3] Doebeli, M. and Knowlton, N. (1998). The evolution of interspecific mutualisms. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci., 95, 8676–8680.
[4] Durrett, R. and Levin, S. (1997). Allelopathy in Spatially Distributed Populations. J. theor. Biol.,
185, 165–171.
[5] Gore, J., Youk, H. and van Oudenaarden, A. (2009). Snowdrift game dynamics and facultative
cheating in yeast. Nature, 459, 253–256.
[6] Griffin, A., West, S. and Buckling, A. (2004). Cooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria.
Nature, 430, 1024–1027.
[7] Hauert, C. (2002). Effect of space in 2 × 2 games. Int. J. Bifurcation Chaos, 12(7), 1531–1548.
[8] Hauert, C. and Doebeli, M. (2004). Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in
the snowdrift game. Nature, 428, 643–646.
[9] Huang, Y. and Wu, Z. (2012). Game Dynamic Model for Yeast Development. Bull. Math. Biol.,
74(7), 1469–84.
[10] Kerr, B., Riley, M., Feldman, M. and Bohannan, B. (2002). Local dispersal promotes biodiversity
in a real-life game of rock-paper-scissors. Nature, 418, 171–174.
168
[11] Maclean, R. and Gudelj, I. (2006). Resource competition and social conflict in experimental
populations of yeast. Nature, 441, 498–501.
[12] Nowak, M. and May, R. (1992). Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature, 359, 826–829.
[13] Nowak, M. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314, 1560–1563.
[14] Nowak, M. (2006). Evolutionary Dynamics. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
[15] Rainey, P. and Rainey, K. (2003). Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial
populations. Nature, 425, 72–74.
[16] Santorelli, L., Thompson, C., Villegas, E., Svetz, J., Dinh, C., Parikh, A., Sucgang, R., Kuspa,
A., Strassmann, J., Queller, D. and Shaulsky, G. (2008). Facultative cheater mutants reveal the
genetic complexity of cooperation in social amoebae. Nature, 451, 1107–1111.
[17] Webb, J. (2007). Game Theory. London: Springer-Verlag.
[18] West, S., Griffin, A., Gardner, A. and Diggle, S. (2006). Social evolution theory for microorgan-
isms. Nature Reviews, 4, 597–607.
[19] Abakuks, A. (1980). Conditions for Evolutionarily Stable Strategies. Journal of Applied Proba-
bility, 17(2), 559–562.
[20] Bishop, D. T. and Cannings, C. (1976). Models of animal conflict. Advances in Applied Probabil-
ity, 6, 616–621.
[21] Bishop, D. T. and Cannings, C. (1978). A generalized war of attrition. Journal of Theoretical
Biology, 70, 85–124.
[22] Chafee, N. (1975). Asymptotic behavior for solutions of a one-dimensional parabolic equation
with homogeneous Neumann boundary conditions. Journal of Differential equations, 18, 111–
134.
[23] Ewer, J. P. G. and Peletier, L. A. (1975). On the asymptotic behavior of solutions of semilinear
parabolic equations. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 28(1), 43–53.
169
[24] Friedman, A. (1964). Partial differential equations of parabolic type. Prentice-Hall.
[25] Garvie, R. M. (2007). Finite-difference schemes for reaction-diffusion equations modeling
predator-prey interactions in Matlab. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 69, 931–956.
[26] Gore, J., Youk, H. and Oudenaarden van, A. (2009). Snowdrift game dynamics and facultative
cheating in yeast. Nature, 459, 253–256.
[27] Hadeler, K. P. (1981). Diffusion in Fisher’s poluation model. Journal of Mathematics, 11, 39–45.
[28] Haigh, J. (1975). Game theory and evolution. Advances in Applied Probability, 7, 8–11.
[29] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary games and population dynammics. Cambridge
University Press.
[30] Hofbauer, J., Schuster, P. and Sigmund, K. (1979). A note on evolutionary stable strategies and
game dynamics. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 81, 609–612.
[31] Huang, Y. and Wu, Z. (2012). Game dynamics model for yeast development. Bulletin of Mathe-
matical Biology, 74(7), 1469–1484.
[32] Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246, 15–18.
[33] Minura, M. (1979). Asymptotic behavior of a parabolic system related to a planktonic prey and
predator model. Journal of Applied Mathematics, 37(3), 499–512.
[34] Nash, J. F. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286–295.
[35] Nowak, A. M. (2006). Evolutionary dynamics. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
[36] Pao, V. C. (1999). Numerical analysis of coupled systems of nonlinear parabolic equations.
Journal of Numerical Analysis, 2, 393–416.
[37] Redheffer, R., Redlinger, R. and Walter, W. (1988). A theorem of La Salle-Lyapunov type for
parabolic systems. Journal of Mathematical Analysis, 2, 121–132.
170
[38] Taylor, D. P. and Jonker, B. L. (1978). Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics.
Mathematical Biosciences, 40, 145–156.
[39] von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944). The theory of games and economic behavior.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[40] Wang M., Huang Y. and Wu Z. (2015). 2D Yeast Cooperation Game. Submitted.
[41] Zeeman, E. C. (1980). Population dynamics from game theory. Global theory of dynamical
systems (Proc. Internat. Conf., Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill., 1979), Springer-Verlag, 471–
497.
[42] Anders, S. and Huber, W. (2010). Differential expression analysis for sequence count data.
Genome Biol., 11, R106.
[43] Bouskill, N. J., Tang, J., Riley, W. J., Brodie, E. L. (2012). Trait-based representation of bio-
logical nitr fication: Model development testing, and predicted community composition. Front.
Microbiol., 3, 364.
[44] Bullard, H. J., Purdom, E., Hansen, D. K. and Dudoit, S. (2010). Evaluation of statistical methods
for normalization and differential expression in mrna-seq experiments. BMC Bioinformatics, 11,
94.
[45] Park B. J. & Lord D. (2008). Adjustment for the maximum likelihood estimate of the negative
binomial dispersion parameter. Texas A & M University.
[46] Bullard, H. J., Purdom, E., Hansen, D. K. and Dudoit, S. (2010). Species distribution models:
Ecological explanation and prediction across space and time. Annu. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. , 40,
677-697.
[47] Faust, K. and Raes, J.(2012). Microbial interactions: From networks to models. Nat. Rev.
Microbiol., 10, 538–550.
[48] Hofbauer, J., Schuster, P. and Sigmund, K. (1979). A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and
Game Dynamics. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 80, 609–612.
171
[49] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary games and population dynammics. Cambridge
University Press, 62–66.
[50] Jolliffe, I. T. (2002). Principal Component Analysis. New York:Springer-Verlag.
[51] Klitgord, N. and Segre, D. (2010). Environments that induce synthetic microbial ecosystems.
PLOS Comput. Biol., 6(11), e1001002.
[52] Larsen, P. E., Field, D. and Gilbert, J. A. (2010). Predicting bacterial community assemblages
using an artificial neural network approach. Nat. Methods, 9, 621–625.
[53] Larowe, D. E., Dale, A. W. and Regnier, P. (2008). A thermodynamic analysis of the anaerobic
oxidation of methane in marine sediments. Geobiology, 6, 436–449.
[54] Marino, S., Baxter, N., Huffnagle, G., Petrosino, J. and Schloss, P. (2014). Mathematical modeling
of primary succession of murine intestinal microbiota. PNAS, 111(1), 439–444.
[55] Marioni, J. S., Mason, C. E., Mane, S. M., Stephens, M. and Gilad, Y. (2008). Rna-seq: an
assessment of technical reproducibility and comparison with gene expression arrays. Genome
Res., 18, 1509–1517.
[56] Miao, H., Xia, X., Perelson, S. A. and Wu, H. (2011). On Identifiability of Nonlinear ODE
Models and Applications in Viral Dynamics. SIAM Rev, 53(1), 3-39.
[57] Nelder, J. A. and Lee, Y. (1992). Likelihood, quasi-likelihood and pseudolikelihood: some com-
parisons. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 54, 273–284.
[58] Nowak, M. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 314, 1560–1563.
[59] Ramsay, J., Hooker, G., Campbell, D. and Cao, J. (2007). Parameter estimation for differential
equations: a generalized smoothing approach. J. R. Statist. Soc. B, 69, 741–796.
[60] Robinson, M. D., and Smyth, G. K. (2008). Small-sample estimation of negative binomial disper-
sion, with applications to sage data. Biostatistics, 26, 321–332.
172
[61] Si, Y., Liu, P., Li, P. and Brutnell, P. T. (2014). Model-based clustering for RNA-seq data.
Bioinformatics, 30, 197–205.
[62] Stolyar, S., van Dien, S., Hillesland, K.L., Pinel, N., Lie, T. J., Leigh, J. A., Stahl, D. A. (2007).
Metabolic modeling of a mutualistic microbial community. Mol. Syst. Biol., 3, 92.
[63] Song H. S., Cannon R. W., Beliaev, S. A. and Konopka A. (2014). Mathematical Modeling of
Microbial Community Dynamics: A Methodological Review. Processes, 2(4), 711–752.
[64] Taylor, D. P. and Jonker, B. L. (1978). Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics.
Mathematical Biosciences, 40, 145–156.
[65] Zeeman, E. C. (1980). Population dynamics from game theory, in Global theory of dynamical
systems. Springer Lecture Notes in Mathematics Vol. 819. Heidelberg: Springer.
[66] Besag, J. (1974). Spatial interaction and the analysis of lattice systems. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series B, 36, 192–236.
[67] Brown. J. S., Sanderson, M. J., and Michod, R. E. (1982). Evolution of social behavior by
reciprocation. Journal of theoretical biology, 99, 319–339.
[68] Cressie, N. (1993). Statistics for spatial data. Wiley Interscience.
[69] Durrett, R. and Levin, S. (1997). Allelopathy in spatially distributed populations. J. Theor. Biol.,
185, 165–171.
[70] Ferguson, T. S. (1967). Mathematical Statistics: A Decision Theoretic Approach. Academic
Press.
[71] Ferriere, R. and Michod, R. E. (2000). Wave patterns in spatial games and the evolution of coop-
eration. The geometry of ecological interaction, simplifying spatial complexity, Eds. Dieckmann,
U., Law, R., and Metz, J.A.J., Cambridge.
[72] Gaetan, C. and Guyon, X. (2010). Spatial statistics and modeling. Springer.
173
[73] Hauert, C. H. (2002). Effects of space in 2 × 2 games. International Journal of Bifurcation and
Chaos, 12(7), 1531–1548.
[74] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge.
[75] Kaiser, M. S. and Cressie, N. (2000). The construction of multivariate distributions from Markov
random fields. Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 73, 199–220.
[76] Kaiser, M. S. and Caragea, P. (2007). Exploring dependence with data on spatial lattice. Technical
report, Iowa State University.
[77] Kaiser, M. S. and Caragea, P. (2009). Exploring dependence with data on spatial lattice. Biomet-
rics, 65, 857–865.
[78] Kaiser, M. S., Lahiri, S. N. and Nordman, D. J. (2012). Goodness of fit tests for a class of Markov
random field models. Annals of Statistics, 40(1),104–130.
[79] Kaiser, M. S., Pazdernik, K. T., Hoeksema, A. B., and Nutter, F. W. (2014). Modeling the spread
of plant disease using a sequence of binary random fields with absorbing state. Spatial Statistics,
9, 38–50.
[80] Nowak, M. A. and May, R. M. (1992). Evolutionary games and spatial chaos. Nature, 359,
826–829.
[81] Nowak, M. A., Bonhoeffer, S. and May, R. M. (1994). Spatial games and maintenance of cooper-
ation. P.Natl.Acad.Sci.USA., 91, 4877–4881.
[82] Nowak, M. A. (2008). Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life. Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
[83] Roca, C. P., Cuesta, J. A. and Sanchez, A. (2009). Effect of spatial structure on the evolution of
cooperation. Physical review E, 80, 046106.
[84] Berman, A. and Plemmons, R. J. (1979). Nonnegative Matrices in the Mathematical Sciences.
Academic Press.
174
[85] Bomze, I. (2002). Regularity vs. degeneracy in dynamics, games, and optimization: A unified
approach to different aspects. SIAM Review, 44, 394–414.
[86] Borwein, J. M. (1982). Necessary and sufficient conditions for quadratic minimality. Numer.
Funct. Anal. Optim., 5 ,127–140.
[87] Boyd, S. and Vandeberghe, L. (2004). Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press.
[88] Campbell, N. A., Reece, J. B., Urry, L. A., Cain, M. L., Wasserman, S. A., Minorsky, P. V. and
Jackson, R. B. (2008). Biology, 8th edition. Pearson Education Inc..
[89] Ewens, W. J. (2004). Mathematical Population Genetics. New York: Springer-Verlag.
[90] Fisher, R. A. (1930). The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[91] Hardy, G. H. (1908). Mendelian proportions in a mixed population. Zeitschrift fur Induktive
Abstammungs- und Vererbungslehre, 1, p395.
[92] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge
University Press.
[93] Maynard Smith, J. and Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246, 15–18.
[94] Motzkin, T. and Straus, E. (1965). Maxima for graphs and a new proof of a theorem of Tura´n.
Canadian J. Math., 17 (1965), 533–540.
[95] Murty, K. G. and Kabadi, S. N. (1987). Some NP-complete problems in quadratic and linear
programming. Math. Programming, 39 (1987), 117–129.
[96] Nash, J. (1950). Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 36, 48–49.
[97] Nocedal, J. and Wright, S. J. (2006). Numerical Optimization. New York: Springer-Verlag.
[98] Pardalos, P., Ye, Y. and Han, C. (1991). Algorithms for the solution of quadratic knapsack
problems. Linear Algebra and Its Applications, 152, 69–91.
175
[99] Sandholm, W. H. (2010). Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. The MIT Press.
[100] Templeton, A. R. (2006). Population Genetics and Microevolutionary Theory. John Wiley &
Sons Inc..
[101] Trefethen, L. N. and Bau III, D. (1997). Numerical Linear Algebra. SIAM, 1997.
[102] Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. The MIT Press.
[103] Weinberg, W. (1908). Aber den nachweis der vererbung beim menschen. Jahreshefte des Vereins
fur vaterlandische Naturkunde in Wurttemberg, 64, 368–382.
[104] Bomze, I. M., Budinich, M., Pardalos, P. M., and Pelillo, M. (1999). The maximum clique
problem. Handbook of Combinatorial Optimization 4, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1–74.
[105] Bomze, I. (2002). Regularity vs. degeneracy in dynamics, games, and optimization: A unified
approach to different aspects. SIAM Review, 44, 394–414.
[106] Broom, M., Cannings, C., and Vickers, G. T. (1993). On the number of local maxima of a
constrained quadratic form. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, 443, 573–584.
[107] Fletcher, R. (2000). Practical Methods of Optimization. Wiley.
[108] Garey, M. R. and Johnson, D. S. (1979). Computer and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of
NP-Completeness. W. H. Freeman and Company.
[109] Hidalgo, C. (2011). Networks, Complexity and Its Applications. Springer.
[110] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998). Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cam-
bridge University Press.
[111] Huang, Y., Hao, Y., Wang, M., Zhou, W., and Wu, Z. (2015). Optimality and stability of
symmetric evolutionary games with applications in genetic selection. Journal of Mathematical
Biosciences and Engineering, 12(3).
[112] Lewis, T. G. (2009), Network Science: Theory and Applications. Wiley.
176
[113] Motzkin, T. S. and Straus, E. G. (1965). Maxima for graphs and a new proof of a theorem of
Turan. Canadian Journal of Mathematics, 17, 533–540.
[114] Nocedal, J. and Wright, S. J. (2006). Numerical Optimization. Springer.
[115] Pardalos, P., Ye, Y., and Han, C. (1991). Algorithms for the solution of quadratic knapsack
problems. Linear Algebra and Its Applications,152, 69–91.
[116] Sandholm, W. H. (2010). Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics. The MIT Press.
[117] Scott, J. (2000). Social Network Analysis: A Handbook. SAGE Publication Ltd.
[118] Vickers, G. T. and Cannings, C. (1988). On the number of stable equilibria in a one-locus,
multi-allelic system. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 131, 273–277.
[119] Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994). Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications.
Cambridge University Press.
[120] Weibull, J. W. (1995). Evolutionary Game Theory. The MIT Press.
177
PUBLICATION LIST
Peer Reviewed Journal Articles
[1] Y. Huang, Y. Hao, M. Wang, W. Zhou and Z. Wu. Optimality and stability of symmetric evolu-
tionary games with applications in genetic selection. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering,
12(3).
[2] M. Wang, Y. Huang, Y. Hao, W. Zhou and Z. Wu. Evolution of social cliques. Journal of
Optimization Theory and Applications, under review.
[3] M. Wang, Y. Huang and Z. Wu. 2D Yeast cooperation games model. To be submitted.
[4] M. Wang and Z. Wu, ESS in Nonlinear Game and the Adapted Replicator Diffusion Equation.
To be submitted.
Papers in Preparation
[5] M. Wang and K. Dorman. Parameter estimation in dynamical metagenomic model. In prepara-
tion.
[6] M. Wang, W. Zhou, et al. A statistical method on modeling of evolutionary games: Markov
random field model. In preparation.
